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ABSTRACT
Relative Deprivation, Relative Gratification, Status, and Health
by
Samuel Holland
Dr. Jeffrey M. Kern, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The role of perceived inequity in health was assessed and compared to other social
constructs predicted to be relevant in the relationship between inequity and health. Four
studies were conducted that demonstrated that a social comparison-based measure of
relative deprivation (RD) and relative gratification (RG) can predict health and continues
to do so even after accounting for perceived stress, personal income, perceived control,
and social participation. A measure of RD/RG was developed that was based on
prominent social comparisons and objects of comparison. This measure was reliable and
predictive of health in two samplings of different populations. Comparisons of the
RD/RG measure to other measures are explored and future directions in health inequity
research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Social comparisons may have a significant impact on health. Social research is
rich with examples of inaccuracies in self-perceptions. Davis (1966) found that when
comparing students‟ career aspirations across colleges, career aspirations were lower at
the prestigious schools. This is despite the reality that career prospects are often better
for students attending more prestigious colleges. Academy award winners might live, on
average, four years longer than the runners up (Redelmeir & Singh, 2001) despite the
fact that academy award winners and the runners up are all successful in their field and
are all likely to be quite wealthy. Marmot‟s (2005) review of his Whitehall and
Whitehall II studies of British civil servants found that as job position increased, so did
life span. One could do a lot worse than having a well-paid and benefit-rich position
with the British civil service. The relationship between perceived social standing and
health may be through observations of others.
People are surrounded by social information- the available communications
about others. People are constantly exposed to opportunities to receive information
about others- directly and indirectly, deliberate and not. For example, when one sees a
man driving an expensive car this may be indirectly stating that he has a lot of money or
maybe that he is very shallow (perhaps one derives both conclusions from seeing this).
The interpretations of social information vary. One person may derive a very different
conclusion than another person from the same social information.
In studies comparing industrialized countries the amount of equity within the
country increases comparably to mortality rates (Wilkinson, 2005). In all of the
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industrialized countries used in the study, a threshold of wealth had been achieved (i.e.,
the standard of living was sufficient to attain basic services such as food, clean water,
and medical care). On a smaller scale, neighborhoods in the United States show a similar
effect (Diez-Roux, Nieto, Muntaner, Tyroler, Comstock, Shahar, Cooper, Watson, &
Szklo, 1997). As the disadvantage of the neighborhood increased, so too did the
incidence of coronary heart disease (CHD). This effect remained after controlling for
personal income, education, and occupation. Macintyre, Ellaway and Cummins (2002)
contended that the perception of a neighborhood was one of the major factors
contributing towards the residents‟ health.
This status health disparity may not be uniquely human. The relationship
between status and health is found even among primates (Abbott, Keverne, Bercovitch,
Shively, Mendoza, Saltzman, Snowdon, Ziegler, Banjevic, Garland, & Sapolsky, 2003).
Higher status primates live longer than primates of lower status. Status seems to
influence health in non-human primates primarily through access to social support,
which increases safety and resources. With status comes additional access to material
and emotional resources. In humans, this status effect may be compounded by the stress
of not meeting one‟s own expectations, since people generally do not dream of being
low on the totem pole. This stress may lower the immune system‟s efficiency, increasing
illness and death (Cassell, 1976).
Marmot (2005) contended that there exists a status syndrome- one‟s perceived
control (autonomy) and the ability to participate in socially important activities (social
participation) has profound effects on health (both increase as one‟s social standing
improves). As an example of social participation, members of the American middle class
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might consider vacations and new clothes as entitlements. When one is unable (or rather,
when one believes one is unable) to engage in these activities, health may be
compromised from reduced social networks and attenuated immune functioning. This is
not a poor vs. rich dichotomy but a health gradient. Incremental changes in status have
corresponding health effects. While other factors contribute to health, Marmot argued
that these factors are related to status. For example, education and parent‟s health all
contribute to one‟s status (as well the inverse; status contributes to one‟s ability to bad
wording education and the health of family). Money is another important predictor of
health, but this relationship tapers off in industrialized societies once a general
affordability of basic needs and services is achieved (Wilkinson, 2005).
While a relationship between social standing and health has been identified, we
do not yet understand how two affluent people in a wealthy country could have different
health just because one has a little more money. The next step in fully understanding the
relationship between health and status is identifying the causal mechanism by which a
psychological variable (perceived status) affects a biological variable (health). While
there has been considerable progress in the last ten years in identifying the biological
responses to psychological phenomena (Maier & Watkins, 1998) little progress has been
made in understanding how and why these responses occur. Understanding how status
affects health, however, requires understanding how a sense of status is derived. The act
of determining one‟s status- how and where one fits within a given group- is based on
interpretations of social information.
Social theories have emerged to explain the various uses of social information
and provide insight regarding how social information may influence health. Heider
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(1944) stated that there is a need for people to be able to predict their environment to
maximize outcomes. Social information may be a reflexive act that can affect health,
both positively and negatively. This process can and likely does occur without a
conscious awareness as people typically don‟t look at someone in an expensive car and
think: “He has a nice car and therefore is of a higher class than I am. I will now feel
worse about myself and start smoking two packs a day.”
Several social theories were developed to account for how and why people use
social information (Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Over time, many of these theories have
expanded to the point of overlapping into interconnected processes. In this review of the
varying theories, the primary focus is on the development of one of the more popular
social theories- social comparison theory (SCT). Under SCT, people compare
themselves to others for the purposes of determining if their opinions about the world
are accurate and to get a sense of their abilities (Festinger, 1954a). SCT predicts that
people all share a desire to improve their own abilities and look to others to get a sense
of what abilities can and should be improved.
SCT predicts that social comparisons can result in changes in our emotional
state. Furthermore, modern SCT holds that the act of making social comparisons may be
unavoidable. If people are presented with social information they do not like, then they
may change their perceptions to accommodate self-esteem. For example, if one makes a
comparison and does not like the conclusion, that person may feel stressed that their
abilities are not up to par. From social comparisons several consequences may occur
because expectations are heavily influenced by what is observed in others. Besides
changes in self-esteem, social comparisons also affect one's perception of justice in the
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world. Like the theories of social information, the consequences of social comparison
are interconnected. Many studies support the notion that status is derived from social
comparisons, and distress derived from such comparisons is greater in lower status
individuals, thus compromising health.
Health inequity researchers have encountered considerable difficulties in
identifying a stable and consistent relationship between status and health (Marmot,
2005). A reason for this has been a difficulty in determining how status is derived. In
modern society status is not determined by birth or communicated by title. Furthermore,
an individual‟s status today varies by context. One may have a high-status at work but a
low-status in the family. In modern societies without formal class distinctions, status is
understated but still present. Modern status is social in nature; one‟s ranking within a
social hierarchy. Status is defined in part by occupation, as one‟s profession contributes
to autonomy and social participation. As Marmot stated “You may be the world‟s worst
parent or spouse, son or brother, but if you are the local doctor, you are somebody in the
community. You have something going for you that the street sweeper does not” (p.
121).
Marmot (2005) considered the link between social status and health to be a
consequence of higher social standing leading to greater autonomy and social
participation. These two perceptions then act on health by creating psychological states
that either hinder or enhance the immune system. I argue that status is derived from
social comparisons because these perceptions (i.e., social participation and perceived
control) are determined by seeing what one has and does.
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This paper outlines social comparison theory as the process by which status is
evaluated. The consequences of these social comparisons are proposed to be the primary
factor responsible for a social gradient in health. This argument is structured into three
sections. Section one is a review of SCT, section two outlines the consequences
(reactions) to social comparison, and section three is a review of the mechanism of stress
and health. This study is designed to measure the relationship between perceived
inequity, status, and health.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Social Comparison Theory
If humans in modern society evaluate status from social comparisons, then
understanding how and why social comparisons occur is imperative for predicting a
health gradient in status. The formal theoretical conception of social comparison is
attributed to Festinger (1954a). He postulated that social comparison occurred naturally
and for the purpose of self-enhancement. People prefer non-social comparisons,
comparisons made on objective standards such as scaled scores. Social comparisons,
however, are likely to be used when objective standards of comparison are unavailable
and when a model that is similar on some specific characteristic is available. For
example, a person determine if they passed a test simply by having a score above a
specific cutoff score the instructor deems as “passing” (objective comparison) but will
often ask other people how they did on the test (social comparison) to get a sense of how
they are did, and this will likely influence how they feel about their performance. If a
person barely passed a test they might feel good if no one else passed, but not if
everyone else scored very well.
SCT is intertwined with Festinger‟s previous theory, informal social
communication (1950). Informal social communication theory attempts to explain the
pressures towards conformity of opinion among a group. Festinger contended that this
desire for conformity exists because people have a need for social reality and group
locomotion. Stated another way, people try to agree on what is real and have a sense of
moving forward in thought with a group. The group sends “communications” to
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members, and these communications are especially salient to an individual that is out of
step. For example, imagine that someone is dressing outside the social reality (or social
norm, as we are more apt to call it today) and, consequently, given subtle cues that this
behavior is not appropriate for the group (e.g., sneers, condescending talk, and a general
lack of respect). They are behaviors, to be sure, but motivated by opinion and serve as a
pressure towards uniformity to dress in more socially-acceptable ways.
SCT does not conflict with informal social communication theory (Wheeler,
2000). Rather, SCT is an expansion. While informal social communication theory
concerned attitudes, SCT includes abilities and behaviors as well as attitudes (Festinger,
1954a). This is the reason for changing the term communications to comparisons. Social
comparisons occur from an internal motivation to know that one‟s opinions are correct
and to understand one‟s capabilities. This motivation is not social in nature, but is
satisfied with social comparisons in the absence of personal experience.
Festinger‟s original publication on SCT (1954a) is considered difficult to
interpret. Suls and Wheeler (2000) described the effort as “brutal reading” (p. 5). The
more popular treatment of SCT is a symposium paper published in the same year by
Festinger (1954b). In it, social comparison theory was outlined under five tenets:
1. This social process arises when the evaluation of opinions or abilities is not
feasible by testing directly in the environment.
2. Under such circumstances persons evaluate their opinions and abilities by
comparison with others.
3. This comparison leads to pressures toward uniformity.
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4. There is a tendency to stop comparing oneself with others who are very
divergent. This tendency increases if others are perceived as different from
oneself in relevant dimensions.
5. Factors such as importance, relevance and attraction to a group which affect
the strength of the original motivation will affect the strength of the pressure
towards uniformity. (p. 217)
The symposium paper left out the notion of the unidirectional drive upward for
abilities, the consistent desire for improvement. This notion that there is a drive upwards
for abilities was discussed Festinger‟s formal publication (1954a). This drive upwards
was only for abilities. That there is not a drive upwards for opinions is logical given the
assumption that social comparison is used differently for abilities (gauge of potential)
than opinions (gauge of accuracy).
Shortly after introducing SCT, Festinger published a paper describing cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance is a state of discomfort
experienced when one realizes an opinion they held may not be true or engages in a
behavior that conflicts with their beliefs. The theory attempts to predict the efforts one
will engage in to reduce this discomfort. Cognitive dissonance theory is similar to SCT
in the evaluation of opinions. While SCT supplanted informal social communication
theory as an explanatory model, dissonance theory does not supplant SCT because it
does not consider the role of other people (Wheeler, 1991). Cognitive dissonance is a
complimenting theory to SCT, not a successor as SCT was to informal social
communication theory.
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Though Festinger (1954a) introduced SCT, it was the efforts of many other
researchers that tested the theory. The original conception of SCT provided a framework
for understanding the need and the nature of what may be an unavoidable behavior. The
theory, however, was vague about the dynamics of these comparisons. Indeed, following
Festinger‟s publication, (1954a), the theory went uninvestigated. Festinger himself
pursued the development of the study of cognitive dissonance. As Wheeler (1991) noted,
“social comparison theory went nowhere” (p. 6). Wheeler (2000) credits the
development of SCT to the efforts of Schachter, who taught a yearlong graduate seminar
at the University of Minnesota in 1960. These students began testing the tenants of SCT;
further developing and refining the theory.
Festinger (1954a) posited that one makes comparisons to others to understand
how one‟s abilities and opinions align with the world and provide a reference for
improvement. Consequently, SCT stops when a group is very divergent from the self.
Social researchers challenged these predictions. Specifically, early research explored
whether SCT is performed upwards or downwards (Wheeler, 1991). Another issue was
similarity or the degree to which the comparer identifies with the compared. Subsequent
research explored when and why one might make a comparison with someone deemed
dissimilar.
Major advances have been made in the study of SCT since Festinger‟s (1954a)
initial offering, such to the point that many tenets of SCT now incorporate the tenets of
other social process theories. Studies exploring the direction of comparisons led to SCT
expanding to include emotional consequences from comparisons (Wheeler, 1991). This
occurred because the reason one makes comparisons varies, in part, by affective state
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and this information was necessary for predicting the direction of comparisons. The
similarity assumption between comparer and compared underwent revision as well,
mostly in reconsidering who is “similar”. SCT initially described a process of earnest
self-assessment to similar others and was revised to describe an unavoidable process
manipulated to maintain and enhance self-esteem as well evaluate opinions and abilities.
These changes are so vast that some argue that the current interpretation of SCT is a
different theory than the original conception put forward by Festinger. Wheeler (1991)
referred to Festinger‟s (1954a) social comparison for opinion validation and ability
estimation as classical social comparison theory and the later researcher‟s emphasis on
positive affect and ego enhancement as neo-social comparison theory. These changes
are reviewed here to establish a basic understanding of modern SCT and to
conceptualize how SCT can influence health.
The major advances in SCT since Festinger‟s (1954a) paper will be reviewed
here in the following order:
-

Direction of comparisons

-

Similarity

-

Influence of Emotion

-

Individual differences

-

Measurement Issues

Direction of Comparisons
One primary issue in social comparison literature is the direction of comparison.
Festinger‟s (1954a) SCT was initially interpreted as meaning that comparisons are
upwards in nature (Wheeler, 1991). Upward comparisons suggests that one is
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comparing themselves on a comparison dimension to people or thing that they deem to
be higher in rank or status. This was one of the first predictions tested by the Minnesota
students, who developed what is now known as the rank-order paradigm. This is a test of
comparison direction by which participants believe they are being measured on some
trait and given a numerical score of performance and told where they ranked compared
to other participants (all participants were told the same score and rank). They are then
offered the opportunity to see the score of another by selecting a different rank. Wheeler
(1991) described his own development of the paradigm as one of the first published
(Wheeler, 1966). Wheeler tested participants in groups of seven on a measure of ability
to benefit from a psychology seminar. He manipulated student motivation to take the
seminar by the initial description of the class (either a very worthwhile class or not). All
subjects were told they ranked in the middle (ranked fourth) and given the rough scores
of the top and bottom. Participants were then asked which other participant‟s score they
would like to see. Participants overwhelmingly chose those of higher ranks, and this
effect was stronger for the highly motivated participants. This supported the notion of
upward comparisons.
Downward comparisons, those comparisons made towards someone or
something lower on status or ability, were also identified from Hawkmiller‟s (1966)
rank-order paradigm. Similar to other rank-order studies, participants completed a test of
ability and asked whose score in the ranking they would like to see. Hawkmiller
manipulated this design by informing participants they had performed poorly on the test.
In this condition, participants would often favor seeing the score of someone who
performed worse. This was considered by Hawkmiller to be defensive downward
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comparison, and is some of the earliest work that led to the study of the interaction
between affective states and comparison tendency. Goethals and Darley (1977) cited this
research as evidence for the utility of social information for self-esteem (the role of
research exploring downward comparisons in the incorporation of emotion into SCT is
discussed further in the section on emotion).
Wheeler (1991) commented that early SCT researchers‟ interest with
directionality may have been misguided. He noted that the issue of the direction of
comparison is derived from Festinger‟s (1954a) universal drive upwards. Festinger
seems to arrive at this conclusion from research prior to his publication of SCT, which
identified that people set their level of aspiration as slightly better than average (Lewin,
Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944). This is curious since beside the Lewin et al. (1944)
paper there is not much evidence for the drive upwards. Festinger himself did not seem
to support a universal drive upwards (Wheeler, 1991). The concept is absent from his
1954 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Festinger, 1954b) and was mentioned only
briefly in the formal publication of SCT (1954a). Regardless of the original intentions of
comparison directionality, current SCT posits upward, lateral, and downward
comparisons.
Similarity
A second issue in social comparison literature relates to how comparison objects
are chosen and the influence of perceived similarity. Goethals and Darley (1977)
restated SCT to incorporate tenets of attribution theory to better describe the how an
individual evaluates his or her opinions and abilities and how comparisons are chosen.
The tenets of Festinger (1954a) that addressed these issues were Hypothesis I, III, and
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VIII. Hypothesis I stated that “There exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate
his opinions and his abilities” (p. 117). Goethals and Darley (1977) agreed that one does
have a drive to reduce uncertainty about correctness of opinion and adequacy of
abilities, but one also has a desire to believe positive things concerning their opinions
and abilities as well as a need to have high self-esteem.
This need for a high self-image takes precedent over objective appraisal. One
will choose a comparison strategy where they see themselves as doing well over doing
poorly. Festinger (1954a) stated in hypothesis III stated: “The tendency to compare
oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion
or ability and one‟s own increases” (p. 120). Additionally, hypothesis IV stated: “If
persons who are very divergent from one‟s own opinion or ability are perceived as
different from oneself on attributes consistent with the divergence, the tendency to
narrow the range of comparability becomes stronger (p. 133, emphasis in original).
Goethals and Darley (1977) contended that these relate to the similarity hypothesis of
SCT which describe one‟s choice of a comparison other. They argued that similarity had
been interpreted by other researchers too literally, as one with similar scores on abilities
or opinions. Rather, the similarity hypothesis should be considered “when persons are
perceived to be similar to oneself on attributes related to an opinion or performance, the
tendency to compare with them increases” (p. 265). People decide who is a similar other
first, then weight the comparisons accordingly- the greater the estimated similarity the
greater the weight of the comparison. The previous interpretation of a similar other as
similar on the compared ability suffered from a paradox because seeking the
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performance of another was a comparison, yet it is not until one learns of another‟s
performance that one can gauge if the person is indeed similar.
Goethals and Darley (1977) reconsidered SCT from the perspective of attribution
theory. This was deemed important because in the actual evaluation of opinions and
abilities one is really evaluating dispositions, not objective performance. Ability is nonobservable and therefore not directly comparable. Because of this lack of direct
comparison, the extent to which a person judges another to be performing well is
attributional- one attributes a performance as part ability and part situational factors.
Attribution theory provides insight into how one may “divvy up” performance, and
therefore is helpful in understanding SCT. Attribution theory attempts to explain the
methods one uses for evaluating the causes of others‟ responses as well as one‟s own
responses (Kelley, 1973). Opinion comparisons are also under attribution but not in the
same way as abilities because opinion statements are directly observable. However,
evaluations of one‟s opinion systems- a person's values and intelligence- are essentially
opinion comparisons but involve a greater degree of attribution about the causes of the
opinion statements than single opinion comparisons. So while opinion comparisons do
not involve much attribution, opinion systems do have a substantive attribution
component.
Attribution theory and SCT have several commonalities. Both include a need to
understand and predict the environment and base the quality of opinions and abilities on
social information. The theory‟s emphasis on the evaluation of performance led
Goethals and Darley (1977) to recommend the above-described modifications to SCT.
They proposed that SCT‟s drive to evaluate opinions and abilities be expanded to
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include a desire to validate them as well. The similarity hypothesis was expanded such
that an individual will prefer comparing with those who are perceived to be similar on
attributes that are related to their opinion or performance level. Similar others are not
based on performance, but attributed ability. One who is perceived as dissimilar and
performed better would have other traits that could be used as an explanation for the
success (discounting). However, if the dissimilar other‟s performance was worse; this
could be used to boost one‟s image if they considered the differences as inhibitory.
Therefore, a dissimilar other could be used for comparison.
During the 1970s, the tenets of SCT were revised to incorporate affective states
and, in doing so, revised the assumption of similarity (Wheeler, 2000). Goethals and
Darley (1977) emphasized the role of self-esteem in selection of social information. SCT
therefore expanded from self-assessment to also the use of social comparisons for selfevaluation. As described previously, people will make downward comparisons when
they were told their performance was sub-standard (Hakmiller, 1966). Goethals and
Darley (1977) suggested that this was done to avoid drawing the conclusion that one is
inferior. They extended this notion to argue that there is a tendency to view others‟ as
more advantaged in non-ability factors than reality, in order to maximize satisfaction
with success and minimize upset with failure. The inclusion of downward comparisons
led to the incorporation of attribution theory into SCT, to explain why downward
comparisons would occur if people were attempting to objectively evaluate abilities
(people are, but only to the point that self-esteem becomes threatened). SCT and selfesteem were now related in theory, and research explored the emotional influences of
social comparisons as well as the influence of social comparisons on emotions.
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Influence of Emotion
A third development of SCT research is the exploration of the emotional
consequences and antecedents of social comparisons. Again, studies of comparison
direction facilitated this development. Wills (1981) identified downward social
comparisons that were made for the purposes of self-enhancement. Wills theorized that
subjective well-being can be enhanced when a comparison is made to a less fortunate
other (Wills, 1991). He also suggested that people make lateral comparisons. He defined
downward comparison as “comparison with a target who is worse off on at least one
dimension” and lateral comparison as “comparison with one who is also experiencing
problems, but is at the same level as the self on a given dimension” (p. 56-57).
Wills (1991) did not disagree with the notion of upward comparisons; but
downward comparisons also occur, particularly when one is distressed and the objective
situation is not immediately remedied by action. Therefore, if one cannot change their
condition or position, one will instead change perception until one‟s well-being is
perceived as improved. For example, if one finds they have run into a financial crisis, an
“it could be worse…” thought might be used to help ease the pain of the situation. A
comparison direction, then, is based on the context. Upward comparisons occurred under
select situations where the individual does not have much at stake in the outcome.
Downward comparisons occur when one is stressed or threatened, and self-esteem is
linked to comparison process. Lateral comparisons were hypothesized to occur in similar
situations as downward. Wills (1991), however, identified two reasons that might
influence preference of one type of comparison over the other. First, that there is a
natural primacy of downward comparisons available. People generally prefer downward
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comparisons to lateral ones. Second, the intended purpose of the comparison also
influences which type of comparison will be made, such as if the purpose is for
improving life-satisfaction or self-perceptions. Downward comparisons are likely
superior than lateral ones for improving life satisfaction because they provide evidence
that one‟s situation could be worse, and is therefore not as bad as it could be. Lateral
comparisons are superior for self-perception issues because of a validation one‟s
problems are common and occur in others. In the example of having a financial crisis, a
lateral comparison would be thinking of other peers that also have financial problems,
thus delegating the crisis to a “par for the course” mentality.
Not all downward comparisons are equal in impact. A downward comparison to
a friend who is perceived as doing worse does not carry the same weight as a
comparison to a homeless person seen on the street. The degree of discrepancy between
a person and their downward comparison influences the amount of improved selfevaluation (Wills, 1991). Generally, downward comparisons improve self-evaluation no
matter how different the person or group but there is a point where the compared is so
far inferior in ability that empathy is felt instead. Typically, one makes downward
comparisons with individuals who are slightly-to-moderately worse on a comparison
dimension to improve life satisfaction. In the short-term, negative mood is reduced but
positive mood is not necessarily increased (though Wills contended it is possible).
Downward comparisons, therefore, are negatively reinforcing.
Wills (1991) did not make any specific postulates about the long-term effects of
downward comparisons. However, life-satisfaction comparisons are likely based on lifesituations, enduring factors such as income and family. As such, an enduring effect may
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be created from short-term effects. Wills posited that upward comparisons are necessary
for one‟s assessment of ability to be grounded in the real world, and that people are
more likely to make such comparisons when the outcome is expected to be positive.
Should this not occur, one might engage in downward comparisons to protect or enhance
self-esteem.
Perhaps one of the most important follow ups to Festinger‟s (1954a) work on
social comparison theory is Brickman and Bulman‟s (1977) exploration of the
relationship between social comparison and emotion. A “google scholar” search
conducted in May 2008 identified 211 relevant references to the author‟s work in
multiple research topics including self-esteem (Rasmussen, Willingham, & Glover,
1996), career-oriented behavior (Buunk, Peiró, & Griffioen, 2007), race relations
(Okami, 1992), body image (Eisert & Kahle, 1982), and self-perceived health (Powers,
2004). The reason for the popularity of this publication is the authors‟ emphasis on
shifting the focus of social comparison to the consequences derived and the natural
conditions under which the phenomenon occurs.
The initial interpretations of Festinger‟s (1954a) postulates of social comparison
were perhaps an optimistic interpretation of the phenomenon. Social comparison was
outlined by Festinger to be used for opinion and ability evaluation with similar others.
Later researchers assumed a preference for upward comparisons because these were
towards superior others and therefore one could look upon them and attempt to
understand how one‟s own abilities might be raised. Brickman and Bulman (1977)
acknowledged these conditions exist and furthered the expanse of social comparison
theory by contending that the opposite of each of these postulates was also true: people
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will also make social comparisons for self-evaluation, make comparisons downward,
and will make comparisons to dissimilar others. A person is exposed to a multitude of
social information and social comparison is possibly an inevitable element of social
interaction. The social comparisons made and their interpretation is influenced by the
perceived cost of the social comparison. Therefore, social comparison is selected based
upon the intended goal of the person- self-evaluation or self-improvement.
The natural conditions by which social comparison occur were formally brought
to the forefront of social researcher interest with Brickman and Bulman's (1977) work.
The traditional approach of studying social comparison at the time was the rank order
paradigm where participants take a test, are told where they fall in the distribution of
scores, and are then asked who else‟s score they would like to see. Such research
supported the desire for upwards comparisons (Wheeler, 1966) though had also
demonstrated downwards comparison (Hawkmiller, 1966). Brickman and Bulman
(1977) criticized this approach for neglecting the role of social interaction and creating
situations of “low cost”- comparisons in which participants are not particularly invested.
For example, a somewhat well documented effect in social comparison research is the
tendency of people to prefer to wait alone after receiving a test score than when they
have not received the score (Gerard, 1963). This finding had been interpreted as a
satiation of social comparison, but Brickman and Bulman (1977) countered this could
also be evidence of social comparison avoidance.
Brickman and Bulman (1977) attributed the failure to identify avoidance of
social comparison to the assumption that social comparison is only used to attain
accurate appraisals of performance (Festinger, 1954a). Social comparison research had
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been biased by an over-emphasis on rational processes. Another reason for the lack of
studies of social comparison avoidance is the relevance on experimental settings, where
avoiding a comparison is difficult or impossible. For example, in rank-order paradigm
experiments the ability to avoid social comparison has been essentially removed, as the
comparison processes have been made salient by virtue of the procedure. Social
facilitation may also have contributed, as participants may have been unwilling to admit
they were not interested in making comparisons.
As evidence of avoidance of social comparison, Brickman and Bulman (1977)
provided general anecdotal evidence as well as experimental. As anecdotal evidence,
they noted that social norms have emerged in society that limits one‟s ability to attain
social information, such as the stigma about asking another‟s income or asking about
sex. Such norms are evidence that people do sometimes avoid social comparison. This
information, however, is still attainable. Information obtained through gossip has no
self-disclosure to the referent. Common gossip topics are the same topics that are social
stigmatized in polite conversation- money and sex. Gossip, then, is bootleg social
information. Though impolite, gossiping is preferable to mutual disclosure because the
social cost is lower. As experimental evidence, the authors reviewed research performed
by Brickman and Kessler (1977), which tested preference for disclosure of test scores by
performing a variant of the rank order paradigm. Instead of assuming a score revelation,
participants were placed in groups that did or did not anticipate having to reveal their
test score and whether or not the participant anticipated learning others test scores. This
created the groups of mutual disclosure, self-disclosure without receiving social
comparison information, receiving social comparison information without self-
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disclosure. It was this emphasis on naturalistic conditions that facilitated the emphasis
on the emotional consequences of social comparison. Specifically, how individuals seek
social information while minimizing the psychological and social costs involved.
According to Brickman and Bullman (1977), people will affiliate themselves
with certain groups, form coalitions, and compete based on maximizing a sense of self.
This conception was neither supported nor rejected by Festinger‟s (1954a) original
conception of SCT. Festinger did describe social comparison as occurring naturally and
for the purpose of self-enhancement and people have a drive upwards for improving
their abilities. It is unlikely, however, that Festinger lacked the cynicism to consider
people as more interested in being seen well than objectively doing well. Festinger
(1954a) stated, “those who could not view themselves positively would have deep
feelings of failure” (p. 157). His subsequent dissonance theory did address a similar
notion that consensus was more desired than accuracy (Goethals, Messick, & Allison,
1991). Dissonance theory posits that people will justify their feelings or behavior by
adjusting cognitions, and is founded on the notion that perceptions will be altered for the
purpose of maintaining or improving self-image. As with comparison directionality, it is
possible that the development of SCT to include the influence of emotion may have been
originally considered by Festinger. Regardless, incorporating affect into SCT expanded
the purpose of social comparisons from being useful for attaining candid self-assessment
to defending self-image. With self-esteem as an influencing role in the types of social
comparisons as well as the conclusions drawn from them, other individual differences
were considered for how they relate to SCT.
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Individual Differences
A fourth issue in social comparison literature is the role of individual differences.
Individual differences refer to the ways individual people differ in their behavior and
include personality traits (such as self-esteem) and perceptions (such as worldview). The
variations in social comparison stem from a desire for individuals to view themselves
positively. Modern SCT suggests that the type of comparison, the direction, and the
conclusion will be selected to maximize positive assessment. This conceptualization
implies that individuals will favor self-serving comparisons over realistic assessments up
to the point a reconcilable conflict with reality is created. Put simply, people would
rather believe they are doing well more than they want to do well. The term “well” is
defined here loosely as “better than average”.
The utility of social comparison in self-esteem is constrained by reality. Klein
and Kunda (1993) found that people would revise their own estimates of how often they
engaged in a desired behavior when informed that the majority of people similarly
engage in the behavior. Thus, people will create self-serving perceptions of others and
themselves. Goethals and Klein (2000) stated that there is a “balance between the careful
logic and rational that people sometimes bring to social comparison versus the irrational
and biased thinking that just as often affects the way they compare to others” (p. 23).
The study of downward comparison and the emotional consequences associated
with it also contributed greatly to an increased interest in the study of individual
differences in SCT (Wheeler, 2000). Goethals (1986) explored reality constraints of
SCT as related to the prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner‟s dilemma is a social experiment
where a person role-plays they are a prisoner of the police after committing a crime and
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is separated from their cohort and both are offered a deal (Poundstone, 1992). Whoever
talks to the prosecution will be offered a reduced sentence. If one testifies (defects) for
the prosecution while the cohort remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent
accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent (cooperates), both
prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If both choose to
defect, each receives a five-year sentence. Participants in the prisoner‟s dilemma
determine which the best course of action is. Goethals (1986) found that people playing
the prisoner‟s dilemma would underestimate the proportion of people playing
cooperatively, regardless if the participant played cooperatively. Both groups considered
cooperation to be a positive ability. Thus, Goethals concluded that people underestimate
the proportion of individuals doing well and overestimate the uniqueness of their own
strengths, since those who cooperated also committed the underestimation, which he
termed uniqueness bias (UB).
Goethals et al. (1991) defined UB as “reality-constrained self-deception” (p.
162). The UB was stronger for traits that are difficult to objectively measure (such as
kindness and cooperation, “would” behaviors) than those more easily ascertained (such
as intelligence, “could” behaviors). Thus, self-evaluations are self-serving but reality
constrained. The level of reality constraint varies because the level of precision in the
measurement of an ability or opinion will vary. For example, college students have more
assessments of intelligence, such as standardized test scores and GPA, than many other
individuals. Therefore, a college student would likely have greater difficulty in
manipulating intelligence ability comparisons than a non-student who has fewer
measures present in his environment. The college student would not be bound to
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accepting the truth, per se, as shifting comparison groups could provide an escape to the
conclusion that one is not intelligent. The reality constraint therefore also varies by
comparison groups.
UB has also been identified in other populations including primary school
attending children, high school children and middle management bankers (Goethals et
al., 1991). Several variations in UB were identified. The degree of UB concerning
intelligence across studies and was highest in the high school study. Overall, however,
the UB on intelligence was lower than the UB for moral and athletic items. Gender
effects were also identified. The males tended to differentiate themselves more (commit
a greater UB) for athletic and intellectual behaviors while females tended to have greater
UB for moral behaviors. The gender differences were consistent across the studied age
groups. According to Goethals et al. (1991), realistic social comparison is more common
when one is forced to confront comparative information. Laboratory experiments, such
as the rank-order paradigm, manipulate comparison and therefore make differences
salient. This laboratory design, however, may be too contrived to simulate day-to-day
comparisons.
Wheeler and Miyake (1992) attempted to measure social comparison as it
occurred naturally through diaries that participants kept for a two week period. The
participants were told before the study began that noticing a similarity or difference with
another is not necessarily a comparison unless followed by a psychological reaction (a
contentious point explored later). When a participant felt they had made a social
comparison they recorded the referent and dimension as well as their mood before and
after the comparison. Prominent referents (>5% of total responses) were close friends,
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ordinary friends, acquaintances, strangers, family members, imaginary persons,
significant partner, and famous persons. Prominent dimensions included academics,
personality, physical appearance, lifestyle, abilities, social skills, wealth, and opinion.
All of these comparison groups and dimensions of comparison were provided by the
authors with one exception. The “significant other” comparison group was identified as
a prominent comparison group through an “other (specify)” option in the questionnaire.
Sex differences were identified in comparisons. Women were statistically significantly
more likely to compare with a family member and men were more likely to compare
with a famous person. Women were also more likely to compare themselves on
appearance and men were more likely to compare on opinion. In terms of affect on
mood, participants were morel likely to make downward comparisons on friends than
anyone else.
The overall experience of recording social comparison was reported to be nonintrusive and reasonably valid. In post experimental follow up questions, participants
reported little difficult in recording comparisons, somewhat accurately, with little
interference in their daily lives and they did not experience an increased sensitivity to
social comparison in such a way as to change the number of comparisons. Participants
also did not report hesitation to report comparisons due to guilt. Self-report data of such
mental processes as social comparison may be difficult to measure, but this does suggest
that comparative processes can be measured through self-reports.
The finding by Wheeler and Miyake (1992) that downward comparisons were
made with friends is in conflict with Wills (1991) downward comparison theory which
predicts the opposite. Also, upward comparisons were more likely to occur when one
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felt bad and downward when they felt good, also in conflict with downward comparison
theory. Wheeler and Miyake (1992) suggested errors in reporting could have influenced
the results but proposed instead that mood states influence social judgments, and that
mood influenced self-assessment more than assessment of others. In their study, selfesteem was measured before the 2-week period started. Those with higher SE made
more downward comparisons and responded with more positive affect than those with
low SE.
This incongruence in prediction of the effects of downward comparison was
accounted for through individual differences (Wheeler, 200). Wills‟ (1981) work on
downward comparison suggests that low self-esteem individuals would make downward
comparisons for self-enhancement. Beck‟s (1976) cognitive model of depression,
however, holds that individuals with depressive symptoms are perceptually biased
against themselves and use upward comparisons to maintain this bias. These are
dysfunctional comparisons used to keep an individual from improving their self-worth.
These two theories make different predictions, and neither is incorrect. Rather, one‟s
state of self-esteem and depression both influence the kind of comparisons one makes.
Wheeler and Miyake (1992) found that one‟s self-esteem prior to a comparison
influenced the direction of the comparison. Those with high self-esteem made more
downward comparisons and were less bothered by lateral and upward comparisons (their
research is described in greater detail later).
Wheeler (2000) explored studies of social comparison and self-esteem and
identified an enduring tend: Downward comparisons are more likely to be made by
those with high self-esteem, are highly extroverted, and generally experience positive
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emotions. Upward comparisons, conversely, are more likely to occur among those with
low self-esteem (stable or unstable) and are highly agreeable. Highly agreeable people
are those that are not skeptical of others and do not believe themselves to be superior to
others and as such are more cooperative than competitive.
Neuroticism was the only trait found to predict affect of downward comparisons:
the positive effect of downward comparisons was greater for those high in neuroticism,
but neurotics did not make more downward comparisons than non-neurotic individuals
(Wheeler, 2000). Wheeler argued that neurotics have a stronger need for validation that
someone is worse off. Besides- or perhaps related to- neuroticism, other personality
traits influenced comparison choices. People that are dominate, competitive, and
ambitious compare downward when given a choice, as do extroverts. Though not as
consistent, upward comparisons are made by those with unstable self-esteem.
Self-esteem appears to be the predictor as well as the outcome of the choice in
upwards or downwards comparisons (Wheeler, 2000). High self-esteem is related to
downward comparison. People that have high self-esteem are more likely to use social
comparisons to maintain a high self-esteem when confronted with failure than those with
low self-esteem. Conversely, low self-esteem people will be enhanced after success
instead of failure and will make upward comparisons after poor performance (high selfesteem people will avoid these). Depressives are perhaps more willing to attain accurate
information at the cost to self image, or will seek this information deliberately (in line
with Beck‟s prediction). This incongruence is reconciled by acknowledging the role of
self-esteem in choice of comparisons.
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Beyond choice in comparison, self-esteem plays a role in the affect of
comparisons as well. Self-esteem dictates not only the choice in comparisons but the
conclusions one draws from them. Those high in self-esteem responded less negatively
to upward social comparisons. Low self-esteem people did not tend to make downward
comparisons to use social comparison to reduce distress, unless they were not given
competing information. In these conditions, those with low self-esteem responded more
favorable than high self-esteem. It seems that those manipulating social comparison to
be seen in a favorable light are less likely to be depressed. Depressed individuals benefit
emotionally from downward comparisons, but tend to make upward comparisons when
available. Ahrens (1991) argued that in general, there are numerous social comparisons
that can be made and people selectively attend to the large amount of information
available in the world.
Social comparison is used to maintain self-esteem. This is in line with Beck‟s
(1976) concept of depression. However, one may also manipulate comparisons to
enhance self image, as Wills (1981) contended. The exact nature of why and how one
uses social comparisons is not understood, though Festinger (1954a) contended that
there is a drive to see oneself positively (again, these modern developments in SCT may
be implied in the original consideration by Festinger, 1954a). For the current purposes,
the important findings here are that comparisons vary along two dimensions- direction
(upward, lateral, or downward) and comparison outcome (favorable or unfavorable).
Individual differences determine when one seeks either dimension.
While the dimensions of comparisons are meaningful, the most important aspect
of SCT may be the emotional consequence of the comparison (Alicke, 2000). When one
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is forced to cede superiority to another, they will re-evaluate the other‟s ability level as
much a higher than their own, known as the genius effect. Such findings illustrate that
besides not seeing the world objectively; people try to see the world less objectively to
maintain their self-image. In Goethals et al. (1991) review of UB, the phenomenon was
highly correlated with self-esteem and negatively correlated with depression.
Apparently, it is healthy to think of oneself as unique, even if this is not true.
Measurement Issues
By the late 1990‟s, SCT had expanded to the point where identifying what was
not part of the theory needed to be established. Wood (1996) gave a formal definition of
social comparison derived from a meta-analysis of SCT research. This was not easy, as
underscored by the author with a story of the Nags Head Conference on Social
Comparison in May 1992, where 16 social comparison researchers continually asked
what social comparison is without successfully agreeing upon an answer. Still, there was
a “core value” of social comparison that was generally held- that social comparison is
“the process of thinking about information about one or more other people in relation to
the self” (p. 520-521). This definition contains two contentious phrases; thinking about
and in relation to the self. The first, which individuals think about information, does not
imply careful or conscious thought. The second phrase, where individuals consider
information in relation to themselves, concerns at a minimum only identifying a
difference or similarity between oneself and another.
The degree to which these two phrases can be expanded does not have a general
consensus in the literature and therefore Wood (1996) described major processes that
occur in social comparison to explore these disagreements. These are: acquiring social
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information, thinking about it, and reacting to it. When one is acquiring social
information, one may do so directly with another person or indirectly through such
things as television and gossip. Wood noted that researchers varied considerably as to
whether the acquisition of information involved focusing on a comparison target and
examining similarities or differences to simply identifying those similar to the self.
When thinking about social information, the process leads to making a judgment about
the comparison and determining the implication of the comparison. When reacting to
social information, one concern among SCT researchers is whether or not the
comparison must affect the comparer to be considered a social comparison.
The process of acquiring information is an issue of contention among researchers
because it calls into question the definition of a social comparison referent (Wood,
1996). While the core definition states that the comparison is at least with someone the
individual makes direct contact, the definition can be extended. Other comparisons
include indirect comparisons, those comparisons with people the individual indirectly
attains information (such as from a coworker about another coworkers promotion) to
fictional characters, stereotypes, and products of the imagination. As described
previously with the research of Goethals, et al. (1991), social reality is not perceived
accurately and a perception of this reality is constructed to serve one‟s comparative
purposes. Because of the importance of indirect comparisons on social reality, Wood
(1996) argued in favor of including such referents within the study of SCT, succinctly
summarized by the explanation: “imaginary comparison others have a psychological
reality” (p. 522).
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The process of thinking about a comparison raises the issue of whether a
comparison must be a deliberate effort to seek social information in order to be
considered a social comparison (Wood, 1996). People may directly seek comparison
information or encounter it in their environment. Social comparisons may not be
deliberate or even conscious efforts. As reviewed previously with the work of Brickman
and Bulman (1977), people may not be aware of the comparisons they make. Though
not every encounter is a comparison, not every comparison is deliberate. Therefore,
Wood (1996) did not believe comparisons must be deliberate efforts.
The process of reaction to a comparison brings into question the issue of whether
a social comparison must have an impact to be considered a comparison. One may
identify someone as doing better on a relevant dimension but not be affected. Whether
or not this is considered a social comparison was identified by Wood (1996) as a
divergence in the literature. Arrowood (1986) stated that the criterion of a comparison be
that it changes the self-evaluation. Wood (1996) disagreed with this position, offering
that in cases where one wants to confirm instead of change self-evaluation. Because of
such situations, a comparison should not be validated by its effects.
Having argued for a rather inclusive mindset towards what is to be considered a
social comparison; Wood (1996) outlined what he considered is not a social comparison
and explored such boundaries through a summary and critique of the varying methods of
measuring SCT. The methods of social comparison measurement fall into the categories
of selection, reaction, and narration. Each of the three approaches has several
paradigms and measures.
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In the selection approach, social comparison is the dependent variable and the
focus is on the processes involved in seeking information. Social information is made
available to the participants by the researchers and comparison conditions are
manipulated. For example, in a rank-order paradigm experiment participants take a test
then are given a scored rank. They are given the opportunity to see the score of a
different rank. If they choose someone who scored higher then this is an upward
comparison, while a comparison towards someone scoring lower qualifies as a
downward comparison. Early rank-order paradigm studies were the first to demonstrate
downward comparison, though people usually selected to see the scores of those who
ranked higher (Wheeler, 1966). Wood (1996) noted that this approach suffers from a
lack of focus on the reasons for the comparisons.
The reaction approach uses social comparison as the independent variable and
the focus is on the effects of the comparison. Davis‟ (1966) study of career goals in
prestigious versus non-prestigious schools (mentioned in the introduction of this review)
is an example of the reaction approach. Students who earn high grades at a college
where it is easier to earn high grades will often have higher goals than a student who is
just as qualified but attends a more difficult college. Reaction studies suffer from a
similar problem to the selection approach in that it is difficult to ascertain if the changes
found between groups are truly due to social comparison (Wood, 1996).
Like the selection approach, the narration approach also attempts to assess the
social information attained in everyday comparisons, but it uses participant reports. For
example, in a self-recorded comparison diary technique, participants keep a log of their
comparisons. The experiment by Wheeler and Miyake (1992), in which participants
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recorded their social comparisons, is an example for this approach. Wood (1996) felt the
self-rated approach was unacceptable as a measure of SCT because of the inability of the
researcher using this method to distinguish social comparison and social judgments.
According to Wood, three factors affect the validity of narration techniques: lack of
awareness, social desirability/self deception, and problems in selectivity and recall. The
three problems of narration would be greatest with self reports because participants must
first recognize and admit they make comparisons and the retrospective nature of selfreport measures increase the risk of committing selection, recall, and aggregation errors.
In aggregation errors, one‟s answers are skewed when they aggregate the information.
Wood considered the self-rating approach of assessing social comparison as
inappropriate because they are judgments derived in part from social comparison, but
also from other processes such as self-serving attributions. Furthermore, comparative
ratings may be made without actually considering social information. Even when asked
to rate themselves to a comparison target they may simply answer following a heuristic
where they always see themselves as better (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yrak, &
Vredenburg, 1995).
Wood (1996) provided several recommendations for measuring social
comparison. One was that social comparison measures should avoid global self-report
measures because social comparison is mired with social desirability, self-deception, and
lack of awareness of engaging in social comparison. If a method requires participants to
admit they engage in social comparison, conveying permission for making social
comparison is prudent. Another recommendation was to use the least constraining
methods as possible. Wood suggested providing comparison targets that are available in
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the participants‟ daily life, prominent people/groups that the individual likely uses for
comparison. Wood concluded that overall, the study of social comparison has
traditionally emphasized selection studies and as such social comparison literature has
little knowledge of how people react to social comparisons.
Festinger (1954a) posited that the drive to compare is strong and the desire to
have the superior performance is as great as the desire to achieve uniformity (this was
his concept of a unidirectional upward drive). Subsequent research has suggested that in
situations were one does not excel, an adjustment of perception will occur until a feeling
of being better does occur (Alicke, 2000). The purpose of SCT is not only accurate
information of social position but positive self-evaluation. People manipulate their
interpretation of social information to boost self-esteem. Such manipulations take place
by expanding a sense of self or marginalizing the deficiency. This occurs because people
want to feel good. Successfully validating opinions and abilities is more satisfying but
adjusting perceptions is often quicker and easier.
Festinger‟s SCT (1954a) suggests an inherent uncertainty in people‟s knowledge
of their own opinions and abilities, which drives a desire to seek social information.
Brickman and Bulman (1977) later argued that people seek social information for selfesteem management. Under these situations, social comparison does not lead to a desire
to improve but a changing of perception until one comes out on top. Likely, social
comparison is a reflexive mechanism that gives information of one‟s standing. When
one is challenged by the findings, they may strive to do better or adjust their perception
to accommodate a threatened self-image. The expansion of SCT to incorporate affect
resulted in research of the effect of SCT. This shift created an overlap with SCT and
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other social process theories that had been exploring the relationship between emotion
and social information.

The Reactions to Social Comparisons
During the 1970‟s, SCT formally shifted to include the study of social
information and emotional influences. The interest in the consequences of social
comparison marked what Buunk and Gibbons (2000) considered the “renaissance” of
SCT. As discussed previously, the incorporation of SCT with attribution theory revised
the predictions of who is selected for comparison (Goethals & Darley, 1977). When
SCT researchers became interested in the effects of social comparison, an effort began to
further connect SCT to existing social process theories. Following the formulation and
extended research on SCT as the prominent theory that explains the way humans process
social information, other alternate theories have emerged that focus on the consequences
of social comparison self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) and relative
deprivation/gratification (RD/RG).
The theories of SCT and SEM set the stage for explaining when and how one
will utilize social information and feel satisfied (relatively gratified) or dissatisfied
(relatively deprived). An extensive portion of section II explores the history of RD
because the concept has enjoyed a longer but more contentious research history than
SCT (RG has only recently been explored in depth). Additionally, RD and RG are
argued here to function as intermediary variables between social comparison and health.
A comprehensive understanding of the history of RD is necessary for understanding how

36

perceived deprivation can affect health and why in some situations it might not. This
review of the consequences of SCT is organized in three sections:
-

Self-evaluation maintenance

-

Justice and belief in a just world

-

Relative deprivation and gratification

Self-Evaluation Maintenance (SEM)
As SCT expanded to include emotional states, the theory complemented a related
social process, the self-evaluation model of social comparison (SEM). SEM adds that
comparisons to others can create a sense of pride (Tesser, 1988). Tesser argued that SCT
neglected to evaluate the relationship between social comparison and emotion.
Specifically, he argued that social comparisons were important for defending and
maintaining self-evaluation. When one encounters someone who is doing better, SCT
predicts a threat to self-esteem. However, sometimes one will be filled with pride that
another is doing better. Because of this, Tesser (1988) argued for a theory that explored
self-evaluation. Self-evaluation refers to the way a person views him/herself and
attempts to predict when a specific emotion will be felt as a result. For example, in some
situations individuals feel jealousy when outperformed while in other situations pride is
felt. SCT predicts that a person will compare themselves to others and conclude if the
comparison is favorable or unfavorable. This results in SEM and SCT predicting
different outcomes from a comparison. For example, a person may brag if their friend
has a prestigious job or celebrate the success of one‟s favorite football team. Under SCT,
one would be predicted to feel distressed because they do not have a prestigious job and
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are not a successful football player. SEM accounts for the pride experienced by the
success of another, termed reflection.
There are two requirements for reflection (Tesser, 1991). The first is that the
accomplishment has to be very good. The second is there needs to be a psychological
connection. Tesser referred to this connection as closeness. Comparisons are more likely
as closeness increases. SEM is similar to SCT because it suggests that levels of
closeness influence the expression of social comparison, analogous to the similarity
hypothesis of SCT. Closeness is different than similarity, however, and people may
make comparisons based on groups that are perceived as similar or close (Suls &
Wheeler, 2000). SCT and SEM are at odds, Tesser (1991) contended, because in
situations where an individual underperforms, SCT lowers self-esteem while SEM
would raise self-esteem through closeness. An individual‟s sense of self weighs in the
processes and individuals will engage in either SCT or SEM to maintain a positive selfevaluation. When encountering a comparison of lowering self-evaluation one either
strives to improve ability or works to reduce the weight of the comparison.
Under SEM, comparisons are made with a close other; someone the comparer is
tied to emotionally (Tesser, 1991). The degree of emotional connection to a person is the
distance, which a greater distance being for those one has less emotional connection.
This close other does not be similar in ability. This distance to comparison groups was
also discussed in research by Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1988) which described
two forms of evaluation: universalistic and particularistic. Universalistic evaluations are
assessments of standing made towards others in general while a particularistic
evaluation is an assessment made with others whom one feels a bond. Tesser (1991)
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described SEM as being capable of measuring particularistic evaluations well because of
the construct of closeness, something SCT could not accomplish.
SEM is based on the interplay of other‟s performance, closeness, and relevance
(Tesser, 1991). These three relate with one another such that they function both as
causes and consequences (Tesser compared SEM to Boyle‟s law which holds that
temperature, volume and pressure interact in the dynamics of gas). For example, when
relevance and other‟s performance is high, closeness will decrease. Under SEM, one
would predict that when an individual is outperformed on a dimension, the relevance of
that dimension is decreased. Tesser supported this multi-directional model through
previous research. For example, Tesser and Smith (1980) found that in a guessing task,
subjects gave their friends easier clues than to strangers but in a high relevance situation
subjects gave their friends harder clues than strangers. Relevance moderates whether an
individual is in a state of reflection or social comparison. If relevance is high- social
comparison will emerge and a person will feel threatened. If relevance is low, reflection
would emerge. In both situations, Tesser (1991) noted that one would find an increase in
arousal but the direction of that arousal-the felt emotion- would be different.
To support this, Tesser (1991) described previous work in which researchers
dichotomously manipulated the dimensions of relevance, performance, and closeness by
assessing the feelings derived from situations where respondents either outperformed or
were outperformed on a task that was either important or unimportant against either
close or distant (Tesser & Collins, 1988). In situations where one was outperformed by a
close other on a highly relevant dimension, jealousy was reported. The closeness was
not statistically significant however, but relevance and performance interacted. Pride
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was felt when one outperforms another and increases with relevance. Closeness did not
have an effect on pride and was higher in the low relevance group. Tesser (1991) argued
that this supports the notion of reflection. Performance, relevance, and closeness acted in
response to one another, so as to maximize self image.
Classical SCT may be a sound theory for select contexts. Specifically, when an
individual is interested in sincere efforts to improve control over their environment or
understand their position. The concept of SEM works in many ways fill in the gaps left
in SCT, such as providing the dynamics of how one desires to feel better from upward
comparisons but is not motivated to improve. Beach and Tesser (2000) are diligent to
explain that SEM is separate than SCT, not a competing theory. SEM is distinct from
classical SCT in that when one engages in SEM the aim is to maintain self-esteem rather
than reduce uncertainty about abilities. Both constructs are influenced by the degree of
an interpersonal relationship with the comparison other. In SEM this dimension is
closeness while in SCT it is similarity. Whether one engages in SEM or SCT depends on
how strongly the dimension is important to the comparer‟s self-identity. The more
important the dimension to one‟s self-image, the more likely SEM will be engaged to
defend self-esteem. Additionally, as the degree of closeness with the individual
increases so too does the likelihood that SEM will be favored over SCT. However, as
SCT expanded to incorporate emotional evaluation, the distinction between SEM and
neo-social comparison theory becomes difficult to identify. Suls and Wheeler (2000)
agreed that SEM is separate, but that both theories have social comparison elements.
The neo-SCT incorporates affect and downward comparisons, while SEM expands upon
how one may derive positive self-image from any comparison.
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Justice and Belief in a Just World
The expansion of SCT to include emotions complemented other existing theories
(as with SEM). SCT‟s development also provided explanatory mechanisms to other
social processes, such as equity theory. Equity theory holds that a perception of inequity
creates a negative emotional state (Austin, 1977). This negative feeling occurs for both
the sufferers and the beneficiaries of the inequity, in the forms of anger and guilt,
respectively. Though, the beneficiary experiences less distress than the sufferer. Austin
related equity theory to social comparison through the argument that justice is defined
by social comparisons. One evaluates the fairness of a situation by appraising situations
of those deemed as similar. As an example, Austin described students comparing their
grades in a class with their classmates to get a sense of whether or not the teacher is fair.
When inequity cannot be removed and balance restored, one will attempt to justify the
inequity. The inequity that cannot be effectively rationalized creates distress.
Belief in a just world (BJW) research follows people‟s desire to believe that
people get what they deserve (Lerner, 1965). BJW theory holds that people develop
general schemata that create general theories about reality. If one‟s theories suggest that
the world is a just place then one has a higher BJW. This belief allows individuals to
approach the world as if it is stable and orderly. Belief in a just world has been tied to
mental health. Dalbert (1999) argued that BJW had a positive impact on mental health
by creating feelings of competence and control, fostering the notion that good deeds will
go rewarded (thereby allowing people to invest in their own good future), and fostering
investment in long-term goals. By creating a stable and positive way to view the world,
BJW enables people to feel that they have control over their lives.
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BJW has undergone refinement and has been divided into a general belief in a
just world and a personal one (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Personal BJW centers on the
individual and is the belief that one‟s own fate is just, that one‟s own local environment
is fair and just, that life is fair for oneself and one‟s own family and friends. General
BJW is focused on the world at large and is the belief that the world in general is fair
and just for all people. Lipkus et al. (1996) compared personal BJW and general BJW
and found that personal BJW was a better predictor of life satisfaction, stress, and
depression than general BJW.
Relative Deprivation and Gratification
As discussed previously, Wood (1996) contended that the consequences of social
comparison were not understood. SEM and justice theories suggest SCT‟s relationship
to self evaluation and worldview but still do not directly address the consequences of
social comparisons. A possible set of reactions to social comparison may be relative
deprivation (RD) and relative gratification (RG), two concepts that may be independent
but related to modern SCT. RD and RG are discussed thoroughly here, as it is my
position that RD and RG is a consequence of SCT. Furthermore, this model can be
useful in accounting for perception-related effects such as status-related health
inequities. While SCT had been progressing towards extending social comparisons to
emotional consequences, RD theory originally focused on emotional consequences
under select social comparisons (though this overlap was not originally identified).
Research concerning the theory of RD arose to account for dissatisfaction with situations
that did not seem to logically create dissatisfaction. This illogical dissatisfaction was in
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time attributed to the source of comparisons, and was extended to account for a wide
range of psychological phenomenon.
The text credited with beginning the formal study of RD was The American
Soldier, a four volume series of books summarizing social research performed on the
U.S. army throughout WWII by the Information and Education Division (IED) of the
U.S army. The IED commissioned Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starc and Williams to
carry out a review of the studies and write up the results, published in 1949. At the time,
this was seen as a natural extension of the continuing need for psychological
understanding in war. For example, the Alpha test was adopted during WWI as a
measuring device of ability. Stouffer et al. contended that the purpose of their work was
to move forward from the study of abilities to perceptions. They stated: “Just as World
War I gave new impetus to the study of human aptitudes, so World War II has given
new impetus to the study of attitudes” (p. 5, emphasis in original).
Stouffer et al. (1949) contended that their work was intended for three audiences:
Army officials, historians, and social scientists. They noted that social scientists are their
primary audience and identified several benefits of army studies to the social sciences.
One was a very low dropout rate, as soldiers were commanded to participate. Another
was a study of class. Stouffer et al. described the time and sample of the study as very
unique because with WWII beginning there were massive increases in soldier size. Also,
because of conscription, many soldiers were not necessarily happy to be there so there
was an excellent opportunity for the study of frustration. Furthermore, the environment
was different than civil institutions in three ways. First, the authoritarian nature of the
armed services is far greater than any civil institution. Second, the pronounced stratified
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social system in the military. Third, in the armed forces there is an increased emphasis
on traditional ways of doing things and a discouragement of initiative.
Stouffer et al. (1949) considered these conditions, though extreme, were not
unique to the military. They gave the example of a factory worker during an industrial
depression. Such a person would have little control and be in a very similar situation to a
WWII soldier in terms of inability to leave. Therefore, the situation of the Army was an
ideal environment to study the relationship between status and attitude. Like Marmot‟s
Whitehall studies that found changes in employment grade were linked to health effects
(Marmot, 2005), the soldiers in Stouffer and colleagues (1949) study had little perceived
control and are limited in their social participation. SCT attempts to explain the
relationship between comparisons and emotion while health inequities research explores
the effect of status on health. The work of Stouffer and colleagues (1949) was an early
effort to study the effect of status on attitudes and serves here as the research bridge
between SCT and health inequity research.
Volume one of The American Soldier described the attitudes of soldiers across
the span of the war as well as demographic variables such as education and race. Six
hundred pages detailing variations in soldiers‟ attitude does not sound like enjoyable
reading. To the contrary, Stouffer et al. (1949) demonstrated not only a literary skill but
also an enviable ability to convincingly generalize findings to the general population.
For example, the following excerpt illustrates the breadth to which Stouffer and
colleagues were applying their findings:
Although it is a popular stereotype to view American civilian culture as a
classless society, a host of sociological investigations have shown how important
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the class lines are in our social system. Perhaps the greatest distinction between
American and the most older European cultures is not the absence of class lines in
America as compared with Europe but rather the greater extent of vertical
mobility from one class to the next above. This vertical mobility has been made
possible throughout American history by the progressive increase in standard of
living, through the opening of new lands, and through increase in productivity per
man hour by unparalleled use of machine power. It has been facilitated also by the
differential birth rate, which encourages mobility from the fertile lower socioeconomic strata to fill vacuums left by low fertility in the top classes. To climb
the socio-economic ladder is the American dream, and those who do not succeed
still are psychologically identified with the process through projecting on their
children their own unfulfilled ambitions. (p. 244)
This passage demonstrates a generalization of Stouffer et al.‟s (1949) research of
soldiers‟ attitudes of promotion to the desire for upward mobility in the United States.
When one perceives themselves as capable of improving in social class, they are often
motivated to improve, and when they are denied it frustrates them. In the first volume,
Stouffer et al. used the term relative deprivation in reference to frustration with
promotion rate. Because of the structure of the Army, one‟s rank was analogous to status
and therefore promotion was the mode of social mobility. As the following passage
illustrates:
(The) only prospect of social mobility in the army was to climb the ladder of
noncommissioned grades… Not only did they represent better pay, freedom from many
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menial and irksome tasks, and frequently other special privileges as respecting quarters
or passes, but they also were a badge of success. (p. 247)
Three samples of soldiers were surveyed in the fall of 1943 as they entered the
service and again four months later to ascertain rank. Attitude was measured by the
subset variables termed: personal esprit, personal commitment, soldier-war worker job
satisfaction, and rating of how well the Army is run.
Personal esprit was measured by Stouffer et al. (1949) through ratings in 3 items
covering overall attitude about army life (ex. “In general, how would you say you feel
most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?” p. 95). Personal commitment was
measured through 4 items (ex. “Considering everything, how do you feel about further
service in the Army?” p. 96). Satisfaction with status and job was derived from 7 items
(ex. “Do you consider your own present job or duty in the Army an important one in the
war effort?”). Approval or criticism of the army was derived from 13 items (ex. “How
much of your training or duty time is used in doing things that do not seem important to
you?”). Possible answers varied across items, ranging from three to five options.
Responses were deemed as favorable or unfavorable and analysis performed across
education grades. The better educated (as defined by having completed high school)
tended to have higher scores in personal esprit and personal commitment than less
educated, while also holding less favorable ratings in satisfaction with the status and
were more critical of the army. This effect was described in terms of RD:
With higher levels of aspiration than the less educated, the better educated man had
more to lose in his own eyes and the eyes of his friends by failure to achieve some sort
of status in the Army. Hence, frustration was greater for him than for others if a goal he
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sought was not attained- and this happened often, indeed, as a consequence of the kind
of criteria in which the Army traditionally employed in selecting enlisted men for
promotion. (p. 154)
Cross-class differences were found for the dissatisfaction (Stouffer et al., 1949).
The military had many branches, and these branches were perceived differently both
within and across one another. Military police (MP) were more satisfied with the
promotion rate than Air Corps men, though the actual promotion rate was higher with
the Air Corps. The men that had not been promoted in the Air Corps were more
frustrated than non-promoted MP because the reward seemed more available. Those
promoted in the Air Corps did not find the promotion as meaningful as those in the MP.
There was greater dissatisfaction for the non-promoted and less satisfaction for the
promoted in the Air Corps than the MP. This phenomenon was considered RD.
Within a branch of the military, those most critical of promotion rates showed
the least job satisfaction (Stouffer et al., 1949). However, across branches job
satisfaction was still higher in the Air Corps than MPs. This was attributed to the
prestige of each branch. Air Corps was a higher prestige branch than MP. This was
considered to be due to the greater opportunities for social mobility, and other factors
such as the ability to learn skills useful in civilian life in the Air Corps than the MP. The
authors also introduced RG, as the authors‟ caution against an attempt by the military to
increase promotion rates in the hopes of job satisfaction. They stated that such a policy
would reduce RG of the successful men instead of raising it.
The MPs felt that as a branch of the military they were discriminated against,
while the Air Corps were held in high regard. Air Corpsmen felt greater RD than MPs
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when they were comparing themselves among one another (as they were when
considering their satisfaction with promotion rate) but the reverse was true when they
were comparing themselves against all other soldiers (as they were with rating job
satisfaction). There are three main points to be drawn from this finding. First, who one
uses for comparison varies by the comparison dimension. For promotion rate, soldiers
compared themselves within their branch while for job satisfaction they looked at a
“wider net” of soldiers. Second, the attitude regarding a single dimension may not
represent an entire sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. If one chose to simply assess
attitude about promotion rate, the Air Corpsmen would appear unhappiest of the military
branches and predicted to be least satisfied with their job of any branch, when in fact the
opposite is true. Third, which is a conclusion of the first two; is the role of prestige in
evaluating one‟s satisfaction. If one were looking for a general indicator of happiness,
then job satisfaction is probably a more valid measure than attitude about promotion
rate. Recall that prestige played a substantive role in assessing job satisfaction.
Assuming this is accurate then what mattered to soldiers when evaluating satisfaction is
what they believed other people thought about their status. These results suggest that
one makes comparisons for themselves and as a member of a group (a concept that is
explored later in this text with Runciman‟s (1966) distinction between fraternalist and
egoist RD).
The concept of RD was also employed by Stouffer et al. (1949) as an
explanatory mechanism in a finding concerning the adjustment level of Blacks from the
North to Army life. For those Black soldiers from the North stationed in the South, they
reported resentment towards the discrimination they found in the South. Despite this,
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they reported greater adjustment and satisfaction with Army life than fellow Northern
Black soldiers stationed in the North. This finding was aggravating to the research team,
as Stouffer would later describe:
Some of our analysts were almost in despair at this discrepancy. They actually
held up the report on their study for over a month while they checked and
rechecked in the vain hope of finding errors in the data or analysis to explain the
paradox. (Stouffer, 1950, p. 199)
RD explained this paradox. The Northern Black soldiers were comparing
themselves to Southern Black soldiers. The discrimination they encountered was felt as
temporary for them, as after the war they would be returning home but recognized that
the Southern Black soldiers they worked with would be staying in that environment. As
Stouffer et al. (1949) stated:
Putting it simply, the psychological values of Army life to the Negro soldier in the
South relative to the Southern Negro civilian greatly exceeded the psychological
values of Army life to the Negro soldier in the North relative to the Northern
Negro civilian (p. 654, emphasis in original).
Unfortunately, subsequent research confirming this belief was not available
because the data collection had been performed years before this analysis. The failing
was recognized as an unfortunate condition of the applied research (Kendall &
Lazarsfeld, 1950).
The original academic work of Stouffer et al. (1949) describing RD was post
hoc. The curious finding in military satisfaction led to the supposition that surrounding
levels of reward influence dissatisfaction. This concept implies social comparison but
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does not specifically state that comparisons are involved in the formation or
maintenance of RD. Stouffer et al. did not formally define RD at all, and many
subsequent researchers provided their own definitions. Merton, one of the researchers
for The American Soldier, later described RD as a term to “account for feelings of
dissatisfaction, particularly in cases where the objective situation would at first glance
not seem likely to provoke such feelings” (Merton & Kitt, 1952, p. 52). This early
description of RD suggests it is a condition of irony, where one feels the opposite of
what their objective situation “should” create. From the onset of RD theory a
relationship to SCT can be drawn. If one has an expectation that is fulfilled one would
feel satisfied, while if an expectation is not met dissatisfaction would be the result. If RD
is dissatisfaction, and this dissatisfaction is derived from expectations, and expectations
are themselves determined by social comparisons, then RD is manipulated by social
comparisons.
Later research formulated RD as related to expectations. For example, Davis
(1966) applied RD to college students‟ perceptions of career prospects. He analyzed a
set of data that studied the careers of 35,000 college students from 135 colleges and
universities gathered in 1961. Similar to branches of the military, Davis split colleges by
level of prestige, based on the average scores of entering freshman on a standard test
used for scholarship qualification. Schools were divided into four levels by distribution
of scores. Davis found that GPA correlated strongly with choice in career after
graduation and was stronger than the measure of scholastic aptitude correlated to career
choice. Scholastic aptitude can be considered an objective measure of ability across all
high school students while GPA is a measure of ability within college. GPA is the
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objective standing in a school, but one may use GPA as a ranking of overall
performance (this is perceptive since graduates in the job market would be competing
against other students from other schools).
That career aspirations were not influenced as much by scholastic ability as GPA
suggests that the students did not evaluate their ability by comparing themselves to all
high school graduates or across other colleges but to other fellow students (Davis, 1966).
Their objective standing was not as influential on career aspirations as their perceived
standing. Other high school students that one has never met from schools one has never
been to could be useful comparisons for assessing ability, but they are not as salient as
fellow students. Davis stated: “students judge themselves by local standing” (p. 27). He
argued that based on these findings, the popular notion of getting into the best possible
school might not be the best approach in terms of attaining occupational mobility
(occupation and occupational mobility are likely prominent components of one‟s
evaluation of status).
Among high school graduates within a specific level of scholastic aptitude, the
more selective the college the lower the student‟s GPA (Davis, 1966). This is not
surprising; if two students from the same high school have identical GPAs the one
attending Yale will probably have a lower GPA than the one attending the local
community college. But, with this research in mind, consider the implications. The Yale
student will have less aspiration, and while the community college student may not
achieve all that they aspire to, the Yale student may not aspire to as much. This could
create frustration from either one. The Yale student may be frustrated because her fellow
students have achieved more, while the community college student may be frustrated
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that she did not achieve what her previous self had hoped. Conversely, the opposite may
occur if different comparisons are made. The Yale student, comparing herself to her
high school friends, may feel satisfied that she is doing better, while the community
college student may feel worse due to the same choice in comparisons. As with SCT,
one‟s selection of comparisons, then, would be the deciding criteria and the implication
of this data is that those surrounding us are our primary source of comparison.
Promotion rate and career aspirations are positive dimensions. Gurr (1968 also
considered satisfaction and perceptions of social mobility as meaningful to RD, who
used RD to account for the conditions that can cause civil strife. Gurr defined RD as:
Perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions
of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities
(the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and
keep).” (p. 1104)
Gurr (1968) argued that a reaction to perceived inequity is anger, and anger is a
motivating state for aggression. However, participation in civil strife is mediated by the
intensity of the RD. Using data from 114 political entities and data on civil strife in
those areas between the years of 1961 to 1965, Gurr correlated civil strife to measures of
persisting and short-term economic, political, and sociocultural deprivations. Thirteen
deprivation measures were used; all considered a form of RD. Six of these measures
were used to represent persisting deprivation and seven for short-term deprivation.
Persistent deprivation included such variables as dependence on private foreign capital
(measured by calculating payments to other countries as a percentage of the Gross
Domestic Product) and religious cleavages (as measured by the number of organized
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religious groups). Short-term deprivations included such variables as adverse economic
conditions within a three-year span (evaluation of the number of new reports reporting
such conditions as unemployment and market slumps) and inflation (as measured by
measured by direction of cost of living). Eight of the deprivation variables accounted for
two-thirds of variance in civil strife (R2 = .65) and intensity variables did account for
civil strife significantly (R2 = .43). Gurr noted that this data was not a direct test of
relevance since aggregate data was used but challenged one to explain the findings and
considered this an excellent starting point. He argued that deprivation alone was not
enough to cause strife. What was needed was a sense that one deserved somethingentitlement.
Again, SCT provides and explanatory mechanism. One likely determines what
they have coming to them, entitlement, largely by the groups they ascribe themselves.
For example, one who considers herself working class probably does not believe she can
go weeks without working and still pay her bills.
RD has also been previously studied in relation to status. One of the most cited
studies of RD was Runciman (1966), who measured class distinction in Britain and
attitudes towards inequality. As Marmot (2005) would later argue with social
participation, Runciman (1966) believed that one‟s activities are a mark of status.
Runciman stated:
There may be no inherent inequality in the preference of one man to watch polo
instead of dog racing, to drink wine instead of beer, or to wear a bowler instead of
a cloth cap when he goes to work. But such differences do directly affect the
pattern of inequalities, since however neutral they may be as simple preferences
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of taste, their effect is further to compartmentalize different strata into statusgroups whose divergent styles of life inhibit their recognitions of each other as
equals. (p. 95)
Runciman (1966) contended that education was both the mode of social mobility
and a contributor to RD. Citing the interest of Stouffer et al. (1949) in education as a
predictor variable of the relationship between promotion and attitude, Runciman (1966)
believed that there was a parallel to this finding occurring in Britain. Prior to WWII, few
children of manual laborers received secondary education. Therefore, people that had
received secondary education were rarely used as reference groups (either comparative
or normative). As education became more available, families had their children enrolled
in secondary education, increasing the use of comparisons by the parents on individuals
that had completed secondary education. The working class families felt more RD
because they increased upward comparisons because their children were members of
that dimension (closeness).
The magnitude and frequency of the RD for manual laborers had risen, even
though objective inequality had actually decreased from greater access to education
(Runciman, 1966). Furthermore, mass communication was increasing and was exposing
the laborers to the possibility of a middle-class life. Runciman could not formally test
this, as the research was not time series. Rather, he sought to measure class
identification and perceptions of how one was doing in relation to others. He was
curious about how manual workers and non-manual workers ascribe themselves and
their perceptions of how they are doing in relation to others. He predicted that those at
the top of their class would report the lowest level of RD. Manual laborers at the top
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within their class would feel less RD than those at the lower level and those at the lower
level of the non-manual labor workers because the manual laborer does not use nonmanual laborers for contrasting comparisons.
To evaluate RD, Runciman (1966) relied on self-reported income. He did not
favor objective measures of income, stating that estimates of income are more
meaningful than objective measures for the purposes of assessing RD. The research
consisted 1415 participants that had been classified as manual or non-manual by
reported occupation (919 manual and 496 non-manual). He first attempted to determine
who people used as a normative reference group with the question “What sort of people
are you thinking of when we talk about “people like yourself‟?” (p. 162). Non-manual
workers most commonly used personal criterion (such as “good sorts” and “self
respecting” people) while manual workers used class distinctions (such as “working
class” and “manual workers”).
Runciman (1966) found difficulties in measuring status, as the class people
belonged to and believed they belonged to was not necessarily the same. One question
asked the participants to describe what class they considered themselves, and another
question asked what they believed to be the middle class- non-manual or manual
workers. Many people in manual labor jobs considered themselves as middle class
(22%) while many people in the non-manual jobs considered themselves as working
class (19%). This suggest that studies of status may be measuring something different
than objective measures of class, as people do not necessarily ascribe themselves to the
class their station in life suggests.
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As a measure of RD, Runciman asked: “Do you think there are any other sorts of
people doing noticeably better at the moment than you and your family?” (p. 192). For
individuals at the bottom tier for income, roughly 1/5th stated “no” (21% of low income
non-manual workers and 17% of low income manual laborers). Runciman summarized
the finding as such: “It is still remarkable that so many of the poor should be unable (or
unwilling-in either event, their reticence is remarkable) to think of others who are doing
better.” (p. 193).
Perhaps they were aware of others doing better financially but not doing better
overall. Just as how promotion rate was not indicative of overall quality of position,
financial comparisons may not be used the same by everyone as a measure of success.
Those in the high self-reported income group had similar responses as well, regardless
of status as manual or non-manual work (Runciman, 1966). This, Runciman argued, was
indicative of the selection of referents because although both groups reported doing
better than anyone with similar frequency (31% of non-manual laborers reported that
there are no other people doing noticeably better at the moment compared to 39% of the
manual high wage earners), the wage of a high earning manual worker was objectively
less than the wage of a high earning non-manual worker. Thus, though earning less,
manual workers experienced less RD than non-manual workers.
Beyond illustrating the difficulties in measuring status and the importance of
reference (comparison) groups in perceived advantage and disadvantage, Runciman
developed a widely used definition of RD:
A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person
or persons which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X
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(whether or not this is in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible
that he should have X. (pg. 10)
Many of the terms used by Runciman have parallels to SCT. The “some other
person or persons” having “X” were referred to by Runciman as reference groups. The
term reference group is derived from Hyman (1942), who used the term to describe
those groups one uses for status comparison. An individual uses reference groups for
comparison to determine their own successes and shortcomings, and people can have
many reference groups at any given time. Hyman stated that while someone may have a
large number of reference groups, the number of habitually used groups is small and
likely to relate to specific problems. This is conceptually identical to the Festinger‟s
(1954a) comparison groups.
Runciman (1966) distinguished between comparative and normative reference
groups, those that people contrast against their situation and those from which people
take their standards, respectively. These two groups can and do overlap. The
membership reference group, the one used for normative comparisons, can vary as
people may consider themselves as belong to many different groups. A middle-class
Caucasian father in the United States may draw normative comparisons to other
members of his income-level, other Caucasians, other Americans, and other humans.
Though not stated by Runciman (1966), the concept of normative and
comparative references is similar to Festinger‟s (1954a) SCT of abilities and opinions.
Festigner (1954a) contended that we desire conformity with opinion but to be better in
abilities. Runciman‟s (1966) argument can be reconstructed under SCT to be that
opinions are normative, and abilities are comparative. As further support for this
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merging, Runciman argued that RD was considered a consequence of comparative
references. He stated: “If relative deprivation is to be precisely described, all inequalities
which give rise to feelings of relative deprivation must be treated as inequalities between
and only between the membership reference group and comparative reference group” (p.
14).
Runciman (1966) also expanded the concept of RD to include two subtypes:
egoistic RD and fraternalistic RD. Egoistic RD is a function of comparing oneself to an
in-group, while fraternalistic RD is derived from comparing one‟s in-group to an outgroup. Such distinctions are analogous to Festinger‟s (1954a) notion of similarity, and
Tesser‟s (1991) emphasis on closeness.
Runciman (1966) considered one‟s sense of justice as the psychological variable
that can facilitate or impede the creation of RD from objective conditions, and a theory
of justice is necessary for creating an appropriate assessment of RD: “Whatever meaning
is given to „justice‟, the appeal to justice will distinguish those feelings of relative
deprivation which can and which cannot be properly described as a sense of envy rather
than the perception of an unfulfilled right.” (p. 252). This is similar to Gurr‟s (1966)
notion of entitlement. Justice would regulate a sense of entitlement. The two however,
appear to disagree on the causes and measures of RD. While Runciman (1966)
considered one‟s choice of membership groups as influencing comparison choice (and
therefore RD), Gurr (1968) did not emphasize the importance of social information, only
a sense of what one feels entitled to. Davis (1966), similar to Runciman, considered RD
as a shorthand expression to describe the influence of one‟s immediate surroundings on
gauging ability.
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Gurr (1970) made the case for objective measures to be used for RD.
Expectations, he argued, could be measured through “status quo” indices such as wage
and salary data as well as national inflation rates. If, for example, these statistics
demonstrated a decline in economic prosperity, they could be considered equivalent to
expectations not being met by a declining ability- decremental deprivation. Rising
expectations could be measured through increased rates in schooling and literacy as well
as promises of reform from political leaders. Gurr also suggested that interpersonal RD
may be measured through migration and religious affiliation. This measurement
approach of aggregate objective condition data allows for comparisons across groups
(such as across countries) and can be performed with existing data. However, as Merton
and Kitt (1950) described, RD is a conclusion derived from comparisons to referents,
and one has no guarantee that objective conditions are indeed creating RD. For example,
if one experiences wage reduction, RD may be felt or one may feel RG because at least
they still have a job. Without a consideration for individual interpretation of objective
conditions, RD may be inferred but cannot be measured.
Stouffer et al.‟s (1949) analysis of attitudes on promotion rates found that one‟s
perception sometimes disagreed with objective conditions. Furthermore, the rate of
mobility within a field does not necessarily correlate to a satisfaction with status.
Though MPs were happier with promotion rate, they were less satisfied because in the
“big picture”, they had one of the least prestigious positions in the army. This influence
of prestige is similar to Davis‟ (1966) finding that GPA was a better predictor of future
career aspirations than actual academic caliber. Runciman (1966) found a similar
distinction as people tended to compare themselves along the similarity of their ascribed
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class. Gurr (1970) identified that the consequences of frustration of perceived inequity
could be civil strife and violence, though one needed a sense that they deserved better,
similar to Runciman‟s (1966) emphasis on one‟s sense of justice influencing RD.
By 1970 RD has been applied towards a variety of topics such as urban violence
(Gurr, 1968) and career choices (Davis, 1966). However, this broad scope of application
may be due to RD being a concept with profound effects or because RD is poorly
defined and therefore malleable as an explanatory devise. Cook, Crosby and Hennigan
(1977) argued for the validation of RD as a construct and outlined efforts to create
construct validation. They reviewed previous research to determine if RD is capable of
validation. They reviewed previous definitions, such as those described above, even
going so far as to contend that “(there is) no single definition common to the major
theorists” (p. 308). In reviewing previous research, six components of RD were
identified: not having X, wanting X, social comparison, feasibility of having X,
entitlement to have X, and no personal responsibility for not having X.
These are similar to Runciman‟s (1966) conditions of RD, but are expanded to
include concepts of feasibility and an absence of personal responsibility for not having
“X”. These conditions provided by Cook et al. (1977) were not agreed upon in the
literature, rather included an “all of the above” collection of the conceptions of RD from
research by prominent RD researchers. For example, a lack of personal responsibility for
not having X was indicated by Crosby (1976) as a necessary component, though none of
the other prominent RD researchers of the time included such a condition.
Because of the variations of definition, RD could be considered either a
hypothetical construct or an intervening variable. The former can be directly measured
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while the latter is a label to describe a set of processes. For example, Cook et al. (1977)
used thirst as a hypothetical construct and cognitive dissonance as an intervening
variable. RD has been described as both, even by the same researcher and in the same
publication. Davis (1959) referred to RD as a “subjective feeling” and a “belief that
there is differential treatment” (p. 23). Here, the “subjective feeling” description implies
it cannot be directly measured (an intervening variable) while the consideration of RD as
a belief of inequity could be considered a hypothetical construct. Cook et al. (1977)
argued that there is also difficulty in identifying if RD is a cognitive or emotional
process, though many researchers used both. For example, Runciman (1966) considered
the magnitude or perceived size of RD to be cognitive while the degree as emotional.
Gurr (1970) suggested that magnitude and intensity co-vary (Cook et al., 1977).
The differing definitions and conceptions likely contributed to another problem
with RD theory- lack of specificity of measurement. This impeded the theory‟s
development. Gurr (1970) considered RD as measurable from objective economic
conditions such as inflation rates and average salaries. Runciman (1966) used yes/no
questions such as “Do you think there are other sorts of people doing noticeably better at
the moment than you and your family?”(p. 302). Cook et al. (1977) regarded both efforts
as measures of magnitude (which they considered cognitive), but not intensity
(considered emotional). There is no measure of the tension that develops from a
disparity. Also, there were no efforts to identify if the comparisons mattered to the
individual (which could be considered similar to a measure of intensity, as the first
would likely dictate the second), no measure of expectancy, or any concern that such
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questions had primed a response by making such differences more salient simply by
asking.
Cook et al. (1977) explored previous RD research in an effort to identify if the
construct was an entity separate from other psychological constructs (such as equity and
frustration). They restricted their review to egoistic RD (Davis, 1966; Runciman, 1966;
Gurr, 1970). They stated that since most authors assumed RD is directly measurable,
then RD is considered in the research as a hypothetical construct, though not specifically
stated. They found that researchers often do not distinguish between cognitive
magnitude measures and emotional intensity measures. Cook et al advocated for RD to
be considered as an intervening variable. The benefits of treating it as an intervening
variable include: no longer requiring a presumption of tension, not requiring a specific
statements of the independent and dependent variables involved and statements of
conditions, and serves as a label of convenience. To justify RD as an intervening
variable, the authors revised the concept of RD to the following conditions: one does not
have or have enough of X, one wants X, one compares with similar others who have X
or more of X, and one feels it is feasibly to have X. These conditions are not
independent and can happen in any order. For example, feasibility may influence social
comparison. One may consider it feasible to become famous and therefore use famous
people for comparisons. Furthermore, the two previously described conditions of
entitlement and lack of personal responsibility for not having “X” are moderators of how
RD will be expressed (e.g., anger, achievement).
Furthermore, Cook et al. (1977) argued for treating RD as a hypothetical concept
partially because of the difficulty in previous RD research to verify an emotional pre-
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condition: “This position has the advantage of not requiring direct measures of an
elusive and presumptive tension state” (p. 310). No major support is given for this
declaration other than what seems to be a desire for validation of the theory. Wheeler
and Zuckerman (1977) criticized this distinction of RD from equity theory, stating: “(I)t
seems questionable whether feasibility is missing from the equity model” (p. 354). They
contend that RD is a state experienced by those that are a “victim” of inequity while
relative gratification is experienced by one who comes out ahead in perceived inequity.
Finally, shifts in measurement approach may also contribute to measurement
issues. Lerner (2003) criticized the measurement of all justice theories (equity, just
world, and relative deprivation). Specifically, Lerner noted the increasingly common
practice of measuring one‟s sense of justice from role-play scenarios. He argued that
such hypothetical situations may not hold interest to the participant, thus creating what
he called “low impact” scenarios where individuals may respond in socially normative
ways instead of justice-motivated interests.
It seems that the work of Gurr (1966) and Runciman (1966) were prototypes for
what would become two primary approaches to measuring RD: assessing deprivation
through either objective standards or perceptive ratings of people‟s attitudes of “doing
better”. Yitzhaki (1979) argued that RD for an individual could be calculated through
the computation of the weighted sum of the difference between an individual‟s income
and the income of people in the same reference group with greater incomes (an objective
standard). Conversely, Crosby (1982) measured RD in a more perceptive approach by
asking how “bitter or resentful” (p. 80) participants felt regarding seven aspects of
women‟s employment situations on a six-point Likert scale.
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The review of RD by Cook et al. (1977) pertained more to the individual
application of RD. This form of RD was in the vein of Davis (1966) work on
perceptions of career choice. Gurr‟s (1966) application of RD towards social movement
and civil strife was different direction for the theory, as it accounted for group behavior
rather than individual differences. This is similar to Runciman‟s (1966) notion of
fraternalist deprivation. The application of RD to explaining the causes of civil strife and
social movements was very popular in the 1960‟s and 70‟s. Davies (1962) believed RD
was a necessary but not sufficient condition for social movement, Vanneman and
Pettigrew (1972) assessed race relations in the United States and considered RD as
existing in Black communities because of the relative advantage of Whites, and
Morrison (1973) believed RD acted as a catalyst for social movements because RD was
cognitive dissonance- people were upset that their expectations were not fulfilled.
The ability of RD to account for social movement, however, was criticized by
Gurney and Tierney (1982), primarily because of inconsistencies in the conceptual,
theoretical, and empirical design of the construct. They argued that types and patterns of
RD are often offered, but a relationship between objective and perception conditions is
never articulated. For example, Gurr (1970) offered three patterns of RD: detrimental,
aspirational, and progressive while also suggesting there were four sources of one‟s
expectations: previous experience, abstract ideals, standards of a leader, and one‟s
choice in reference groups. Gurney and Tierney (1982) also argued that such distinctions
further complicate the theory of RD because they obfuscate a fundamental issue of RDthe relationship between objective and perceptive conditions. For example, Gurr‟s
(1970) three patterns of RD may describe objective conditions that all result in the same
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RD (an objective condition) or three unique forms of RD (a perceptive condition). The
failure to distinguish between objective or perceptive conditions has allowed for what
Gurney and Tierney (1982) considered a misstep in RD theory- the use of
macroeconomic indices to assess RD. A failure of the literature to clearly outline how
objective conditions relate to perceived conditions resulted in multiple definitions and
varying measurement approaches. This lack of researcher agreement in the theory and
application created results that could not be compared to one another. This was stifling
to the development of the theory. Because of the lack of researcher consensus, RD never
became a coherent theory. Unfortunately, this criticism continues to plague RD research.
There is still no agreed-upon mode of measurement of RD and researchers continue to
attempt alternate methods (Webber, 2007; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, van
Dick, & Zick, 2008).
Another deficit in subsequent exploration of the consequence of perceived
inequity is the lack of research exploring RG. RG was recognized early in the RD
literature (Stouffer et al., 1949) but not explored. Runciman (1966) recognized the
concept with: “(T)he proverbial way to make oneself conscious of one‟s advantages is to
contrast one‟s situation with that of others worse off than oneself.” (p. 9). RG was
considered a therapeutic technique employed when one was experiencing RD. Earnest
research on the effect of RG is relatively recent (Guimond & Dambrun, 2002).
Recent researchers have attempted to investigate the effects of perceived benefit
rather than deprivation. Two phenomena have both been labeled as this condition.
Yitzhaki (1979) introduced the first label, Relative Satisfaction (RS), defining it as the
mathematical inverse of the YRD. Eibner and Evans (2005) referred to Relative
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Satisfaction (RS) as “being prosperous relative to one‟s peers” (p. 10). They did not
directly measure RS but assumed that an effect found from an increase in RD was
equivalent to a decrease in RS.
Other researchers have referred to this condition as relative gratification (RG).
For example, Guimond & Dambrun (2002) attempted to create RD by having
participants read a fictitious report stating that their job market was dwindling. The
authors attempted to create RG by informing a second group that the job market would
improve considerably. Interestingly, RD and RG were measured via just one question
that asked participants to rate on a 7-point scale how satisfied they were when thinking
about the future, comparing their current situation with what they were going to do in a
couple of years.
The most recent and comprehensive attempt to measure RD and RG built upon
the findings of Guimond & Dambrun (2002) by assessing RD and RG among a
representative sample of South Africans (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, and
Mèot, 2006). The researchers tested the hypothesis that RD and RG both predict
prejudice in a bilinear model of predicting prejudice. Participants rated on a 5-item
Likert scale their degree of satisfaction with the comparison such that higher scores were
indicative of RD while low scores indicated RG. Their instrument included two
components of RD and RG: economic conditions and general conditions. Both
components appear to be further broken down into questions that assessed egoist and
fraternalist comparisons. The economic RD/RG measures assess the individual (egoist)
or the individual‟s ingroup (fraternalist) current economic conditions and future outlook
of economic condition. For example, the egoist economic current condition was assessed
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by: “At the moment are you (satisfied/dissatisfied) with your personal economic
conditions?” (p. 1035).
The general RD/RG measure also had two questions for each the egoist and
fraternalist category, but instead of using the comparisons of current rating and future
outlook, “outgroups” were chosen for each. The general egoist condition questions
assessed personal conditions compared to other South Africans and other members of
the participants‟ ingroup while the fraternal questions assessed the conditions of the
participants‟ ingroup compared to other groups in South Africa and South Africa
compared to other South African countries. For example, the fraternalist general
question that asked the participant to compare their ingroup to other groups in South
Africa was, “Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your ingroups are
(better/same/worse) than those of other groups in South Africa?” (p. 1035). This is our
understanding of the survey framework used by Dambrum et al. (2006), not one
explicitly stated in the published research paper.
By including an RG dimension, the researchers were able to detect an effect not
anticipated in the literature, that RG predicts prejudice as well as RD. Should the
researchers have chosen to measure only RD, they would have simply found that RD did
indeed influence prejudice. Therefore, the inverse of RD should not be assumed to have
the inverse of the effects of RD.
Unlike SCT, which can be considered to have expanded over the last sixty years,
RD has had a less organized development due to a series of unresolved contentions in
the literature. One area of contention has been how RD is distinct from other social
theories. Davis (1959) stated that wanting, not-having, and social comparison were
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necessary for RD to occur. These conditions, as Wheeler and Zuckerman (1977) argued,
are the same as those of inequity described by Cook et al. (1977). This author does not
find this problematic. Rather, I consider perceived inequity as a possible consequence of
social comparisons, and if distress is felt then this condition is RD (and if satisfaction is
derived then RG is felt). Along the course of this review of RD I have interjected the
SCT parallels and correlates to suggest that RD is inequity perceived from social
comparisons.
A second area of contention is the ambiguity of whether RD is an intervening
variable or a hypothetical construct. I argue that RD is a hypothetical construct because
distress derived from perceived inequity could be directly measurable through
participant ratings or other methods. Furthermore, the support for RD as an intervening
variable seems to be the difficulty in measuring the construct (Wheeler & Zuckerman,
1977). This is not a valid reason for RD to be considered an intervening variable. A third
contention is the definition and nature of RD (Crosby, 1979).
Of the multiple definitions of RD, I consider Runciman‟s (1966) interpretation of
RD being dependent upon social comparisons and Gurr‟s (1966) explanation of the
relationship of RD in which the magnitude and intensity of RD co-vary. However, I add
the caveat that perceived magnitude and intensity co-vary. Perceived deprivation is the
condition where RD may occur, therefore they co-vary in that one may exaggerate the
disparity because of the felt RD (intensity) or the intensity may be greater because one
feels the difference, though perhaps objectively small, is considered large (magnitude).
Gurney and Tierney (1982) criticized RD researchers for often failing to clearly outline
how objective and perceptive conditions interact. In my interpretation and application of
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RD, the phenomenon is perceptive. RD is a consequence of social and temporal
comparisons.
What one has had in the past and abilities observed in others dictates the RD.
One assesses their standing in these comparisons (though they may not be accurate) and
any distress derived from these comparisons is RD (while any satisfaction derived would
be RG). Furthermore, RD is directly regulated by SCT. As SCT explored self-evaluation
and self-assessment, one finding was that there were defenses people engaged in to
avoid seeing themselves unfavorably (Brickman & Bulman, 1977). RD is the “leftover”
negative self-evaluation derived from comparisons not effectively rationalized.
Objective conditions are likely indirectly relate to RD in that comparison are likely
selected based on objective conditions, but the two are independent and may move in the
same or different direction.
This is not a novel interpretation of the phenomenon. Rather, this interpretation
of RD was likely the original understanding. As described by Merton and Kitt (1950):
“Relative deprivation can provisionally be regarded as a special concept in reference
group theory” (p. 52). RD was originally considered a social theory- a unique condition
from reference groups. Reference group theory is similar to SCT in that comparisons are
made to others as a frame of reference. Therefore, RD is a specific conclusion of social
comparisons, and under SCT one would expect RD to emerge from dissatisfaction from
comparisons and efforts to discount this dissatisfaction (such as shifting the importance
of the comparison or the perceived degree of similarity with the comparison) are not
entirely effective. This interpretation of RD was difficult to measure in social movement
research, which required large data sets and analysis often with historical data.
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Adjustments were made to the theory that allowed objective measures to be considered
as measures of RD, a technique that contributed towards the muddling of the theory
(Gurney & Tierney, 1982).
Similar to Wood‟s (1996) core definition of social comparison, a similar
definition of RD is that it is distress derived from comparisons. The degree of this
distress will vary by the degree of closeness or similarity with the comparison group and
relevance of the object of comparison. The distress may lead to either stress or social
upheaval; depending on if the RD is egoistical or fraternal, which likely dictated by
whether the comparisons are SEM or SCT. SEM creates closeness and would be
fraternal while SCT predicts similarity-based comparisons and would therefore be
egoistical. The fraternal predictions of RD to motivate collective response have been
difficult to verify, leading to the conclusion that RD is not useful (Gurney & Tierney,
1982).
While the difficulty of fraternalist RD to predict collective action does warrant
criticism of the theory, RD is a viable construct. RD is a hypothetical construct that is a
link in a chain reaction stemming from social comparisons. Social comparisons may
create emotional reactions. One‟s emotional response to social comparison may create
distress (RD) or satisfaction (RG). From here the chain of effects can move in several
different directions as RD and RG can influence one‟s satisfaction with their current
environment, desire for social movement, and career aspirations. One area to test this
model would be status-related health disparities. The relationship between status and
health could be mediated through the stressfulness of undesirable conclusions following
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social comparisons. Status is likely evaluated through social comparison and as such
SCT can predict status-health effects through the measure of RD and RG.
Stress and Health
In the introduction I suggested that social information affects health and I
provided examples such as the lifespan of academy award winners and British civil
servants. Thus far, this text has reviewed how expectations can emerge from social
information and a proposed model is offered by which SCT can create emotional states
such as RD and RG. A person may develop a sense of unhappiness derived from social
information (relative deprivation) and/or may feel satisfied (relative gratification). These
“consequences of social comparisons” may influence behaviors and feelings (such as
career aspirations, happiness with current status, and desire to revolt). These
comparisons may also negatively affect health due to the distress caused by social
comparisons. These states would increase in unfavorable as status decreased, accounting
for status-related health effects. Even gratification can be stressing (such as when one
feels guilty) or can be beneficial (such as with coping). While the notion that perceptive
states affect health is generally accepted, reliably demonstrating this effect has been
difficult (Marmot, 2005). This has been due, in part, to difficulties in defining stress and
health. The purpose of this section is to outline the mechanisms of stress and health. The
review of stress and stress research is presented in the following order:
-

The biology of stress

-

The concept of stress

-

The measurement of stress

-

Stress and health
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The Biology of Stress
The physiological response to a threat, known as the stress response, is adaptive
for survival in times of crisis (Clow, 2001). The types and frequency of modern
stressors- variables causing stress- are often different than the stressors our ancestors
experienced. Biologically, the stress response is designed for infrequent life threatening
situations. Today‟s humans face frequent but rarely life threatening events, though the
body cannot discriminate between types of stressors and therefore responds to all
stressors as if they were life threatening. Frequent activation of the stress response
results in dysregulation and can damage the body, often more so than the stressor
(especially since most modern stressors are not life threatening). The stress response
falls under the domain of the autonomic nervous system and is comprised of the
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems (SNS and PNS, respectively).
Stress activates the SNS while relaxing activates the PNS. The process starts
when the brain identifies a stimulus as a stressor (Clow, 2001). Then, an emotional
response to the stressor is regulated in the limbic system. The limbic system functions
primarily for survival behaviors- sexual reproduction, fear and aggression. In particular,
the hippocampus and amygdala function to regulate the stress response in this stage. The
limbic system can then activate the hypothalamus, which can control the two stress
response systems: sympathetic adrenal medulla (SAM) and hypothalamic-pituitaryadrenal (HPA). Together these two systems regulate the cardiovascular and immune
system. Either one can be activated by psychological stressors.
SAM is a general stress response that is activated by arousal, pleasure, and strain
(Clow, 2001). When activated by a perceived threat, the sympathetic nervous system
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will activate the release of nonadrenaline to activate internal organs and adrenaline into
the bloodstream, released by the SAM system. The SAM system also changes
cardiovascular systems. For example, the heart beats faster (upwards of five times the
resting state amount) and the blood vessels restrict to increase blood flow. Blood is also
routed away from arteries that supply blood to the digestive system, the skin, and the
kidneys. Vasopressin, a hormone that inhibits urine formation is released to further
inhibit processes that are ancillary during a life and death situation. The continued and
repeated activation of this system, however, can cause damage. For example, the
continued increase in blood pressure can cause damage to the blood vessel lining,
allowing fatty deposits to accumulate in micro-tears. This plaque lining is referred to as
atherosclerosis and can cause a heart attack. This example illustrates how frequent stress
can lead to health problems.
The HPA is a system only occurs as a stress response and is activated in extreme
situations, though what is considered “extreme” varies across individuals (Clow, 2001).
If during the SAM response the stressor is deemed to be a threat, a chemical messenger,
corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF), is released from the hypothalamus. When CRF
reaches the pituitary gland, adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) is then released into
the circulating blood system and eventually reaches the adrenal glands. Here, the outer
cortex of the adrenal glands responds to ACTH by releasing glucocorticoid cortisol.
Cortisol and ACTH circulate in periphery blood normally, regardless of exposure to
stress. In stress encounters, however, the cortisol level becomes elevated and works to
release energy reserves. This, when coupled with increased blood flow from the SAM
system, results in greatly increased energy expenditure in stressful situations. Glycogen,
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converted starch, sugars, and carbohydrates are released from the muscle and liver and
are broken down into glucose in the blood. This is intended to give the body energy
during the crisis period. However, too much glucose creates the fatty substance that
adheres to the tiny tears that occur in the development of atherosclerosis and
underscores the potentially unhealthy consequence of over activation of the stress
response. Another mode by which chronic stress can affect health is through abundance
of cortisol, a steroid that can pass to every part of the body and affect the brain by
reducing tryptophan rates. Tryptophan is a precursor of serotonin (5Ht), a
neurotransmitter associated with mood. Cortisol in the brain can therefore contribute to
depressed mood.
Stressors can also activate the immune system and also sometimes create health
problems. The immune system has two strategies to ward off infection (Clow, 2001).
The first is humoral immunity, which is non-specific (i.e. it is a non-specialized general
response to threat). In humoral immunity, antibodies are secreted. Antibodies are
proteins that bind to and deactivate invading pathogens. This non-specific immune
system works for pathogens that are outside a body‟s cells. Once a pathogen has invaded
cells, the second system is valuable- cell-mediated immunity. This system actively
destroys invading pathogens and is used primarily for viruses. The immune system is in
charge of protecting the body from infectious agents and can fail in two ways. First, it
can fail due to under vigilance, whereby agents gain entry and infection occurs. Anytime
one becomes sick, this would be a case of under vigilance. Second, over vigilance can
occur in which the immune system itself causes illness. Asthma is an example of over
vigilance.
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The cells of the immune system are sensitive to the stress hormone cortisol (Clow,
2001). Cortisol down-regulates cell-mediated immunity but can enhance humoral
immunity. Acute stress may up-regulate cell mediated immunity as a spike in cortisol
seems to initiate this response. Continued cortisol secretion, however, shifts the focus of
the body away from cell-mediated immunity to humoral immunity. A chronically
stressed person may have an attenuated cell-mediated immune system (under vigilance)
while an over activity of humoral cells (over vigilance).
Stress is not the only variable that influences cortisol levels. Both cortisol and
immune cells demonstrate circadian changes and individual differences (Clow, 2001).
Cortisol is always present at some level in the blood, as the hormone is involved in other
processes such as controlling the biological clock. During situations without marked
stressor-related cortisol activity, the hormone is lowest during the night. The act of
waking up causes a shock that produces a three-fold increase within the first 30 minutes.
Cortisol levels then gradually decline as the day progresses. The stress response of the
HPA takes 20-30 minutes and as such, cortisol spikes 30 minutes after a stressor and
then slowly falls until returning to baseline. The down regulation of cortisol is conducted
by cortisol detection cells in the pituitary and hypothalamus. These receptors know the
appropriate levels (baseline) of cortisol, which fluctuate across the day. When levels of
cortisol are high for that time of day, down-regulation is initiated.
The fluctuations in humoral and cell mediated immunities are referred to as
counter regulatory (Clow, 2001). In a 24-hour period these cycles will alternate, with
humoral immunity being most active in the day and cell-mediated immunity occurring
largely at night. Individuals may be predisposed to one strategy over another and stress
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can influence both. If stress suppresses one system (down-regulated), the other system
then increases in activity (increasing the likelihood the system is in over-regulation).
This description is a broad review, not intended to serve as a formal
representation of the sequela of processes that are influenced by the stress response.
There are many other processes and components of immunity that can affect health. For
example, sIGA is an antibody of the mucousa, which provides primary defense and
protection of the mucous lining (Clow, 2001). Acute stress raises sIGA while chronic
stress lowers it. Not every immune process that can be influenced by stress is outlined
here. The purpose of this summary of immune functioning is to provide an explanatory
mechanism for the relationship between stress and health: both share at least one
common hormone, cortisol. This review illustrates the multidimensional influences of
stress and health. Stress does not simply equate to impaired health through attenuated
systems. Rather, chronic stress can create dysregulation, interfering with biological
homeostasis. Generally, cortisol is a product of stress and a regulator of immunity and
this dual role may not be coincidence. The immune system requires significant amounts
of energy to produce and maintain- resources that become more precious in an
emergency situation.
Cannon (1932) described the physiological responses of the sympathetic nervous
system as a fight-or-flight response. The term now refers to the supposed purpose of the
sympathetic nervous system in response to threat- to create an increase in short-term
energy intended to help the organism escape or combat the threat (Taylor, Klein, Lewis,
Guenwald, Gurun, and Updegraff, 2000). The term, however, may be inappropriate due
to the implication that the response to a threat creates only two possible reactions and is
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equally possible between the sexes. Women may respond differently to threats than men.
The popularity of the fight-or-flight conception of stress may have been partly due to the
utilization of male participants in the majority of stress research. The disproportionate
use of males, as opposed to females in such research has been attributed to the high
percentage of males in colleges during the early part of the 20th century as well as
females having been excluded from studies due to their greater cyclical variation in
neuroendocrine responses. The existence of gender differences in response to threats
was posited by the field of evolutionary psychology, which is a discipline of psychology
that seeks to understand the evolutionary value of psychological processes.
Taylor et al. (2000) cited evolutionary psychology as the conception of research
that facilitated the consideration of revising the flight-or-flight response to stress after
considering multiple endocrine and behavioral studies in affiliation. A central tenet of
the theory is the importance of producing offspring and the development of behavioral
mechanisms that facilitate successful reproduction. Due to a greater parental investment,
(ie., the large amount of energy required for producing offspring) fighting or fleeing
from a threat does not appear to be as adaptive for women as men. For example, in the
likely environment in which humans evolved (the African plains), an attack by a
predator would be a threat. Pregnant women (or a new mother with a child) would not
be adept at fending off a predator by attacking or running away. Because women are the
biological caregivers for infants, a fight response would put them and their offspring at
risk while a flight response may not be feasible for women that are pregnant or caring
for young children. Instead, strategies may have evolved among women to affiliate with
other women in times of stress. Therefore, behaviors may have evolved that involved
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removing offspring from a threat and creating support systems that preemptively
provided protection in case a threat arose. Such a system would likely involve
cooperation with other women, as cooperation with males creates a risk of rape and
other violence. Taylor and colleagues (2000) referred to this response as tend-andbefriend. This system would likely have emerged from the attachment and care giving
that mothers often feel with their offspring. This is not to suggest that fight-or-flight
does not occur in women, only that the response may be more descriptive of the male
stress response (nor is this to suggest tend-and-befriend only applies to females, as
discussed later).
Taylor et al. (2000) identified hormonal differences between men and women
that supported the notion that the fight-or-flight response is less descriptive of the female
stress response than the male response to threat. Hormonally, men have greater
concentrations of testosterone while women have greater amounts of oxytocin.
Testosterone increases with acute stress and is associated with higher levels of hostility
(Girdler, Jammer, and Shapiro, 1997). Additionally, testosterone is an androgen
associated with aggression and rough-and-tumble play is largely absent in women.
Female hostility is not associated with the arousal of the sympathetic nervous system.
This, Taylor et al. (2000) argued, is supportive of the notion that while women are also
aggressive, it is not tied to testosterone and the arousal of the sympathetic nervous
system. While aggression levels may not manifest differences across gender, the
conditions that create aggression may differ. Men may feel aggression in response to
stress due to the higher amounts of testosterone. Therefore, the stress response of
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aggression would not be as common in women. This reasoning challenges the likelihood
of a “fight” stress response among females.
The presence of increased levels of oxytocin in women would reduce the
likelihood of a “flight” response as well as provide a mechanism for tend-andbefriending as a stress response. Oxytocin is a hormone released by the posterior
pituitary as part of the PNS. The hormone is found to have a sedative and anxietyreducing property found in virtually all mammals. Because of this property, oxytocin is
utilized by the body in down-regulation of the stress response. While oxytocin is in
females and males, Taylor et al. (2000) identified three reasons that there may be sex
differences regarding the role of oxytocin in the stress response. First, females have
more oxytocin released in a stress response than males. Second, androgens inhibit
oxytocin and therefore the higher levels of testosterone found in males during the stress
response would inhibit the oxytocin released. Third, estrogen influences the effect of
oxytocin and would be more influential in women as they have higher levels of estrogen
than males.
Affiliation behavior also seems related to oxytocin (Taylor et al., 2000).
Oxytocin may promote maternal bonding with an infant based upon data showing that
pregnant and breastfeeding women were found to be calmer and more social than
matched-age women, and this mood was correlated strongly with oxytocin levels. The
calming effect of oxytocin may have initially evolved to promote bonding between
mother and offspring, but it also may increase r females‟ tendencies to create affiliation.
This has the evolutionary advantage of additional protection from predators. Female
affiliation has been seen among many primates, and is beneficial for allowing young
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females to gain experience in tending infants. The affiliation behavior can take place
without the hormonal influence as well (Keverne, Nevison, & Martel, 1999). Oxytocin
can prime affiliation behavior among females but affiliation may be maintained among
primates because of higher order brain functioning that allows the primates to recognize
the benefits of affiliation.
Taylor et al. (2000) contended that oxytocin was related to relaxed mood,
maternal behavior, and social affiliation. The benefits of social affiliation can be
recognized by organisms with higher cognitive abilities. Sex differences then exist in
the stress response, as females would be more likely to engage in social behavior when
stressed because of lower testosterone and greater amounts of oxytocin than females.
Taylor and colleagues argued there is ample evidence supporting this, such as in rodent
studies in which crowding is found to stress male rodents but calm female rodents
(Brown & Grunberg, 1995).
The affiliation choice is not random, as Schacter (1959) found that women
preferred to affiliate with other women who are perceived as being similar to
themselves. Women engage in more social networks, which Taylor et al. (2000) view as
being a part of the stress response. Women also engage in more close relationships with
same-sex peers and are more likely to refer to them for support (Belle, 1987). Recall that
Wheeler & Miyake (1992) found that women were statistically significantly more likely
to compare themselves with a family member and men were more likely to compare
themselves with a famous person, suggestive of the greater importance of affiliation
among females. This does not mean that women are less stressed. Taylor et al. (2000)
reviewed research that found female affiliation could be stressful. For example, women
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rank interpersonal stressors as the most frequent stressor and causing the most stress
(Davis, Mathews, & Twamley, 1999). While social affiliation may be a stress response
found in females, this response may itself cause stress.
The differences in hormone levels between men and women appears to prime
them to adopt different strategies in response to stress (Taylor et al., 2000). This
conclusion is a generalization, as women will engage in fight-or-flight and men can
engage in tend-and-befriend, but the point is that there is a tendency towards sex
differences in response to stress. The greater down-regulation of the stress response and
the enhanced social support generally found in females over males is a possible
explanation for the longer life span of women because of a reduced vulnerability to
stress-caused health deficits. Women may then be less likely to engage in stress-coping
risk behavior (such as smoking) and less vulnerable to conditions associated with
chronic stress (such as cardiovascular problems).
Stress is a deemed threat that creates a cascade of hormonal changes in the body.
Sex differences found in the stress response (Taylor et. al, 2000) imply biological
variation. Once a threat has been identified, men and women may respond to a threat
differently due to differences in their amounts of testosterone and oxytocin. Differences
occur not only between biologies but also between philosophies. The HPA stress
response is regulated by the hypothalamus, which is first activated when the amygdala
detects a threat. The amygdala may be influenced by psychological processes. People
with high psychological resources (perceived personal control and self-esteem)
experience greater de-regulation of amygdale activity when presented with a threat
(Taylor, Burklund, Eisenberger, Lehman, Hilmert & Lieberman, 2008). Corresponding
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lower cortisol activity was also found with lower amygdala activity. The lower
amygdala reactivity in those with higher psychological resources likely results in
decreased cortisol activity. Psychological processes are affected by social comparisons.
For example, self-esteem has been argued in the previous sections as being influenced
by social comparisons. One‟s perception of stress influences one‟s biological response to
stress, and social comparisons play a role in perceptions.
The Concept of Stress
The previous review of the stress-response underscores our considerable
progress in understanding the biological relationship between stress and the body.
Identifying a strong relationship between stress and health, however, has been
surprisingly difficult. This is due in part to the difficulty in measuring the concepts of
stress and health as well as how the two interact. Social comparison seems to be
involved, even in the biological process of stress, as the tend-and-befriend stress
response apparently causes an organism to seek out “similar others”. Stress, like social
comparison and RD, is an indirect variable that cannot be directly measured. As such,
there is controversy surrounding the definition and measurement of stress (Jones &
Bright, 2001). There is also disagreement about whether or not the construct of stress
even exists. The history of the construct of stress and the relationship between stress and
health will be briefly described to underscore current issues in the measurement of these
constructs.
Seyle (1956) formally proposed the current conception of stress. His notion of
stress only referred to the physiological response to challenge. Despite a wide range of
types of stress, Seyle contended that the body has one non-specific response- the general
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adaption syndrome (GAS). The GAS consisted of the three stages of alarm, resistance,
and exhaustion. Alarm is the initial indication of the presence of a stressor (a stressor is
anything inducing stress, a rather circular definition). Resistance is the body‟s
maintenance of the physical changes. Exhaustion occurs when the exertion of the body‟s
physiological response can no longer be maintained. These physiological changes
include increased heart rate and a redirection of biological processes (discussed
previously). This conceptualization of stress has been criticized, most notably for being
overly simplistic (Hinkle, 1973) and for being circular in defining stressors as anything
that causes stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Seyle (1976) admitted that at the time his
GAS model was first put forward that wasn‟t very proficient in English and that he
would have preferred to use the word strain to refer to responses to stress (Jones &
Bright, 2001).
The stress research community has not agreed upon a definition of stress but
subsequent definitions incorporated the influence of perception into the stress response.”
(p. 20). Lazarus & Folkman (1984) defined stress as a “particular relationship between
the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing”. McGrath
(1976) referred to stress as “A (perceived) substantial imbalance between demand and
response capability under conditions where failure to meet demand has important
(perceived) consequences his or her resources and endangering his or her well being” (p.
19). Other researchers however have recommended abandoning the use of the construct
of stress entirely (Hinkle, 1973; Pollack, 1988) while others contend there is no
disagreement about the definitions (Cox, 1993). Jones & Bright (2001) concur with
Lazarus & Folkman (1984) that the term “stress” should be used to describe a process of
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the relationship between person and environment, accommodating the role of perception
and stress.
As stress research grew in popularity, the way in which stress is perceived has
changed (Jones & Bright, 2001). The current conception of stress is dependent on
perception and therefore changes as a result of study. Stress has shifted in mainstream
culture from being considered an unavoidable facet of life to a man-made creation,
capable of being avoided (but they contend that stress in some form or fashion probably
cannot be completely avoided). Jones and Bright primarily blame social scientists for
propagating this incorrect conception and suggest a rather entertaining posit that people
may be more stressed today because they feel we can avoid it, but cannot avoid it
because stress is unavoidable. The conceptualization of stress seems to be as important
to experiencing stress as it is to understanding the concept.
Three approaches to conceptualizing stress are currently used- traditional,
interactional, and transactional (Jones & Bright, 2001). The traditional approach
assesses stimulus-response situations. For example, a researcher may compare the health
of one country to another, conjecturing that one country‟s inhabitants may have more
stressors than the other country and therefore greater health problems may occur in that
country. This approach is useful for identifying overall trends but ignores individual
differences in the conceptualization of stress.
The interactional approach recognizes three conditions in the stress response:
environment, intervening variables, and strain outcomes (Jones & Bright, 2001).
Environmental events are the stressors (such as workload). Intervening variables are
individual differences (such as personality type). Strains are the effects experienced
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(such as anxiety). The intervening variables are a set of conditions that will either
increase or decrease the strain of the stressor. The interactional approach considers
individual differences, unlike the traditional approach, but not the interaction between
the environment and the person‟s response.
The transactional approach shifts the emphasis of stress research to the
interaction of variables (such as the environment and personality) on the appraisal
processes of the individual in determining if a situation is stressful (Lazarus, DeLongis,
Folkman, & Gruen, 1985). Appraisals are combined from personal agendas and
objective inferences. Personal agendas include such things as one‟s beliefs about the self
and the world. When a transaction is deemed as stressful, coping processes are then
employed to manage the relationship between the environment and person (this
determines the type and intensity of the stress reaction). For example, previous
experience with a given stressor will influence future appraisals. Under a transactional
approach, a stress relationship is constantly changing because appraisal and coping are
tied to environmental conditions and previous experience. What taxes a person‟s
resources once may be insignificant the second time around and the event may have
never bothered another individual because of personality, environment, and/or biology.
The relationship by which social comparison affects health is considered here as
being transactional. Social comparison is a process whereby one evaluates one‟s abilities
in relation to others (and therefore evaluates one‟s social standing). Furthermore, social
comparison is likely employed in appraisal and coping. Appraisal processes include a
personal agenda, which would utilize social comparisons in the creation of beliefs about
the self and the world. Social comparisons would also be used to gauge if one has the
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resources to contend with a situation by comparing oneself to others with similar
resources. Coping process may then be employed to blunt any distress created, and may
also use social comparisons, such as adjusting the relevance of comparison groups
and/or dimensions. When a person is evaluating whether they have the resources to meet
a demand, comparisons to similar others would be made. As an example of social
comparison in appraisal and coping, a person about to take their first driver‟s test might
think of peers who have recently taken the test and recall what they said about the test to
determine if the experience might be stressful (appraisal). If the act of taking a driving
test was evaluated to be stressful, then social comparisons may be used to manage the
stress, such as thinking of less competent peers that passed the test (coping).
Frustration may emerge as a consequence of these comparisons when people
believe that they should have something that they currently do not have (but others do
have). Social comparison may also be used as a source of comfort in the face of stress
(coping). Some stressors arise from social comparisons and some are managed by social
comparisons. This raises the issue of just how many of our stressors are created by social
comparisons. In a modern society in which lethal physical threats are rare, just about all
stressors may be derived from social comparisons. In modern societies, stress may be
perceived during public speaking, difficult tests, job interviews, and blind dates because
people are concerned that their wishes or expectations will not be fulfilled. Social
comparison may play a large role in the stress response because most stressors are
derived from expectations, which are themselves derived from comparisons to others.
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The Measurement of Stress
Since there are multiple interpretations of stress, there are multiple methods of
measurement. The interactional and transactional theories differ in their measurement
approaches. Interactional approaches are supposed to independently measure
environmental and intervening variables (Kasl, 1978), while transactional approaches
recommend measuring environment and intervening variables together (Lazarus, 1990).
Transactional theorists take issue with separating these variables from environmental
conditions. Under a transactional approach, stress is a process and not a condition, yet
stress measures are typically output measures- measures of a stress condition. As
evidence of such output measurements, Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, (1983)
created the perceived stress scale (PSS) which uses 14 statements that describe varying
stress conditions and is scored along a 4-point scale. The final score is a measure of how
stressed the individual has been in the last month. Lazarus (1990) took issue with the
PSS and most output scales because they ignore the context of the stress and the
resulting unidimensional stress score does not illustrate the qualitative variations in
stress response (for example, is one threatened or challenged by the stress felt?).
Lazarus (1990) instead recommended two approaches towards a transactional
measurement of stress. The first is a continuing approach in which points of transition
are measured. Points of transition are the times when the relationship between person
and environment has changed. These points would be difficult to establish but should be
theory based. Perhaps realizing that this approach would be difficult for most
researchers to implement, Lazarus‟ second approach uses a single score that is assumed
to be a summary of the stress response. This is an aggregate appraisal of the stress
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process by the individual. Unlike output measures, which are presumed by the
researcher in terms of quality and quantity of stress, the individual rates their own stress.
This approach marginalizes the role of fluctuations and memory errors and risks
distorting the relationship of the person and environment with regards to the stress
response. However, such an approach does avoid the pitfalls of traditional output
measures because the qualitative condition of the stress is measured.
In either interactional or transactional approach, measurement issues emerge
(Jones & Bright, 2001). For example, both the interactional and transactional approaches
may utilize self-reports. Intervening variables such as personality are also typically
measured through self-reports. Self-reports have reliability and validity issues because
recall and social facilitation may bias responses to the items. The use of self-report
measures of stress is problematic particularly because stress may not be a conscious
experience (Jones & Kinman, 1990). Breznitz (1990) criticized Lazarus‟ (1990)
approach to measuring stress, stating that his measures rely only on stress components
that are accessible to awareness. By doing so, these measures inadvertently focus on
sociological content (such as work, family, and health) and shift the focus away from the
psychological factors (such as the need to be liked, anxiety, and loss of perceived
control). In this regard, objective measures would then be superior, such as a report of
major life events. Such a scale is objective because though self-report, it does not have a
perceptive stress rating. The ratings of the stressfulness of such events are pre-set and
consistent across participants. However, such a measure is not necessarily a
comprehensive measure of stress because while major life events are stressful, so are
daily hassles (Jones & Bright, 2001).
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Additionally, objective measurements discount the perceptive component (Jones
& Bright, 2001). Perceptive measures of stress have been found to be related to health.
The PSS, despite being criticized by Lazarus (1990) for ignoring the context of the stress
and the emphasis on a unidimensional stress score, has been found to be
psychometrically fit and a superior measure of health than a life events scale (Cohen,
Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) and has been shown to be significantly correlated to
anxiety and depression (Spada, Nikčević, Moneta, & Wells, 2008). As will be described
next, the relationship between stress and health is far from understood, in no small part
because of conceptual and measurement issues related to stress. The nature of the
relationship of stress and health is hypothesized to be indirect and is another difficulty in
stress-health research.
Stress and Health
In the typical study that examines the relationship between stress and health,
participants have been exposed to a common stressor and a specific health effect is
measured (e.g., resistance to infection, cardiovascular trouble, mortality). For example,
Romanian children that had been adopted into the UK before the age of four showed
profound psychological dysfunction in attachment, increased inattention/overactivity,
heightened autistic features and greater cognitive impairment than children of the same
age but adopted within the UK (Rutter, Kreppner, & O‟Conner, 2001). Romanian
institutions were at the time regarded as very poor, and therefore stressing, while those
in the UK were considered superior. A greater number of the Romanian children
demonstrated an undiscriminating social approach, a seeming lack of awareness of
social boundaries, and a difficulty in picking up social cues on what is socially
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appropriate or acceptable to other people. The pattern of inattention/overactivity was
also greater in the Romanian sample. The authors commented that these symptoms are
typically considered predominately genetic with only minor psychosocial influences.
Such studies emphasize the continuing development of our understanding of the
effects of stressors and deprivation. Stressors, however, do not cause equal amounts of
stress and the health effects can be varied. Additionally, the relationship between stress
and health is indirect and therefore makes it more difficult to identity the existence of
this relationship. Cassell (1976) considered this relationship the imperative charge of
modern epidemiologists. In traditional epidemiology, the causal agent is sought for a
specific disease. Stress can be considered an agent but it does not cause a specific
disease. This makes a “cause-effect” relationship difficult to identify. This is especially
true in analyses with aggregate data, such as using large groups of people that have been
exposed to a suspected stressor because there would likely be different and multiple
health effects. Therefore, the agent-disease approach is not appropriate for the stresshealth model. Because stressors are assumed to influence health through adjusting a
person‟s endocrine levels and changing susceptibility to disease, no specific disease will
always result from stress.
Cassell (1976) believed that stress influences an organism‟s host immunity- the
overall ability of the body to respond to threats. Constant stress leads to high cortisol
levels that over time reduce the effectiveness of the body‟s response to a perceived
threat. Cassell recommended that instead of viewing environmental conditions only as
stressors and non-stressors, they should also be considered as sometimes being
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protective or beneficial. Psychological processes may improve host immunity, similar to
what stress-immune researchers now consider coping (Jones & Bright, 2001).
Cassell (1976) charged modern epidemiologists to identify the characteristics of
the psychological phenomenon that evoke major endocrine changes in the brain. Instead
of looking towards concrete events and situations, the constants in stress-health
relationship are likely to be psychological. Marmot (2005) considered these constants to
be one‟s sense of control and social participation. People that had a high sense of control
could cope better with stressors, and those who participated in activities their culture
deemed necessary had good protective health. Consequently, they would be more
resilient to a stressor than someone who had less perceived control and could not engage
in as much social participation.
The health effects of stress are likely opportunistic, resulting from increased
susceptibility caused by stressors. This susceptibility can be due to compromised
immune functioning from the endocrine effects (such as prolonged cortisol production)
or from unhealthy coping behavior (such as smoking). An ideal study of stress and
health would require hundreds of measures of health, and this is assuming that one has a
valid measure of stress.
Cassell (1976) suggested that social processes may influence health indirectly.
Similarly, the psychological processes suggested by Marmot (2005) to influence health
may result from social comparison. One‟s amount of perceived control and social
participation were the defenses against stress‟ adverse effect on health. Perceived control
would be related to social comparison in that it is perceived control that influences the
impact of stressors. People gauge their ability to control a situation based largely upon
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their previous experiences and what is observed in others. Perceived control, then, is
evaluated in part through social comparison. Social participation, the ability to engage in
activities one considers necessary to their position, also would be derived from social
comparisons to similar others. Furthermore, entitlement (the arguable required state for
RD) can be considered to result from a perceived inability to engage in social
participation. One identifies social participation- what one should have and do- from
comparisons to those deemed we identify as similar. This is how social comparisons
may affect health. By serving as the psychological process by which perceived control
and social participation is derived, and the RD experienced from such comparisons may
be chronically stressing, thus lowering host immunity.
Status has been tied to health, and this relationship is not explained away by the
possibility that those in higher status have access to better resources (Marmot, 2005).
This status syndrome is an explanation for the finding that disease and mortality follow a
social gradient. This is not to suggest that one‟s boss will always outlive them. While
status is related to health, so too is one‟s assessment of one‟s status (an overall sense of
“how one is doing”).
Social comparisons are a possible mechanism by which an assessment of status
influences health because social comparisons have a bi-directional relationship with selfesteem. The threat to self-esteem derived from social comparisons in the evaluation of
status may be chronically stressing. This would have two effects on health. The first
would be impaired host immunity that would increase the rate and duration of illness.
The second would be employing coping mechanisms, which may be detrimental to
health (such as smoking or risk-taking behaviors).
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In studying the nature of social comparison, the processes by which status
influences health can be predicted. Marmot‟s status syndrome may therefore be
predicted by the nature of the social comparisons. If the underlying nature of the
comparison processes that lead to status-related health effects can be identified, then
control may be achieved and possibly even management of this relationship. The
purpose of this research is to create a social comparison-based measure of RD/RG and
test the relationship between RD/RG and status and health. These constructs will be
reviewed here, followed by the measures selected to measure them.
Review of the Measurement of Selected Constructs
I. Status
The construct of status is based upon the hierarchy of individuals within a given
system (Marmot, 2005). Social status is the hierarchy of individuals along culturally
valued dimensions. Marmot identified two predominate mechanisms of status: perceived
control and participation. The relationship between these two constructs and health was
referred to as the “status syndrome”. He challenged dominant alternate explanations
such as health selection (i.e. poor health causes lower social status, not the reverse), and
spurious variables (e.g. education and genetics). While these variables do contribute to
the so called status syndrome, they do not sufficiently explain why social stratification
of health occurs in industrialized countries.
Marmot (2005) contended that the difficulties in identifying a relationship
between status and health are due to an inability to adequately measure status. His
experience with the relationship between status and health began with the Whitehall
study, now known as Whitehall I, which began in 1967 with 18,000 male British civil
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servants classified by pay grade (Marmot, Adelstein, Robinson, & Rose, 1978). When
the sample was culled to only those aged 40-64, those on the bottom of the hierarchy
had four times the risk of death as those at the top of the hierarchy. Even those second
from the top of the hierarchy had a higher mortality rate than those at the top of the
hierarchy. A subsequent study, termed Whitehall II, began in 1985 with 10,308 men and
women enrolled in a continuing health study to further explore the status syndrome
(Marmot, 2005). The study indicated that the status syndrome occurs in women as well
as in men. The social gradient has been implicated in the development of a wide range
of diseases such as cancers, depression, suicide, lung disease, and self-reported health.
All of these disease processes were inversely related to status. This supports a
consideration of status level as a stressor that compromises host immunity.
One explanation for the status syndrome is simply that those at the top have
better funding for medical screening and care (Marmot, et al. 1997). Those at the lower
grades were more likely to be identified as having the diseases and being treated for
diseases. Marmot (2005) argued that this discounted the explanation of the top status
individuals having better medical care because if those in the top tier of status lived
longer because of better medical care, incidence would be higher at the top because of
increased detection. The increased treatment of disease at the lower levels was indicative
of the lower levels having more disease.
Marmot (2005) contended that at first blush the samples seemed homogeneousall participants were non-labor based employees in an industrialized country; none were
living in abject poverty and none had ostensible wealth. However, within the sample
were clear stratifications that he felt genuinely represented one‟s perception of the
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world. Marmot noted that the stratification of pay grade in the civil service represented
differences in income, education, and the level of control in the job- the factors he
hypothesized to create the status syndrome. Rather than being three orthogonal
variables, each variable relates to the other to contribute to one‟s sense of status and
control. A scientist studying each variable would likely run into difficulty identifying a
health effect. For example, if education was used as a variable, the college graduates in
religion may earn significantly less money than accounting majors. Likewise, studying
income separately would be confounded by variations in perceived control and social
status across equally paying positions. The Whitehall studies identified an effect because
pay grade in the British civil service was a very precise classification system of status.
Marmot considered status as a combination of education, income, and perceived control.
RD/RG is considered here to be influenced by status as well as by the two contributors
to the status syndrome (social participation and perceived control) but also to influence
perceived control and social participation.
Measuring Status
Citing the interest of Stouffer et al. (1949) in education as a predictor variable of
the relationship between promotion and attitude, Runciman (1966) believed that there
was a parallel to this finding occurring in Britain, and considered education as generally
equivalent to status. Runciman (1966) contended that education was both the mode of
social mobility and a contributor to RD. When a controlled sample of participants were
given an infectious dose of an upper respiratory infection (URI) causing agent,
participants with high school diplomas or less education had the most colds, while
participants with some college had the fewest colds (Cohen, Frank, Doyle, Skoner, &
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Gwaltney, 1998). This effect was significant even after controlling for age and antibody
resistance. Marmot (2005) identified a health gradient tied to status, and considered
status as a combination of education, income, and perceived control.
Previous research has identified a relationship between self-reported perceived
control and health. The relative contributions of material deprivation, education, national
economic inequity, and perceived control to self-reported health were examined among
seven post-communist countries (Bobak, Pikhart, Rose, Hertzman, & Marmot, 2000).
The data was obtained from surveys administered during the 1990s, subsequent to the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The authors noted that during this time
period inequity was rising in many of the countries and was at best sustained in the
countries. The seven countries included in the study were: Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia. Material deprivation was determined
through the sum of responses to three questions relating to the frequency with which
participants did not have all the food, clothing, and electricity/heating needed on a fourpoint scale. National economic inequity was measured with the Gini coefficient.
The Gini coefficient is a mathematical calculation of income distribution in a
region (Yitzhaki, 1979). It is an overall measure of inequality in a given region that can
range from 0-1, with a score of “1” denoting that one person has all of the resources and
has been argued to be a measure of social inequity. Perceived control was assessed
through aggregated ratings of agreement to nine questions (such as “At home, I feel I
have control over what happens in most situations” and “I often have the feeling that I
am being treated unfairly” (Bobak et al., 2000). The Cronbach‟s alpha reliability score
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for this study was 0.65. Self-reported health was measured by one question, “How do
you rate your health over the last 12 months?”
The Gini value was not found to be a statistically significantly predictor of selfreported health once individual characteristics (age, sex, education, and marital status)
were controlled (Bobak et al., 2000). Education and material deprivation were, however,
related to self-reported health, and perceived control was found to statistically
significantly mediate the effect of material deprivation. Put differently, the impact of
material deprivation on health appeared to be influenced by the extent to which an
individual felt that they could exert control (change) a situation.
One‟s objective situation may be less important to health than one‟s beliefs
regarding one‟s ability to change that situation. Research suggests that in a sociological
context, self-reported health measures are influenced by perception of control (e.g.,
Bobak et al., 2000). Measures of objective inequity do not uniquely predict social health
gradients once perceived control and individual differences are accounted for.
Measuring Social Participation
Marmot (2005) considered perceived control and social participation to be the two
factors contributing to the status syndrome. Social participation, the second construct of
the status syndrome, is the degree to which a person engages in societal activities. For
example, many members of the United States consider home ownership an important
activity. Perceived control is likely both a component of status and an influencing
process while social participation is a characteristic of status. At each status level
participatory activities exist, but the list of those activities one can engage in increases as
one moves up in social status. Marmot stated: “All societies have rankings because
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individuals are unequal in a variety of ways; but not all societies have the same gradients
in health. What matters is the degree to which inequalities in rankings lead to
inequalities in capabilities- being able to lead the lives they most want to lead” (p. 240).
The construct is expansive and ambiguous, complicating measurement. Every individual
has a unique set of formal and informal membership groups, and each has a collection of
activities.
Social participation has been related to mental health and civil order. Gough
(1952) stated “The thwarted needs for group appreciation and recognition found outlet in
socially disapproved ways. Once this assessment was made, the counseling process was
simple and straightforward, and a constructive solution could be achieved” (p. 227). In a
longitudinal study, social participation was found to be moderately stable over a twentyyear period (Hyyppä, Maki, Alanen, Impivaara, & Aromaa, 2008). Ellaway & Macintyre
(2007) did not find any consistent pattern of social participation to be predictive of risk
factors for CVD, though participation in groups was found to be negatively correlated to
distress, and this effect was stronger in men than women.
Social participation may be a broader construct than perceived control. One‟s
sense of perceived control is a more concise concept, while social participation has
greater ambiguity about what is considered regular participation in formal and informal
membership groups. Chapin (1928) measured social participation by recording the
quality of membership to provided organizations. A score of 1 indicated membership, 2
for attendance, 3 for financial contributions, 4 for committee memberships, and 5 for
holding office. Gough (1952) tested behavioral and psychological problems related to
social participation using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) as a
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template (32 of the total 42 items were taken directly from the MMPI). The scale
included such items as “I like science” and “When in a group I usually do what the
others want rather than make suggestions”. This measure was designed to assess
tendency towards social participation, operating on the assumption that social
participation was important for psychological health.
The longitudinal study of social participation described above by Hyyppä et al
(2008) recorded the frequency of attendance in clubs (e.g. concerts, sports events),
congregations (e.g. church attendance), outdoor and productivity activities (e.g. hiking,
fishing), hobbies (e.g. drama, singing), and studying and cultural interests (e.g. reading
books, listening to music). Though the measure was not provided in the publication, the
scale was likely lengthy, tailored to the population of interest (urban dwelling Finish
individuals), and influenced by the researchers‟ beliefs regarding social participation
(twenty years ago). Ellaway & Macintyre (2007) used reports of frequently participating
in an exhaustive list of groups divided into: political groups, trade unions, environmental
groups, civic groups, church or other religious groups, charitable organizations,
education, art or music group or evening class, social clubs, and sports clubs, gym or
exercise classes. The Assessment of Life Habits (LIFE-H) measures social participation
in those with disabilities across dimensions such as attaining adequate fitness,
recreation, and interpersonal relationships (Fougeyrollas, Noreau, Bergeron, Cloutier,
Dion, St-Michel, 1998). There are multiple measures of social participation, and large
variation between them, and each measure appears to target a specific population (much
more than perceived control). Similar to RD, social participation seems to have a
contentious history of alternate interpretations and varied approaches to measurement.
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Measurement of Stress
Stressor effects occur when a situation is evaluated as threatening or demanding,
and resources to cope with the situation are deemed to be insufficient (Lazarus, 1990).
Stress is measured in the present study because stress is predicted to be the mechanism
by which RD/RG affects health. Measures of stress are objective or perceptive (Jones &
Bright, 2001). Objective measures of stress, such as measures of life change events or
daily hassles, attempt to assess the occurrence of events predicted to be stress inducing.
Both perceived stress and objective ratings have been found to correlate significantly to
stress, and both likely contribute uniquely to the stress health relationship (Cohen,
1986). The health effect of stress, however, is believed to be from the emotional
response to an objective event (Lazarus, 1977). The success of objective stress measures
in predicting health is therefore probably due to the frequency with which objective
stressors are perceived as stressing (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). Objective
stress measures miss situations that may be stressing to an individual but which are not
considered to be stressing by researchers. Furthermore, from a practical consideration,
no measure could be considered truly “objective” because researchers determine what is
considered a stressful event from either theory or data (i.e. neither could be considered
completely immune to human perception). As such, objective measures not only fail to
measure the emotional response to an event but also are likely to never fully assess the
entirety of stress inducing events.
The perceptive measures of stress may be more suitable for assessing the
relationship between stress and health as they measure the perceived stress derived from
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events, coping processes, and individual differences (Jones & Bright, 2001). The
objective measures provide an assessment that controls for participant bias.
Measuring Stress
A reasonably psychometrically fit measure of perceived stress is the Perceived
Stress Scale (PSS), a 14-item measure of the perceived stressfulness (Cohen, Kamarck,
& Mermelstein, 1983). The PSS was designed around three factors of the stress
experience: unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloading. These factors have been
found to be central to the stress experience (Cohen, 1978; Lazarus, 1977). The scale is
evenly divided between positively and negatively worded items. It was designed for
samples with at least a junior high school education (Cohen et al., 1983). The original
study of the PSS found no sex or age differences, and was adequately reliable- both in
coefficient alpha (ranging from .84 to .86) and test-retest reliability (.85 at the two day
mark and .55 for the six-week mark). This study included three samples, two from a
college in the Western United States and the third consisted of a community sample
derived from a smoking cessation study.
Previous validation of the PSS identified relationships between the scale and
measures of life events, social anxiety, depression, and health (Cohen et al., 1983). For
life event scores, the PSS had a small to moderate correlation in all three samples. Age
effects were found in regards to the relationship between the PSS and life events when
the sample was divided into “young” (16-25) and “old” (36-70). While no significant
overall age differences had been found in PSS scores, the relationship between PSS and
number of life events was strong in the young (r = .65, p < .05), while in the old this
relationship was not found (r = .19, p > .05). The PSS was found to be a statistically
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significantly better predictor of health outcomes than the life-events score (Hotelling ttest p < .05). Increases in social anxiety were associated with increases in perceived
stress (Hotelling t-test p < .001), and the number of life events was unrelated to social
anxiety. Other authors have cautioned, however, that self-rated stress scales are mired by
anxiety (Jones & Bright, 2001; Marmot, 2005).
The perceived stress index (PSS) has been found to be psychometrically fit and a
superior measure of health than a life events scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein,
1983) and correlated to anxiety and depression (Spada, Nikčević, Moneta, & Wells,
2008). The PSS was found to be significantly correlated to affective and physical
symptoms after controlling for the variance of the life events measures. This suggests
that the PSS measures a unique component of the stress-health relationship not attained
by life events measures.
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Measurement of Health
Similar to the measurement of stress, identifying an appropriate measure of health
is also difficult because there are many processes and indicators of health to consider
(e.g. mortality, self-reported symptoms, blood pressure, hormone measures such as
cortisol, and immune measures such as immunoglobulins). In spite of these theoretical
barriers, establishing that stressful events have a health effect has been moderately
successful (Marmot, 2005). For example, research studying hostility behavior has
identified a relationship between this personality type and coronary heart disease (CHD;
Williams, Haney, Lee, Kong, Blumenthal, & Whalen, 1980). A hostile personality was
found to be a predictor of CHD independent of other contributing variables such as
blood pressure, serum cholesterol, and cigarettes smoking. Identifying an effect,
however, does not explain the reason for the effect. For example, in the study of CHD
and hostility, the authors argued that rather than hostility being causative, being nonhostile was likely therapeutic (and certainly both are possible).
The difficulty in interpreting stress-health effects is due to the indirect effect of
stress on health. An increased risk of CHD for those under constant stress does not occur
because “stress germs” get in the heart. Stress mediates the susceptibility to infectious
disease through changes in immune and endocrine activity (Glaser, 2005). The HPA is a
prominent system of study for understanding stress and health because the system
maintains host immunity. The effect of stress on endocrine levels seems to depend on
the duration of the stressor. Initial exposure to a stressor increases HPA activity (such as
a spike in cortisol activity) (Miller & Cohen, 2005). Chronic stressors, however, create
the opposite effect- the de-regulation of the system results (such as reduced cortisol
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production). Because RD and RG are considered stable psychological states, RD is
predicted to be an acute and chronic stressor and RG may function as a coping behavior,
also durable (acting as a stress buffer).
Measuring Health
Marmot (2005) stated “(I)t is a good deal more useful to ask people if they are
healthy than if they are under stress. People who respond to a question on how healthy
they feel by saying „poor‟ are correct. This single question is remarkably predictive of
subsequent risk of dying.” Idler and Benyamini (1997) examined the ability of selfreported health to predict mortality in 27 studies across several countries. The authors
selected studies that were published in English, utilized representative community
samples, and provided estimates of the effect of self-ratings of health on motality or
survival time after covariates for health status and socio-demographic factors were
included in the analysis. They found self-reported health was a better predictor of
survival than variables such as medical records or self-reports of medical conditions.
The authors noted that the health self-rating question across studies, with some studies
asking respondents to compare their health to others their age while other studies asked
for an overall general rating. Other studies emphasized the current situation (e.g. “at the
present time…”). All showed high predictability. The authors also noted that the ability
of self-rated health to predict actual health was maintained across languages; suggesting
the effect was robust to semantic wording and cultural variations.
Idler and Benyamini (1997) identified sex differences in the relationship of selfreported health and mortality: the unique effect of self-rated health on the prediction of
mortality was more apparent in men than in women. The univariate distributions of self-
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ratings of health did not differ as a function of gender, and both men and women
referred to the same criteria when self-reporting health. The authors posit that the reason
for the sex difference may be that women evaluate their health over their entire life
searching for prevalent health problems such as existing conditions or in comparison to
other women. Because women may be more likely to use social comparison in health
evaluation, the validity of self-rated health is decreased.
The self-rated health question assesses the overall array of illness and could also
be incorporating symptoms of undiagnosed diseases (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). This
can also be interpreted as indicating that self-ratings of health are representative of
human judgments of the severity of the current illness. Objective measures of health will
not capture the severity of symptoms as well as self-reports. Also, the effects of
interactions between conditions are not reflected by the additive measure of chronic
disease. The authors noted that they had found no study that had tested the association
between self-rated health and interactions of conditions. The self-rated health question
also reflects family history. The authors noted that three studies included measures of
family history or longevity and that two of these studies showed an independent effect of
self-ratings when this family history was taken into account. Another consideration
made by the authors is that self-rated health functions as a dynamic evaluation capable
of incorporating trajectory of health as well as current level. Still another benefit to selfrated health is the implication that reverse-causation is also being measured. Self-rated
health may affect behaviors that affect health. Poor perceptions may lead to less
willingness to engage in self-care, adhering to screenings, medications, and treatment,
and preventative practices, while good perceptions would increase willingness to
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participate in health promotion. Lastly, self-rated health may also reflect within-person
resources. Overall it appears that self-rated health may be an efficient rating of health,
incorporating both stress and coping ability.
Self-rated health is a perceptive rating, but ideal studies of stress and health
should include perceptive and objective measures (Jones & Bright, 2001). In our study,
HPA activity is the biological mechanism predicted to influence health through
mediation by the stress of relative deprivation. Therefore, HPA activity measures are
considered as objective measures of stress and health. Cortisol is considered the most
prominent endocrine indicator of a stress effect on health (Miller, Chen, & Zhou, 2007).
However, conflicting findings have emerged from stress studies with regard to the
hormone. There are two prominent reasons for this. The first is due to the diversity and
interaction of stressors. Stressors can be short-term (episodic) or long term (chronic),
and both are believed to have different effects on health (Maier & Watkins, 1998).
Episodic stressors include such events as having an argument or a car accident. Chronic
stressors include enduring problems such as taking care of a loved one with dementia or
being in a hostile work environment. Episodic and chronic stressors, however, can be
tied to one another, such as when one loses a job (episodic) and therefore becomes
unemployed (chronic). Episodic stressors have been studied primarily in laboratory
settings while chronic stressors in humans require field research. An organism does not
receive exposure to only one form of duration of stress- an organism experiencing
chronic stress is also likely to experience acute stressors, creating a complex interaction
that is difficult to interpret.
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The second reason for cortisol‟s standing as a contentious measure of stress is
that other variables besides stress have been shown to also influence levels of the
hormone. Circadian rhythms and the act of awakening influence cortisol levels (Czeisler
& Klerman, 1999). Sex differences have also been found. Kirschbaum, Kudiekla, Gaab,
Schommer, Untied, and Hellhammer (1999) compared salivary cortisol among women
in varying levels of menstruation and men in response to a stressor. Men‟s cortisol
response to social stressors tended to be in larger than women‟s. The gonadal hormone
estradiol may be responsible for this difference (Kirschbaum et al., 1999). Estradiol
hormone fluctuates greatly in women over the course of the menstrual cycle, with low
quantities in the early follicle stage, peaking around ovulation, and then decreasing in
the leuteal phase. Kirschenbaum et al. found that such social stress tasks as public
speaking and performing arithmetic in front of an audience induced conditions
suggestive of increased HPA activity- increases in ACTH, cortisol, heart rate, and
reduced report of calmness. This response was greater in men than women and was
believed e to be at least partially due to estradiol levels.
Salivary immunoglobulin A (sIgA) is found in mucosa and is regarded as the
main immune defense against oral antigens (Bosch, Ring, de Geus, Veerman, &
Amerongen, 2003). Due to this “front line” status and the ease with which sIgA can be
collected through salivary collection; the protein has been extensively utilized as a
measure of immune functioning (Pawlow & Jones, 2005). Individuals with sIgA
deficiency often have reoccurring and severe infections (Braconier, Nilsson, Oxelius, &
Karup-Pedersen, 1984), and sIgA levels are negatively correlated with increased
susceptibility to urinary tract infections (Brandtzaeg, Baekkevold, Farstad, Jahnsen,
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Hohansen, Nilson, & Yamanaka, 1999). Similar to cortisol, acute stress may raise sIgA
levels while chronic stress may decrease levels of the protein. Chronic stress exposure
has corresponded with reduced sIgA output (Deinzer & Schuller, 1998).
Levels of sIgA may follow a social gradient, supporting the utility of measuring
the protein in stress research (Evans, Der, Ford, Hucklebridge, Hunt & Lamber, 2000).
In a longitudinal health study in Scotland utilizing a sample of 1000 participants,
variations in sIgA were obtained based upon participants‟ sex, age, and socioeconomic
status (status was derived from census data). All were significant unique independent
predictors of sIgA. Women, lower social class, older age, and smoking were associated
with lower sIgA. The effect of social status, however, was reduced when the smoking
variable was considered in the prediction model (social status was significant at p = .024
but was p < .10 when the smoking variable was added). This finding does not refute the
use of sIgA in studies of the status syndrome. First, even after accounting for smoking
there was still a substantial portion of variance in sIgA explained by status. Second,
smoking and status interact with one another. People of lower socioeconomic status
smoke more as coping behavior (as well as engage in other risk behaviors, see Marmot
2005). A study of sIgA should therefore include a measure of smoking status as well as
other risk behaviors.
Cortisol and sIgA, however, have not been found to consistently respond to
stressors in a predictable manner. Vokmann and Weekes (2006) examined the effect of
academic examination on cortisol and sIgA levels. Students with three or more major
exams, papers, or projects had increased perceived stress (as measured by the PSS)
compared to students in the first week of summer when school was not in session. No
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significant differences were found between the groups in terms of cortisol and sIgA.
However, when participants who had increased scores in PSS before and after the
stressor were isolated and assessed, an increase in cortisol, but not sIgA, was found.
Pawlow and Jones (2005) tested the effects of relaxation training on both cortisol
and sIgA levels. Significant decreases of both measures occurred subsequent to the
training, and were statistically significantly lower than control subjects. This study of the
effect of relaxation therapy on cortisol and sIgA levels underscores the influence of
social variables on these two measures of HPA activity, while also demonstrating the
influence of acute stressors.
Bosch et al (2003) noted that of 13 studies of the effect of sIgA on academic
stress, half found an increase whereas the other half found a decrease in the protein. The
reasons suggested for this inconsistency are similar to those with cortisol. The utility of
using the measure in relation to stress health research is mired by non-stress influences
as well as differing effects of acute and chronic stressors. Studies of stress and health
have continually found that acute and chronic stressors produce opposing results (Bosch,
de Geus, Ring, and Amerongen, 2004). RD/RG may have an effect on cortisol and sIgA,
but the interplay of chronic and acute stressors may complicate identifying such an
effect. Many of the studies of endocrine and immune health find effects that are small
and within the range of healthy functioning (Glaser, Rabin, Chesney, Cohen & Natelson,
1999).
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Relative Deprivation/Gratification
As discussed previously, different approaches to measuring RD have been used due
to the varying interpretations of RD theory. Specifically, Sen (1981) stated that two
major interpretations of RD have resulted in two different approaches to measuring RDRunciman‟s (1966) feelings-centered approach and Townsend‟s (1974) conditionscentered approach. Runciman‟s (1966) feelings-centered approach is targeting the
emotional consequences of perceived inequity while the Townsend-based approach
focuses upon income-inequality and RD within income-inequality.
Although variations in measurement procedures are often necessary as
researchers attempt to apply the RD construct to other constructs, the previously
discussed approaches to the measurement of RD vary along three important dimensions
that compromise the coherence of RD theory. First, there is little consensus on which
reference groups should be used when making comparative evaluations. Second, there
has been an overriding focus on income or economic factors as the object(s) included in
such comparisons. Third, there have only been very limited efforts to assess RG and the
interaction or combination of RD and RG.
The majority of RD research has been performed using comparisons groups that
have been chosen on an a priori basis by the investigators. This may be useful in
evaluating the RD experienced if or when comparisons are made to a designated
comparison group, but does not determine if any of the participants actually utilize that
comparison group in naturalistic settings. Essentially, researchers assume that their
population sample is making the comparison to the selected group.
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Research into the influence of RD on prejudice or health might benefit by
determining whether the RD resulting from comparisons to the groups chosen by the
researcher reflects the participants‟ RD, or if this is contrived condition that may be
affected by other comparisons. For example, an individual may have a larger income
than the majority of the people in the surrounding neighborhood, but still experience a
high level of RD because that individual also focuses on comparisons to friends who
have still higher incomes and may or may not reside in the immediate neighborhood. If
researchers selected the surrounding neighborhood as the comparison group, the
individual would likely report a lower level of RD than if friends were specified as a
comparison group.
Smith & Leach (2004) are a notable exception to this critique. Through having
participants record who they were comparing themselves at random intervals they found
that participants were in the process of making a comparison 70% of the times they were
paged, generally make more individual than group comparisons, and use their previous
self as a comparison group. Researcher-selected comparison groups assess the level of
RD experienced when comparisons are made to the selected group made but not whether
the participants compare themselves to that group. Based on the example of Leach &
Smith (2004), there is no reason to assume neighbors are a significant comparison
group. Selection of comparison groups should be research driven, not researcher driven.
The next area of concern regarding the assessment of RD relates to what is being
compared or the so-called “objects of comparisons”. The most common objects of
comparison have been participants‟ economic status, typically including their income
and/or possessions. Income is a commonly used object of comparison by researchers but
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this may be due to the ease of data procurement and analysis rather than an assumption
that this is the only primary object on which people compare themselves to others. For
example, people may compare themselves to others based upon on their
accomplishments or the number of friends that they have. These comparisons could
create RD. In support of this, Leach & Smith‟s random interval comparison group
assessment research found that comparisons were made concerning money as well as
relationships and family. RD consists of distress-inducing perceptions of inequity and a
scale measuring RD should assess an individual's thoughts and beliefs while making as
few assumptions as possible about the participant‟s objects of comparison or comparison
groups.
The final limitation of extant RD measures involves the failure to measure the
related condition of RG. The feelings produced by perceived advantage may, in part,
offset the feelings caused by perceived disadvantage. For example, if an individual felt
RD based upon comparisons to a particular ethnic group, but felt RG due to comparisons
with other ethnic groups, the cumulative effect might be different than if RD was felt
relative to all of these groups. RD and RG may be opposite ends of a single continuum
or related but not orthogonal conditions but by focusing on only one, researchers may to
have only been measuring half of a construct. For example, recent research assessing the
influence of RG on prejudice suggests that while RG may be the inverse of RD, the
impact of RG is not necessarily the opposite of RD (Dambrun et al., 2006).
By measuring RG and RD together, direct comparisons can be made that assess if RG
has the inverse effect of RD as well as any cumulative conditions the two may create.
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From the literature reviewed above, inconsistencies are apparent in both the
theoretical and the implementation in RD theory. Crosby (1982) critiqued the
implementation of RD theory stating that there is no clear focus of RD theory as social
scientists focused on what created RD while political scientists focused on the
consequences of RD. Though written twenty-five years ago, the critique that RD
research suffers from a lack of operational focus appears to still be a legitimate concern.
The above-discussed research review demonstrates a lack of a coherent framework of
RD. Rather, the majority of RD research has attempted to identify situations where RD
may occur; identifying set comparisons from which RD can emerge rather than the
situations under which RD does emerge. Given the lack of coherence in the application
of RD theory, the future research of RD should remain grounded in the work of the
original researchers of the field. At the very least, current efforts to measure RD should
adhere to the lessons learned by previous efforts, such as the multiple definitions and the
importance of directly measuring dissatisfaction. Therefore, researchers developing a
measure of RD should make as few assumptions about the comparison groups and
objects of comparison as possible, and rely upon the population of interest to supply this
information. From economics (Yitzhaki, 1979) to mental health policy development
(Eibner, Sturm, & Gresenz, 2004), RD is a construct with profound implications for
social scientists in viewing human interaction and therefore requires careful deliberation
about the appropriate method of measurement.
Given the interest in measuring RD as opposed to income inequality, and our posit
that RD and RG can occur regardless of income distribution, the current study will
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follow Runciman‟s conception of RD and his approach for measuring feelings of
inequity.
Under Runciman‟s (1966) definition, a person is relatively deprived when four
conditions are met 1) when the individual does not have “X”, 2) when the individual
sees other person or persons which may include himself at some previous or expected
time, as having X, 3) when the individual wants “X”, and 4) when the individual sees it
as feasible that they should have “X”. Few RG scales were found in the literature but the
general trend was to measure it as the inverse of RD (Yitzhaki, 1979; Guimond &
Dambrun, 2002; Eibner & Evans, 2005).
A measure of RD/RG should assess the comparison groups an individual uses
(Runciman, 1966, Sen, 1981), the “who” of social comparison. No two individuals,
however, have identical reference groups. Therefore, likely comparison groups that most
individuals compare to on some level would provide the best approach for an overall
measure of RD/RG. Additionally, the objects of comparison, what is being compared,
should also be identified. Finally, an RD/RG measure should assess the perceived
inequity to the comparison groups. The approach for identifying the extent to which an
individual derives distress from comparisons to prevalent groups along prevalent objects
will not perfectly measure an individual‟s overall level of RD/RG. This is because no
individual will likely have the exact groups/objects identified (with no other
groups/objects beyond those identified). By including likely comparison groups and
objects for comparison the authors hope not to perfectly capture RD, but gain a
reasonable assessment that can be used in many situations and many different groups of
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people, a “global” measure of RD. The RG component of the scale was similar in
approach to the steps taken to develop the RD measure.
In a global measure of RD/RG, feelings of deprivation/pleasure would be
assessed for a variety of likely comparison groups. For every comparison group and
every object of comparison that is assessed, a measure of displeasure this comparison
creates is necessary. The validity of such a design depends upon the appropriate
selection of comparison groups and objects of comparison that are used by the
population of interest. Measuring RD/RG through personal assessment may be difficult
given that someone will quite likely have several comparison groups with which they
identify. However, Hyman (1942) stated the number of reference groups a person uses is
small and likely to relate to specific problems. This suggests that reference groups can
vary in location but are relatively constant and stable across time. However, it is unlikely
that the comparison groups will be the same across participants. The selection of
comparison groups should be specific enough to discriminate individuals but not so
much so as to exclude participants. For example, selecting “brothers” as a comparison
group would be too specific and cumbersome, as a “sisters” counterpart should be
included, followed with possibly a “mother”, “father”, perhaps also “grandmother” and
“grandmother”. In the above example, these potential comparison groups were collapsed
into “family members”. The participant would, in theory, read into the comparison
group whichever individuals they define as their family members, negating the need for
questions about specific family members. This was the approach used for the current
measure of identifying comparison groups- attempting to be specific enough to separate

115

groups but vague enough to allow individual variation in whom specifically belongs in
these groups.
Besides comparison groups and objects of comparison, there are other concerns
to be considered for scale development. Given that the comparison groups and the
perceived distress felt from comparisons to these groups will fluctuate with the
individual, a global measure of egoist RD/RG should be elastic in the way in which it
assesses perceived deprivation/satisfaction across comparison groups.
In the review above, the argument is made that social comparisons are
unavoidable and when one compares oneself to others and is distressed from them they
will suffer stress. This stress is likely enduring (chronic) and significant health problems
may emerge from compromised host immunity. Furthermore, RG may be therapeutic. If
these predictions are accurate, then understanding one‟s selection of comparison groups
and the dimensions of comparison are necessary for predicting the impact of social
comparison and health. The validation of a measure of RD/RG should be achieved
through identification of significant paths between the construct and status, stress, and
health. First, the operationalization of the constructs of RD/RG, status, stress, and health
are provided here. Then, a proposal is provided for a two-part study to identify
prominent comparison groups and objects of comparison and then build a measure of
RD/RG from these responses and test the construct in relation to status, stress, and
health.
Measuring Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects
To identify comparison groups and objects, the researchers created the
Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects (PCGO) scale (Holland & Kern, in prep).
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Expected comparison groups were selected based upon previous research of social
comparison and temporal comparison theory. The only group specifically stated under
Runciman‟s (1966) conditions for RD was previous self. Therefore this group was
included. Schor (1998) also identified the following groups of comparison: coworkers,
family members, friends, and members of the same religion. Schor (1998) considered
media figures as possible comparison groups. This can include characters displayed on
television even if these characters do not actually exist. Therefore, “fictional characters”
were included as possible reference group to include those individuals the participant
watches on television, in league with Schor‟s theory of a media forming a reference
group. In summary, the comparison groups identified as prevalent from previous
research were: previous self, coworkers, family members, friends, members of the same
religion, and fictional characters.
Similar to comparison groups, prominent objects of comparison were also
identified. Previous literature has primarily used financial-based comparisons
(Runciman, 1966; Townsend, 1974; Yitzhaki, 1979). The use of financial objects makes
sense using Runciman‟s (1966) conditions. Whatever “X” is, it can probably be bought.
Therefore, one object of comparison in an RD/RG scale should be a “financial” object.
Not everything one might use for comparison, however, can be purchased. As such,
there are likely other prominent objects of comparison in addition to financial objects.
A second prominent object of comparison for consideration is interpersonal
relationships. Wilkinson‟s (2005) argument that the quantity and quality of interpersonal
relationships affects health and is used as a standard of comparison suggests the
possibility that interpersonal relationship comparisons may occur and result in RD. A
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third potential object of comparison is a general, non-specified object of comparison.
Recall the first condition of RD specified by Runciman (1966): When an individual does
not have “X”. The “X” is not defined but assumed by much of the previous research to
be assessed through what the current authors refer to as the “financial” object of
comparison. Additionally the current authors posit that interpersonal relationships are an
object of comparison. These are two objects of comparison but there are likely other
prominent objects of comparison. However, if there is a good or service the individual
desires, this can be measured without specifying what “X” truly is. The definition of “X”
need not be defined by the test makers but by the participants. If asked “I feel my
coworker has it better than me” the respondent determines the degree of agreement with
this statement based on what “Xs” they find important. The term “general” describes
overall comparison- one that is not limited to financial gains or interpersonal
relationships but functions as a wide-ranging assessment. Questions measuring
comparisons for an RD/RG scale should consider “X” as being possibly financial,
interpersonal, or general to reduce the possibility of excluding possible sources of
comparisons.
To identify these prominent comparison groups and objects, the researchers created
the Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects (PCGO) scale. Expected comparison
groups were selected based upon previous social comparison research, temporal
comparison theory, and the previous testing of the PCGO (Holland & Kern, in prep).
Participants were given a set of comparison groups to rate for the “general” object of
comparison, then the “financial”, followed by the “interpersonal” object of comparison.
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Participants were provided with the following instructions at the beginning of the
questionnaire:
Think about how well you are doing generally. Now that you have the idea about how
well you are doing generally, how did you reach that conclusion? To what degree did
you compare yourself to the following groups?
Comparison groups were then provided and participants rated the degree to which
they believed that they compare themselves to each group. Participants were asked to
rate their degree of comparison to each comparison group on a scale of 1-5 with 0
indicating “no comparison” and 5 indicating “heavy comparison”. For example, the item
for the comparison group “coworkers” and the “general” object of comparison stated
“To what degree did you compare yourself to your coworkers?”
To identify additional comparison groups not listed, the following question was
included after the ratings for comparison groups for the “general” object of comparison:
Are there other groups you compare yourself to that we did not include? If so, please
write them in below along with how important this comparison is to you. Three
blanks are given, but you can write more if you need to.
This item is repeated for the “financial” and “interpersonal” comparison objects. The
“general” object set of ratings was given to participants first to prevent financial and
interpersonal-based comparisons from influencing participants‟ assessment. To identify
additional objects of comparison, the following item was included following the section
instructing participants to identify additional comparison groups:
We just asked you to compare yourself to others. We asked you to compare yourself
on how well you were doing generally. What was it that you compared yourself on?
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The PCGO was created with the intention of identifying prominent comparison groups
and objects that are used for the development of the RD/RG questionnaire.
Measuring RD and RG
The findings of the PCGO would dictate the items for a global measure of
RD/RG. The currently proposed RD/RG measure is based upon self-reported inequity of
a specified reference group in a specified condition (e.g. comparisons to coworkers on
emotional experiences). This is intended as a measure of magnitude. This alone may be
sufficient as a measure of RD/RG because although it is an objectively phrased item,
participants would likely not rate their comparison objectively. If participants believed
they were doing worse than someone and were distressed by the disparity, they might
answer this item with a lower value than another participant who felt the same disparity
but was not distressed about the situation. This item measures perceived disparity
similar to the local area index measures of RD and the condition-based approach, but is
rated by the participant instead of being derived from data (such as census data).
Previous literature has placed a heavy emphasis on financial-based comparisons.
Researchers developing a global RD measure will should identify other objects used in
addition to financial-based comparisons. For example, an individual may compare with
one group in terms of physical prowess, another in intelligence, another in employment
and still another in philosophy. One possible additional object of comparison is
interpersonal relationships. Smith & Leach (2004) found that many comparisons
participants made were about relationships and family. Wilkinson (2005) stated that the
quantity and quality of interpersonal relationships affects health. Eibner and Evans‟
(2005) research found a relationship between their measure of RD and health. The impact
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of interpersonal relationships on health suggests they may be used as an object of
comparison. In order to identify prominent objects of comparison, an approach similar to
the assessment of comparison groups should be utilized in which a list of potential
objects are provided for participants to rate as well as open-ended questions to find
additional objects of comparison. Wheeler and Misayke (1992) used self reports of
comparisons to identify prominent comparison groups. Common referents (>5%) were
close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances, strangers, family members, imaginary
persons, significant partner, and famous persons. Prominent dimensions included
academics, personality, physical appearance, lifestyle, abilities, social skills, wealth, and
opinion. Sex differences were also identified. Women were statistically significantly
more likely to compare with a family member and men were more likely to compare with
a famous person. Women were more likely to compare themselves on appearance and
men were more likely to compare on opinion. Leach & Smith (2006) followed up their
previous study (Smith & Leach, 2004) by evaluating if an ethnic minority would report
differences in both the type of comparisons (individual to group, group to individual, etc)
made and results from such comparisons. The researchers used open-ended questions to
identify what we call objects of comparison (Smith & Leach referred to them as
“domains of comparison”). The objects identified were academic skill, wealth, social
status, personality, life experience, and relationships. Measurement of these objects is
more likely to validly assess RD than a list of objects derived solely from the researchers.
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Hypothesis
Using the above described measurement approach; the following predictions will be
tested:
-

Self-report data will yield prominent comparison groups

-

Self-report data will yield prominent comparison objects

-

The RD/RG measure will have adequate psychometric properties
within the populations of interest

-

Status will significantly predict health

-

Status will significantly predict RD/RG

-

RD/RG will significantly predict health

-

RD/RG will significantly predict health over and above the affects of
stress, anxiety, and status
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 1: IDENTIFICATION OF PROMINENT COMPARISON GROUPS AND
OBJECTS WITH A COLLEGE SAMPLE
The purpose of the present study was to determine the self-rated perceived
importance of comparisons made towards likely comparison groups and objects of
comparison, as well as to identify additional prominent comparison groups and objects of
comparison. Unlike previous measures of prominent comparison groups (e.g. Smith &
Leach, 2004), the measurement approach employed is a single instance self-report
measure. This study is exploratory in that it seeks to identify prevalent comparison
groups and objects of comparison. However, the research also attempts to validate
groups/objects identified in previous research. Specifically, the a priori comparison
groups tested were: coworkers, family members, friends, members of the same religion,
previous-self, and fictional characters. The a priori objects of comparison tested were:
general, financial, and interpersonal.
Hypotheses:
-

The proposed comparison groups will be statistically highly rated as
tested through one sample t-tests

-

Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison
groups as will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being
reported in 2% of the total sample and the group must be theoretically
likely to create both RD and RG.

-

The proposed comparison objects will be statistically highly rated as
tested through one sample t-tests
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-

Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison
objects as will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being
reported in 2% of the total sample and the group must be theoretically
likely to create both RD and RG.
Method

Participants
Two hundred and thirteen participants participated (148 female) for course credit.
Incomplete questionnaires were removed, resulting in 199 participants (141 female) with
a mean and median age of 19. Prominent ethnic groups of the sample included Caucasian
(53%), Asian (17%), Hispanic/Latino (11%), and African American (9.4%), with the
remainder self-reported “other”.
Procedure
Participants were given the Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects scale
(PCGO). The PCGO contained a list of comparison groups in which participants
indicated the importance they ascribed to each group. The following instructions were
provided at the beginning of the questionnaire:
Think about how well you are doing generally. Now that you have the idea about how
well you are doing generally, how did you reach that conclusion? To what degree did
you compare yourself to the following groups?
Comparison groups were then provided and participants rated the degree to which
they believed that they compare themselves to each group on a 0-5 scale (with 0
indicating “no comparison” and 5 indicating “heavy comparison”). For example, the item
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for the comparison group “coworkers” and the “general” object of comparison stated: To
what degree did you compare yourself to your coworkers?
The comparison groups were coworkers, family members, friends, members of the
same religion, previous-self, and fictional characters (described in the questionnaire as
“TV, movie, or book characters”). The scale was designed in such a way so as to present
each comparison group within each object of comparison. Participants were given the set
of comparison groups to rate for the “general” object of comparison, then the “financial”
object, followed by the “interpersonal” object of comparison.
Since the sample consisted of college students, the participants were instructed to
consider fellow students as coworkers. To identify additional comparison groups not
provided, the following question was administered:
Are there other groups you compare yourself to that we did not include? If so, please
write them in below along with how important this comparison is to you. Three
blanks are given, but you can write more if you need to.
This question was repeated subsequent to the financial and interpersonal objects of
comparison. The general object set of ratings was given to participants first to prevent
financial and interpersonal-based comparisons from influencing participants‟ assessments
of the broad general area. To identify additional objects of comparison, the following
question was written below the section instructing participants to identify additional
comparison groups:
We just asked you to compare yourself to others. We asked you to compare yourself
on how well you were doing generally. What was it that you compared yourself to
others to?
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Results
Analyses
To test the above-described hypotheses, the data from the PCGO fell into two
categories: values derived from the close-ended items evaluating the provided
comparison groups and values derived from the open-ended items requesting additional
comparisons. Evaluation of the provided comparison groups and objects of comparison
was by statistical criteria. The ratings scale ranged from 0-5. A one-sample t-test was
performed to identify if mean ratings were greater than a rating of 2. The cutoff mean of
2 was selected because this value is less than half of the scale and corresponds to the
response of “I care a little about my comparison to this group”. Any comparison group
with a mean less than half would not be a popular enough candidate for an overall
measure of prominent groups. To avoid inflating type-1 error by conducting this analysis
for every comparison group by every object of comparison, comparison groups were
collapsed by comparison object. Any non-significant comparison group was analyzed
individually to evaluate if the comparison group was significant by any of the objects of
comparison.
Evaluation of the open-ended responses was conducted using both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. First, the answers were categorized. For example, “my wife” and
“my life partner” were categorized as “significant other”. Then, in terms of quantitative
evaluation, any new object or group that was added by less than 2% of the participants
was excluded from further analysis. Besides meeting mathematical criteria, the objects
and comparison groups provided by the open-ended responses were required to be
theoretically plausible groups or objects that could create status identification.
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Selected Comparison Groups:
Hypothesis: The proposed comparison groups will be statistically highly rated as tested
through one sample t-tests
Analyses were performed to test the significance of each comparison group within
each object of comparison using one-sample t-tests, resulting in three tests for each
comparison group. Two comparison groups were not statistically significantly greater
than the value of “2”; members of the same religion and fictional characters both had
means below a value of 2. Effect size calculations identified that the object/group
combinations of financial family and financial coworkers both had effect sizes that were
between η2 = .2 and η2 .5, placing the effect size as greater than small but not meeting
the cutoff for medium (η2 = .31 and .34 respectively). All other significant effects had
sizes above the “medium” cutoff of .5.
Gender differences were not statistically significant except for groups of the same
religion and fictional characters (see table 2). However, the means for both females and
males was below 2 for both members of the same religion (1.46 and .98 respectively) and
for fictional characters (1.70 and 1.19). The hypothesis was supported for the comparison
groups: friends, family, coworkers, and previous self, but not for members of the same
religion or fictional characters.
Selected Objects of Comparison:
Hypothesis: The proposed comparison objects will be statistically highly rated as tested
through one sample t-tests
The objects of comparison mean scores were derived from calculating the means of
each comparison group within each object of comparison. For example, the mean score
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for the general object of comparison was derived from the mean of all ratings of the six
comparison groups within the “general” object. One-sample t-tests comparing the ratings
of the objects of comparison to the cutoff of 2 indicated that the means of all three objects
(general, financial, and interpersonal) were significantly greater than the cutoff. The
effect sizes for general and interpersonal comparisons were large (above .80). The effect
size for the financial object of comparison was η2 = .23, a small effect.
Gender differences were examined by splitting the analysis based upon the selfreported gender of the participant. For females, the mean rating of all three objects was
statistically significantly greater than 2. The mean ratings for males, however, were
statistically greater than 2 for the interpersonal and general objects of comparison, but not
the financial object (t(58) = .633, p = .53). The hypothesis was supported for all three
selected objects of comparison except when the sample was split by gender- then males
only rated the interpersonal and general comparisons statistically significant.
Identification of Additional Comparison Groups:
Hypothesis: Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison groups as
will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being reported in 2% of the total
sample and the group must be theoretically likely to create both RD and RG.
Sixty-one participants identified additional comparison groups beyond those given in
the questionnaire. Any response that was given by more than two percent of the entire
sample (n = 4) was a candidate for inclusion. After coding the responses, six groups
emerged: athletes (n = 5), celebrities/TV characters (n = 4), members of the same gender
(n = 4), significant partners (n= 5), strangers, people the participant sees in social settings
such as clubs and bars (n = 7), and teammates (n = 4). After theoretical consideration,
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significant partners was removed for consideration as this group was not considered to
cause RD and RG independent of the existing groups of friends and family members and
that unlike the other groups, not all participants have a significant other (while
participants are more likely to have coworkers, friends, and family members they do not
necessarily have these groups. However, the likelihood of a participant not having a
significant other was too great to consider the group for inclusion). The hypothesis was
supported in that additional comparison groups were identified from open-ended
questioning.
Identification of Additional Objects of Comparison:
Hypothesis: Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison objects as
will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being reported in 2% of the total
sample and the group must be theoretically likely to create both RD and RG.
Open-ended questioning was used to evaluate the identified objects (general,
financial, and interpersonal) and identify additional objects of comparison. Responses
were categorized by similarity and evaluated using the 2% frequency cutoff. The item
used in the PCGO for identifying objects of comparison was not optional, unlike the
open-ended item identifying additional comparison groups. Therefore more participants
responded to this question (n = 171). Responses were categorized based upon perceived
similarity. For example, the statements “what I own” and “finances” were coded as
“financial”. Participants frequently provided multiple responses, yielding 199 coded
responses. The responses that were similar to those previously provided to the
participants were also recorded and all three were identified by more than 2% of the
participants (general, n = 11; financial, n = 23; interpersonal, n = 40). However, three
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additional objects of comparison provided by the participants included academics (n =
14), accomplishments (n = 15), and appearances (n = 16). In theoretical consideration,
accomplishments and academics may be similar. Additionally, if this scale were applied
to a non-academic population, the academic object would likely not be appropriate. As
such, the object of academics was considered to be removed from an RD/RG scale. The
hypothesis was supported in that additional objects of comparison were identified:
accomplishments, and appearances.
Conclusion
Recent research in social comparison has made considerable progress in identifying
individual differences in social comparisons but research investigating the kind of social
comparisons is still deficient. This study was conducted to test the strength of
hypothesized comparison groups and objects of comparison while also identifying other
groups and objects that have not been previously identified. A single-instance self-report
measure was used to identify prominent comparison groups and objects of comparison.
This research is important not only for the prominent comparisons that emerged but from
the technique used to identify them. Both close-ended and open-ended items were used.
Close-ended items were evaluated based on the strength of the comparison while the
open-ended items were evaluated by the popularity of the response in the overall sample.
The close-ended items were participants‟ ratings of comparison groups and objects that
were identified in previous research. The significance of the comparison groups identified
in prior studies and the participants‟ supplied comparisons were tested. Open-ended items
allowed participants to provide additional comparison groups/objects that had not been
previously identified by research but that the participants found to be meaningful. These
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were evaluated though three stages: 1) by popularity- all comparisons made by 2% or
more of the sample were considered, 2) novelty- the answer did not duplicate a previous
answer, and 3) theoretically plausibility - likely to be used in comparisons that can create
emotional states (such as RD).
In terms of comparison groups, the prominent comparison groups provided by the
researchers were coworkers, family members, friends, previous-self, members of the
same religion, and fictional characters. Evaluation of participant ratings identified that
two of the previously identified comparison groups, the members of the same religion
and fictional characters groups, were not significant. For the objects of comparison, all
three of the groups identified by prior research were supported through participant
ratings: general, financial, and interpersonal. This was true regardless participants‟ sex.
Effect size calculations identified that all comparisons were at least of “medium” strength
with the exception of financial comparisons to family members and coworkers. This
suggested that participants generally did not consider financial comparisons to these
groups, or that such comparisons were not as important as financial comparisons to other
groups (such as friends).
Open-ended questioning was used to identify any additional comparisons not
specified by prior studies selected by the researchers. The quantitative criterion for
selection was that each group had, at a minimum, at least two percent of the participants
supplying the new comparison group. This resulted in the identification of seven possible
comparison groups for inclusion: significant others, teammates, athletes, celebrities/TV
characters, strangers, people seen in social settings such as clubs and bars, and members
of the same gender. Additionally, a theoretical criterion for inclusion was that the
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comparison groups not duplicate a previously provided comparison group and would
potentially elicit comparison derived emotional states.
Two of these participant supplied groups were similar- celebrities/TV stars and
athletes. These are both groups that the individual watches on television or in films but
does not physically interact with. Therefore, these two groups could be considered one
comparison group: celebrities/athletes. Celebrities/TV characters are possibly similar to
fictional characters, which was included in the survey but was found to be a statistically
non-significant comparison group. Rather than drop this group and add the celebrities/TV
characters, these groups were merged into “fictional characters, athletes, or celebrities”.
The reported groups “strangers” and “people the participant sees in social settings such as
clubs and bars” are similar to the “general” object of comparison because they represent a
broad group of individuals that the individuals interacts with but are not familiar with.
Because of this, this comparison group was considered similar to the general comparison
group.
In addition to duplication of other comparison groups, some of the provided groups
were similar to comparison objects. For example, “significant others” are unlikely to be
used as a comparison group. They are more likely to be used as an interpersonal object of
comparison (e.g. “I have a wife, therefore I‟m doing better off than most”). Furthermore,
significant others can be considered family and/or friends, two comparison groups
already included. Lastly, while most participants are likely to have members of the
selected groups such as family members (or members they consider to be like family) not
everyone has significant others and inclusion of such a group could be exclusionary.
Another contentious comparison group, teammates, was considered to be too exclusive of
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a comparison group to be considered as a relevant comparison group. Additionally,
teammates are often regarded as friends and would fall into an already existing
comparison group.
Therefore, after theoretical consideration, the only comparison group added to the
researcher-designed list of prominent comparison groups was members of the same
gender. The resulting list of prevalent comparison groups contained the following groups:
friends, family members, coworkers, previous self, celebrities/athletes, members of the
same gender, and general.
The selected prevalent objects of comparison (general, financial, interpersonal) were
significantly relevant to participants. Males, however, did not give statistically significant
ratings for the financial object of comparison. This may be due to the majority of males
not making significant financial comparisons or not making significant financial
comparisons to the selected comparison groups. Effect size calculations identified the
interpersonal and general objects as strong magnitude effects while financial was a low
magnitude effect. This finding suggested that participants generally did not conduct
financial-based comparisons or that participants were not actively aware and/or willing to
admit that they do so.
The low rating of the financial object suggests problems with using the word
“financial” to communicate that the term includes not only physical money, but also
material means. For example, participants may not have understood that cars, houses,
vacations, clothes, and virtually all material objects are included under the concept of
“financial”. The low reported importance of financial-based comparisons is an important
consideration for a scale that requires self-assessment because much of the previous
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research on consequences of social comparison (such as RD) suggests that financialbased comparisons do indeed occur. The current finding regarding the low self-rated
importance of financial comparisons among some males should be studied further to
determine if using the term “financial” adequately represents the construct of material
means.
Open-ended questioning was used to provide an additional evaluation of the selected
objects of comparison and to identify additional objects. The quantitative criteria for
inclusion were that the object be listed by at least 2% of participants. As a check of the
selected objects, the number of participants who reported each of these three selected
objects was above this value. Additionally, based on open-ended questioning, three new
objects of comparison were considered: academics, appearances, and accomplishments.
Appearances and accomplishments were both added because there did not appear to be
any sufficient arguments against their inclusion. The object “academics”, however, is
unique to the academic setting and as such is not recommended for general use, but
should be considered with student populations. In summary, all three researcher-supplied
objects of comparison were supported by the data and two additional objects were added,
resulting in five objects of comparison: general, financial, interpersonal, appearances, and
accomplishments.
One limitation of the current research was the population sampled. The participants
were college students at a southwestern U.S. university. Some responses from
participants may be unique to college students. For example, the finding that academic
accomplishment is an important object of comparison probably will not generalize to a
non-student population. Similarly, the low rating of financial objects of comparison in
134

males may also be an artifact of a college-based sample. The low ratings of importance
for members of the same religion and fictional characters may also be due to the college
sample and may prove to be important to a non-college sample. Therefore, we are
currently conducting this study with a sample from the general population of adults.
Another limitation of the current research is that the questionnaire did not include items
that directly measured the object of comparison. This was instead inferred through the
collapsing of the comparison groups within each object. While participants identified
other objects of comparison through open-ended questioning, the lack of questions
dedicated to objects of comparison is a limitation of this study. This procedure was
adopted because the present study was focused on comparison groups. A subsequent
study focusing on objects of comparison may yield additional objects of comparison. A
third limitation of the current research was the self-report technique employed, which
may suffer from participants‟ lack of awareness of their own engagement in conducting
social comparisons and their propensity to answer according to social norms rather than
earnest feelings of comparison. For example, several participants answered the openended questioning with such statements as “I do not compare myself to others” but they
nonetheless completed the survey, giving non-zero values to the supplied comparison
groups. The survey‟s introductory statements attempted to control for this potential
problem following the recommendations supplied by Wood (1996) for the use of selfreport measures of social comparison theory.
This research identified prevalent comparison groups and objects of comparison,
resulting in the identification of seven comparison groups: friends, family members,
coworkers, previous self, celebrities/athletes, members of the same gender, and general,
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as well as five objects of comparison: general, financial, interpersonal, achievements, and
appearance. Additional research should explore the variation of importance of select
comparisons across demographic variables, such as sex. The present research established
prominent comparison groups and objects useful for the development of a general scale
to measure relative disparity (RD) and relative gratification (RG).
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 2: PERCEIVED INEQUITY SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION
WITH A COLLEGE SAMPLE
The purpose of this study was to develop a measure of RD and RG derived from the
prominent comparison groups and objects identified in the previous study. These
comparison groups were: general, friends, coworkers, family members, previous self,
fictional characters, athletes, or celebrities, and members of the same gender; as well as
five objects of comparison: general, financial, interpersonal, achievements, and
appearances.
The current RD/RG measure is based upon self-reported inequity of a specified
reference group in a specified condition (e.g. comparisons to coworkers on emotional
experiences). This is intended as a measure of magnitude. This alone may be sufficient
as a measure of RD/RG because though it is an objectively phrased item, participants
would likely not rate their comparison objectively. If participants believed they were
doing worse than someone and were distressed by the disparity, they may answer this
item with a lower value than if another participant felt the same disparity was not
distressed about the situation. This item measures perceived disparity similar to the local
area index measures of RD and the condition-based approach, but is rated by the
participant instead of derived from data. If this measurement approach is found to
measure RD and RG, health indices will be explored to identify the relationship between
the RD/RG measure and health.
Hypotheses:
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-

Magnitude and intensity items will emerge as unique dimensions as
tested through exploratory factor analysis (EFA), independent t tests,
and correlation.

-

Magnitude and intensity will have sufficient reliability as tested by
Cronbach‟s alpha and test-retest reliability.

-

Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will not have
statistically significant sex or ethnicity differences as tested through
analysis of variance (ANOVA)

-

Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will meet
construct validity as tested by correlation with related variables as well
as constructs predicted not to be related to the RD and RG.

-

Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will
differently predict self-reported health measures as tested through
linear multiple regression.
Method

Participants
A total of 246 participants (150 female) participated in the study. Ages ranged
from 18 to 42 with a mean of 20.1 and median of 19. The ethnicity breakdown was 24%
Asian, 9 % Black/African American, 12% Hispanic/Latino, 5% Pacific Islander, 47%
White/Caucasian, and 2% Other. The study was performed at a southwest educational
institution. The participants were selected from an introductory psychology course, given
informed consent, and earned course credit for participation. A subset of participants
returned two weeks later and were re-tested with the same questionnaire (n = 36).
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Missing data was accounted for through case deletion as the authors identified no
theoretical reasons for data to be systematically missing.
Measures
RD/RG Scale
The current RD/RG measure was designed to measure participants‟ perception of their
comparisons. Items were created intended to assess participant perception in reference to
the selected comparison groups along a given object of comparison. This was intended as
a measure of the magnitude of the comparisons.
The format of the questions was “How do you view yourself compared to _____
on _____?” The range of answers was on a 7-point ranging from -3 (doing worse) and 3
(doing better). Sum scores can be created for RD by rescoring all positive responses to
zero and RG by rescoring all negative responses to zero. A sum score, representing
overall consequence of comparison can be derived from a total sum score.
Scale questions were designed around a two-part format for every comparison
group by every object of comparison. The first is a measure of magnitude of disparity
(e.g. How are you doing in terms of money compared to friends?). The second is a
measure of intensity of the disparity (e.g. How do you feel about this?). The item “How
do you feel about this” followed each comparison item, also on a 7-point scale with -3
equating to satisfied and 3 equating to dissatisfied. The format measured the perceived
distress from comparisons consistent with the theories of Runciman (1966) and Cook et
al (1977) notion of magnitude and intensity.
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To assess concurrent validity, the RD/RG questionnaire was administered with
measures of related phenomenon hypothesized to be related. One such relationship is that
greater inequality negatively affects health (Eibner & Evans, 2005, Wilkinson, 1996).
Given that RD is predicted to correlate with impaired health, the measure that better
correlates to health measures is hypothesized to be the better measure of RD. RG is also
measured here, yet there are few studies assessing RG for comparison and there is as yet
no hypothesized relationship between RG and health, though RG may be employed to
offset the distress created by RD (Runciman, 1966). RG may act like the opposite of RD
and therefore the relationship between RG and health would be positive. However,
previous research has found that the RG does not necessarily cause the opposite effect of
RD (Dambrum et al., 2006).
General Health
Single item self-report measures of health have consistently been found to predict
disease and mortality (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). Therefore, participants were asked: “On
a scale of one to ten please rate your overall health” with answers ranging from 1 (Very
poor health) to 10 (Excellent health). The self-rated health question assesses the overall
array of illness and could also be incorporating symptoms of undiagnosed diseases (Idler
& Benyamini, 1997). This can also be interpreted as self-ratings of health are
representative of human judgments of the severity of the current illness. Objective
measures of health will not capture the severity of symptoms as well as self-reports. Also,
the effects of interactions between conditions are not reflected by the additive measure of
chronic disease. The authors noted that they had found no study that had tested the
association between self-rated health and interactions of conditions. The self-rated health
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question also reflects family history. The authors noted that three studies did include
measures of family history or longevity and that two of these studies showed an
independent effect of self-ratings when this family history was taken into account.
Another consideration made by the authors is self-rated health functions as a dynamic
evaluation capable of incorporating trajectory of health as well as current level. Still
another benefit to self-rated health is the implication that reverse-causation is also being
measured. Self-rated health may affect behaviors that affect health. Poor perceptions may
lead to less willingness to engage in self-care, adhering to screenings, medications, and
treatment, and preventative practices while good perceptions would increase willingness
to participate in health promotion. Lastly, self-rated health may also reflect within-person
resources. Overall it appears that self-rated health may be an efficient rating of one‟s
health, incorporating stress and coping ability.
Mental Health
The Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) is a self-report symptom rating, which has
been used since the 1950‟s when it was titled the Discomfort Scale (Parloff et al., 1954).
This scale was an adaptation itself from the Cornell Medical Index (Wider, 1948). The
scale measured symptoms along five dimensions- Anxiety, Depression, Interpersonal
Sensitivity, Obsessive-Compulsive, and Somatization. Coefficient alphas for each
dimension were high, ranging from .84 to .87. All item-total correlations were calculated
and found to contribute substantially to each dimension (all were above .50, most were
near .70). Test-retest reliability was evaluated over a one-week period and was found to
be high (values ranged from .75 to .82 for the five dimensions). Correlations between
dimensions ranged from.10 to .44
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The HSCL has been used to measure a variety of mental phenomenon including
PTSD (Glaesser et al, 2004), panic attacks (Norton et al, 1985), and racial identity
(Kibour, 2001). The HSCL has different versions that differ by the number of items.
Versions range from the 90-item form to the 15-item form depending on how many
dimensions the experimenter wishes to assess. The HSCL-30, for example, has thirty
items and measures somatization, depression, and anxiety. The 30-item version of the
scale is designed to assess symptoms of stress using a 5-point Likert scale.
Belief in a Just World
RD is a justice theory in that the construct assumes an underlying motivation for justice
in the world (Lerner, 2003). A similar justice theory is belief in a just world (BJW). BJW
research follows people‟s desire to believe that people get what they deserve (Lerner,
1965). BJW theory holds that people develop general schemata that create general
theories about reality. If one‟s theories suggest that the world is a just place then one has
a higher BJW. This belief allows individuals to approach the world as if it is stable and
orderly. Belief in a just world has been tied to mental health. Dalbert (1999) argued that
BJW had a positive impact on mental health by creating feelings of competence and
control, fostering the notion that good deeds will go rewarded (thereby allowing people to
invest in their own good future), and fostering investment in long-term goals. By creating
a stable and positive way to view the world, BJW enables people to feel that they have
control over their lives.
Like RD, BJW has undergone refinement and has been divided into a general
belief in a just world and a personal one (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Personal BJW centers
on the individual and is the belief that one‟s own fate is just, that one‟s own local
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environment is fair and just, that life is fair for oneself and one‟s own family and friends.
General BJW is focused on the world at large and is the belief that the world in general is
fair and just for all people. Lipkus et al. (1996) compared personal BJW and general BJW
and found that personal BJW was a better predictor of life satisfaction, stress, and
depression than general BJW. Based on these findings, personal BJW is likely a better
correlate to RD.
Dalbert (1999) tested if his five-item General BJW scale and seven-item Personal
BJW were fundamentally different by administering both scales and running exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) and finding a two-factor structure emerging that distinguished
between items designed to measure general BJW and personal BJW. Dalbert also found
that mental health was more influenced by personal BJW than general BJW. Personal
BJW correlated highly with mood level, life satisfaction, and self-esteem. No sex
differences were found for BJW scores. Personal BJW was correlated statistically
significantly stronger with life satisfaction and slightly stronger with self-esteem than
was general BJW. Given that the current research seeks to develop a scale that measures
egoist deprivation and is predicted to relate to health, a measure of RD is predicted to
have a statistically significant negative correlation with the personal BJW scale.
Income
Absolute income is hypothesized to be distinctly different than RD. Therefore;
feelings of deprivation should not be highly related to income. Income was assessed
through participant reports of estimated yearly income before taxes. Given that our
sample will draw from subject pool- typically a college age group- the question was
designed to ask the participant to also specify parents estimated income if they still rely
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on their parents for financial support. Responses were predicted to have a low nonsignificant positive correlation with a measure of RD/RG.
Results
The findings are presented here in the order of the hypotheses. First an EFA was
conducted to identify an underlying factor structure. Second, magnitude and intensity
were evaluated to identify if the constructs, as they were measured in the present study,
were statistically different. Then RD and RG were calculated from the data and validation
was tested through correlation analysis to selected measures that are hypothesized to
correlate strongly to a measure of RD and RG (BJW, HSCL-30, self-reported health) as
well as a measure that is not hypothesized to correlate with the proposed measures
(income). Lastly, the capacity of RD and RG to predict health was tested through
regression analysis.
Reliability
Hypothesis: Magnitude and intensity will have sufficient reliability as tested by
Cronbach’s alpha and test-retest reliability.
Reliability scores in the current study were calculated for the magnitude and
intensity items of the perceived inequity scale to assess the psychometric fitness of our
scale. The magnitude and intensity inequity reliabilities were both α = .94. A subset of
the sample completed the survey again three weeks later (n = 36). These test-retest
reliabilities were r = .67 for magnitude ratings and r = .74 for intensity ratings, all
statistically significant (p < .001). The hypothesis was supported in that both magnitude
and intensity ratings had sufficient reliability.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
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Hypothesis: Magnitude and intensity items will emerge as unique dimensions as tested
through exploratory factor analysis (EFA), independent t tests, and correlation.
EFA was performed to identify the factor structure of the measure (n = 246, 154
female). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .91
indicating that a sufficient sample for performing an EFA was obtained. Bartlett‟s test of
sphericity was statistically significant (p < .001), suggestive of high inter-item
correlation.
The extracted communalities of the model ranged from .53 (intensity response to
accomplishment comparisons to members of the same gender) to .87 (magnitude
response to appearance comparisons with previous self). Fifteen factors emerged as
having eigenvalues over 1, while scree plot inspection suggested an 11 factor model. The
initial eigenvalue cumulative percent was 71% for the 11-factor model and 77% for the
15-factor model. The 15-factor model was selected for inspection. Assessment of the
rotated factor matrix revealed consistent loadings on object of comparison. Both
magnitude and intensity for a given object of comparison items would load on a single
factor that was unique from other objects.
The comparison group, it seemed, did not load into factors with two notable
exceptions. The items measuring comparisons on a general overall object did not load
into a single factor but loaded across three, with no discernable pattern therein.
Additionally, all items measuring comparisons for one‟s previous self loaded in unique
factors independent of the other comparisons for the given object. These loadings were
unique to the comparison; previous-self comparisons on finances loaded onto a different
factor than previous-self comparisons on appearances. Magnitude and intensity loadings,
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however, generally loaded into the same factor including the loadings for previous self.
The factor loading suggest that the items loaded into groups by comparison object, except
in those comparisons concerning one‟s previous self, which loaded independently. One
exception to this was items measuring the general object of comparison. While intensity
ratings loaded within a single factor for the general object, the magnitude ratings were
dispersed across three factors. No items loaded below .3; the loadings ranged from .48
(intensity rating of financial comparisons with the same gender and also magnitude rating
of looks with celebrities/athletes) to .86 (intensity rating of financial comparisons with
previous-self). The factor transformation matrix off-diagonal elements ranged from .007
to .62, indicating that large rotation was applied.
No sex differences were identified when EFAs were performed separately for
males than females. The test of sampling adequacy for males was low (KMO = .63,
versus for females KMO = .81), but otherwise the trends in the data were identical for
males and females.
The hypothesis was not supported because intensity and magnitude ratings did not load
separately into different factors, suggesting high inter-correlation between magnitude and
intensity.
Magnitude and Intensity
Mean and variance scores for all scales and mathematically derived subscales are
presented in Table 3. There was a statistically significant difference between magnitude
and intensity scores (t(238) = 2.02, p = .045, d = .10) with intensity scores statistically
significantly higher than magnitude scores. Magnitude and intensity had a correlation of r
= .80, p < .01. Multicollinearity was estimated through tolerance and variance inflation
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factor (VIF). The tolerance was .36 and VIF was 2.7. Based on these values, analysis
proceeded with the assumption that the magnitude and intensity measures were highly
related but different constructs.
RD and RG
Hypothesis: Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will not have
statistically significant sex or ethnicity differences as tested through analysis of variance
(ANOVA)
RD and RG values were derived from the magnitude and intensity of inequity
scores to evaluate the association between these constructs and the selected health
measures. The scale design allowed for three separate constructs to be compared: RD,
RG, and the cumulative of these two constructs (termed “consequence of comparisons”).
RD scores were calculated by first setting all scores above “0” to zero (these values are
indicative of RG), then the sum of participants‟ responses to the magnitude items and the
sum of the responses to the intensity items were calculated. A similar procedure was
carried out for RG. The total score designed to assess overall social consequence was
derived through subtracting the total RD value from the total RG for each participant.
Because the consequence of comparison is comprised of RD and RG, these three scales
are not independent. The RD mean for magnitude was -10.5 (SD = 10.5) and for intensity
was -9.3 (SD = 11.1). The RG magnitude rating had a mean of 44.0 (SD = 22.3) and the
intensity rating had a mean of 46.6 (SD = 25.8). Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics
for the inequity scales, BJW, income, self-reported health and HSCL-30.
Among all scales and subscales no significant differences were found between
females and males with the exception of the HSCL-30 scale, in which the females
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reported statistically significantly higher scores (F(1,244) = 5.53, p = .02, η2 = .05). No
significant age differences were found between the RD/RG magnitude/intensity
subscales.
Differences in ethnicity, however, were found for all of the social comparison
subscales: RG Magnitude (F(5,228) = 5.37, p < .001, η2 = .11), RD Magnitude (F(5,228)
= 3.78, p = .003, n2 = .08), RG Intensity (F(5,220) = 3.05, p = .01, η2 = .06), and RD
Intensity (F(5,220) = 2.38, p = .04, η2 = .05). A Tukey HSD post hoc was conducted
finding the greatest and only significant mean difference concerned self-reported Asians
to other ethnic groups. For RG Magnitude, the lowest scores were in the Asian group (M
= 34.29, SD = 21.76). This was significantly lower than African Americans (M = 50.42,
SD = 20.33; p = .034) and Caucasians (M = 48.68, SD = 20.35, p = .001). For RD
Magnitude, the lowest scores were in the Asian group (M = -13.59, SD = 11.36). This
was significantly lower (p = .033) than the African Americans (M = -5.90, SD = 8.09).
For RG Intensity the lowest scores were in the Asian group (M = 39.13, SD = 23.19).
This was significantly lower (p = .043) than Caucasians (M = 51.28, SD = 24.98). The
RD Intensity had no statistically significant differences found in Tukey HSD. A more
liberal post hoc test (LSD) was performed to identify where mean differences were (as
the ANOVA was statistically significant). The LSD post hoc test identified a mean
difference (p = .037) between Asian (M = -11.20, SD = 11.52) and Caucasian (M = -7.50,
SD = 8.95). The self-reported Asians consistently reported greater RD and less RG than
other races. The hypothesis was not supported in that while age differences were not
found, ethnicity differences were found in self-reported perceived inequity.
Validation
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Hypothesis: Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will meet construct
validity as tested by correlation with related variables as well as constructs predicted not
to be related to the RD and RG.
As an evaluation of the validity of the current measure, correlational analyses
were performed (see Table 4). Magnitude and intensity ratings were statistically
significantly positively correlated to BJW, the general health question, and the HSCL-30.
As ratings of inequity moved from feeling deprived to feeling gratified, so too did belief
in a just world, overall self-reported health, and mental health. Furthermore, RD and RG
for both magnitude and intensity were statistically significantly correlated (p < .01) to
BJW and both health measures. No measure was statistically significantly correlated to
income except for magnitude RG (r = .14, p < .05). The hypothesis was supported as the
scales assumed to measure RD and RG for both magnitude and intensity were correlated
to the measures predicted to relate to RD and RG (BJW, self-reported health, HSCL-30)
and did not correlate to income.
Hypothesis: Magnitude and intensity dimensions of both RD and RG will differently
predict self-reported health measures as tested through linear multiple regression.
Regression analysis was performed to evaluate the degree to which RD and RG in
both magnitude and intensity ratings were predictive of the health measures of selfreported health and mental health (measured through HSCL-30). Four variables were
entered for prediction for the two health models: 1) RD magnitude, 2) RD intensity, 3)
RG magnitude, 4) RG intensity. For self-reported health, only the RG magnitude and
intensity scores emerged as being significantly predictive. The RD variance overlapped
with the RG such that only RG intensity emerged as a significant predictor. The final
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predictive model of general health emerged using the variables RG magnitude and RG
intensity (R2 = .19; RG magnitude b = .013, SE = .006, t = 2.32, p = .02; RG intensity B =
.013, SE = .005, t = 2.694, p = .08). In the prediction of the HSCL-30 measure of mental
health, only RD intensity emerged as a significant contributor (R2 = .17; RD intensity B =
-.15, SE = .02, t = -7.03, p < .001). The hypothesis was partially supported in that at least
on component of the inequity measures: RD or RG of magnitude and intensity were
predictive of health.
Conclusion
This study was performed to test a social comparison-based measure of RD and
RG and test the relationship of these constructs to related phenomenon. From economics
(Yitzhaki, 1979) to mental health policy development (Eibner, Sturm, & Gresenz, 2004),
RD is a construct with profound implications for social scientists in viewing human
interaction and therefore requires careful deliberation about the appropriate method of
measurement. A review of RD measures suggested that RD is hypothesized to be
stressing- even if not explicitly stated. Measures of RD are used to study behaviors
ranging from anger over income to racism and mortality but the construct has also shifted
in interpretation. For example, Stouffer‟s (1949) original study involved participants‟
dissatisfaction while Crosby‟s (1982) measure attempted to assess the respondents‟
bitterness. Pedersen (2004) used relative deprivation synonymously with envy. Despite
the varying interpretations, each has an assumption that RD is believed to create a level
of distress. Runciman‟s (1966) definition does not specifically state “distress” but can be
viewed as a consequence of the conflict between the individual wanting X, feeling that it
is feasible that they have X and not actually having X. Though not specifically outlined
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by Runciman‟s (1966) definition of RD, a perceived level of distress is inherent to the
existence of RD. The importance of assessing personal distress was made years ago and
continues into current critiques of RD research (Crosby, 1979; Smith & Leach, 2004).
The current measure was found to be reliable in terms of inter-item correlation but
low in test-retest reliability. The low test-retest reliability may be due to the relatively
small sample size. Another explanation for the low reliability is that the value is that
perceived inequity fluctuates among college students. Because the proposed measure had
not been previously tested, an EFA was first performed to identify the underlying factor
structure. The KMO and Bartlett‟s test both indicated that the data was sufficient in
sample size and inter-item correlation to perform an EFA. Principal axis factoring was
performed since the purpose of the EFA was to identify an underlying structure. Promax
rotation was selected because the factors were predicted to be oblique to one another. No
consistent factor structure emerged that corresponded to comparison groups, objects,
magnitude, or intensity. The results indicated a relative uni-dimensionality of the items,
suggestive that a single construct is being measured. However, the data also supported
the possibility that objects of comparison were unique factors while comparison groups
were not. This may be a testing artifact as the items were grouped by comparison object.
Randomizing items in subsequent analysis should remove this effect if it was an artifact
of the item groupings.
The second hypothesis tested was the proposed difference between magnitude and
intensity ratings. The EFA did not identify distinct factors corresponding to magnitude
and intensity items and although a statistically significant difference was found between
the two means, the low effect size suggested this difference was due to a large sample
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size. Furthermore, a high positive correlation was found between magnitude and
intensity. Due to the measurement approach used in this study, the two dimensions of
intensity and magnitude are assumed to correlate but this correlation was so strong they
may be the same phenomenon. To explore the multicollinearity of the hypothesized
dimensions the tolerance and VIF tests were performed and though intensity and
magnitude were highly correlated, they were below the cutoffs for multicollinearity.
Therefore, the magnitude and intensity were considered as highly related but
independent.
The data were transformed to reflect RD and RG dimensions of both magnitude
and intensity. Magnitude and intensity scores were similar and virtually indistinguishable.
This is not to say that magnitude and intensity as constructs are not different but the
method of measurement developed here, by nature of the self-report design, may combine
both aspects. When the participants rate how they are doing in relation to another person
along a given dimension they are already adjusting for intensity when they give their
ratings. In other words, people are not giving a truly objective non-emotional rating of
their position in each item but appear to be producing a conclusion based upon these
comparisons. As such, the intensity dimension of this scale may be superfluous.
Ethnicity differences were found for the RD/RG scores. Post hoc analyses
revealed the significant differences were from scores between self-reported Asian
ethnicity against African Americans and/or Caucasians. Asians scores of RD Magnitude
and RG Magnitude were significantly lower compared to African Americans and Asians
scores of RG Magnitude and RG Intensity were significantly lower compared to
Caucasians. This suggests that there may be cultural variations in perceived inequity
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and/or cultural differences in the reporting of inequity. Further research that does not
employ a self-report design would illustrate this effect further.
The self-report measure of inequity derived from prominent groups and objects of
comparison yielded a measure that was evaluated as high in construct validity due to
significant correlations with theoretically related constructs (BJW, general self-reported
health, and mental health) while also showing a low correlation with a theoretically
unrelated construct (income). Furthermore, components of the scale expected to measure
the magnitude and intensity of the perceived inequity were independent from one
another. EFA suggested a unidimensional construct.
RD and RG seem to account for the variations in health differently. In terms of
self-reported health, only one‟s RG- overall amount of perceived superiority was
contributive. Conversely, RD seemed predictive of mental health. A person‟s perceived
gratifications- one‟s successes compared to others- was related to positive health.
Perceived disparity seemed related towards mental health. While causation conclusions
should be discussed with caution, this finding suggests that RG may be therapeutic to
overall health while RD may be contributive to mental disorders.
Effect size estimation was d = .10 (a dependent t-test, independent means and
standard deviations were used for effect size estimation, consistent with Dunlop, Cortina,
Vaslow, and Burke, 1996). This low effect size suggested that the statistical significance
was due more to the large sample size. As such, the means were not considered to be
statistically significantly different.
A limitation of this study was the method of measuring prominent comparison
groups. Self-report was used to identify such groups and as such at least two
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measurement issues arise. The first is the dependence on conscious comparisons. All of
the groups and objects selected for the RD/RG measure were those highly rated by
participants as commonly occurring. Comparisons that the participant is not aware are not
captured. The second concern is the assumption that participants had at least a cursory
understanding of social comparison processes. This was not always the case, such as one
participant‟s response to the open-ended comparison group question that “I don‟t
compare myself to others, I‟m my own person”. Being independent and looking to others
to get a sense of standing are not mutually exclusive. Other researchers have explored the
importance of social comparison to the individual (e.g. Buunk & Gibbons, 1999). The
impact of these concerns is difficult to assess from the present data. One could argue that
these are limitations create a shallow assessment of RD/RG. Alternately, perhaps RD and
RG are only derived from conscious and conspicuous comparisons. A third concern was
the sample, which consisted of college students at a southwestern U.S. university. The
sample may provide a limited range of variation of perceived inequity. As the purpose of
the present study was the validation of this measurement approach and to explore
possible health effects, future research should expand on the health measures as well as
increase the demographic variability of the sample.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 3: IDENTIFICATION OF PROMINENT COMPARISON GROUPS AND
OBJECTS FROM AN EXPANDED POPULATION
Both studies in experiment one were exploratory studies with the aim of
identifying and validating a measure of perceived inequity. Study one attempted to
identify prominent comparison groups and objects in the population of interest. This was
accomplished using the Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects (PCGO), a measure
by which participants rate their perceived importance of supplied groups along given
objects of comparison found in previous research to be prominent. Additionally, the
PCGO includes sections for participants to add groups or objects that they find
meaningful. After the data from administering the PCGO were analyzed, items intended
to measure perceived inequity from these groups/objects were created. The scale was
validated through strong correlations with related phenomenon (e.g., belief in a just
world) as well as low correlations with phenomenon predicted to be unrelated (e.g.,
income). The scores of perceived inequity were also calculated to estimate relative
deprivation (RD) and relative gratification (RG) in both magnitude and intensity. With a
reasonable support for a valid measure, the scale was compared to indicators of health.
A strong relationship was found between perceived relative social position and health
ratings.
The sample, however, consisted of psychology students enrolled in a
southwestern U.S. university and they participated in the study for course credit.
Furthermore, the health ratings were all self-reported. The perceived inequity scale
measured both magnitude and inequity. This measure was lengthy and test fatigue may
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have influenced responses. The overarching purposes of experiment two were to
increase the demographic variability of the sample and to replicate the previously
identified relationship between the developed scale and health.
Study one and two was conducted to evaluate the feasibility of developing a reliable
and valid self-reported measure of inequity that can predict health. Both studies sampled
from a state university and as such generalizing the findings of social comparison effects
to a population beyond college students may not be accurate. The purpose of this study
and the subsequent study are to evaluate the measurement technique and effects identified
in studies one and two with a more diverse population.
The same scale that was used in study one was used here. The a priori comparison
groups tested were: coworkers, family members, friends, members of the same religion,
previous-self, and fictional characters. The a priori objects of comparison tested were:
general, financial, and interpersonal.
Hypotheses:
-

The proposed comparison groups will be statistically highly rated as
tested through one sample t-tests

-

Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison
groups. These groups will be identified through two tests: the proposed
group being reported in 2% of the total sample and the group must be
theoretically likely to create both RD and RG.

-

The proposed comparison objects will be statistically highly rated as
tested through one sample t-tests
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-

Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison
objects as will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being
reported in 2% of the total sample and the group must be theoretically
likely to create both RD and RG.
Method

Participants
One hundred and eighty participants participated (76 female). Incomplete
questionnaires were removed, resulting in 154 participants (68 female) with a mean age
of 34 and median age of 31. Prominent ethnic groups of the sample included Caucasian
(51%), Asian (4%), Hispanic/Latino (26%), and African American (16 %) with the
remainder self-reported “other” (3%).
Procedure
Participants were recruited from two Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada. Local DMVs were selected because the general
population of U.S. citizens visits the DMV; even those without a driver‟s license get state
IDs at a DMV. Additionally, patrons of the DMV often wait long periods of time in an
indoor environment and that facilitates test taking. Participants were recruited at a booth
set up at the entrance with a sign soliciting participation (the sign stated “Bored? Take a
short study. Return it when you leave. For UNLV. Free water”). For participating,
participants received their choice of either bottled water or hot chocolate, depending on
the weather.
Measure
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Participants were given the Prominent Comparison Groups and Objects scale
(PCGO). The PCGO contained a list of comparison groups in which participants
indicated the importance they ascribed to each group. As per the findings in Study one,
the instructions for the PCGO were revised to increase facilitation of admitting to social
comparison. The following instructions were provided at the beginning of the
questionnaire:
Sometimes we compare ourselves to other people. We compare ourselves to
others to get an idea of how well we‟re doing. Sometimes we also compare
ourselves to how we had it previously- our previous selves. Below is a list of
groups of people you may compare yourself to. The purpose of this test is to
measure which groups you compare yourself to and how important each
comparison is to you. Please read each question and determine for each group of
people how strongly you compare yourself to them. Thank you.
Also as per the findings of study one, open-ended questioning identifying prominent
comparison groups and objects was immediately provided before any of the researcherprovided groups were offered. For the open-ended items, the following instructions were
provided: “Think about how well you are doing generally. Remember, we compare
ourselves to others to get an idea of how well we‟re doing.” This was followed by the
item asking “We asked you to compare yourself on how well you were doing generally.
What was it that you compared yourself to others to?” along with space for the
participant‟s response. To measure comparison groups, the next item was phrased “Who
was it that you compared yourself to?”
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Comparison groups were then provided and participants rated the degree to which
they believed that they compare themselves to each group on a 0-5 scale (with 0
indicating “no comparison” and 5 indicating “heavy comparison”). For example, the item
for the comparison group “coworkers” and the “general” object of comparison stated, “To
what degree did you compare yourself to your coworkers?”
The comparison groups were coworkers, family members, friends, members of the
same religion, previous-self, and famous people (the previous implementation of the
PCGO in study one had used a slightly different term, “fictional characters”, described in
the questionnaire as “TV, movie, or book characters”). The scale was designed in such a
way so as to present each comparison group within each object of comparison.
Participants were given the set of comparison groups to rate for the “general” object of
comparison, then the “financial” object, followed by the “interpersonal” object of
comparison.
Results
Analyses
As with study one, analysis was performed by analyzing the values derived from the
close-ended items measuring the provided comparison groups and interpreting the
answers supplied for the open-ended items requesting additional comparisons. For the
first set of data, evaluation of the provided comparison groups and objects of comparison
were based upon statistical criteria. The objects of comparison mean scores were derived
from calculating the means of each comparison group within each object of comparison.
For example, the mean score for the general object of comparison was derived from the
mean of all ratings of the six comparison groups within the “general” object. The ratings
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scale ranged from 0-5. A one-sample t-test was performed to identify if mean ratings
were greater than a rating of 2. The cutoff mean of 2 was selected because this value is
less than half of the scale and corresponds to the response of “I care a little about my
comparison to this group”. Any comparison group with a mean less than half would not
be a popular enough candidate for an overall measure of prominent groups. To avoid
inflating type-1 error by conducting this analysis for every comparison group by every
object of comparison, comparison groups were collapsed by comparison object to avoid
excess analyses. Any non-significant comparison group was analyzed individually to
evaluate if the comparison group was significant by any of the objects of comparison.
Gender differences were also investigated in the importance of selected groups and
objects of comparison with analysis of variance (ANOVA). Age effects were also
assessed through ANOVA (age was categorized as 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, and 50 and
over).
Evaluation of the open-ended responses was conducted using both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. As with study one, the answers were categorized. Then, in terms of
quantitative evaluation, any new object or group that was supplied by less than 2% of the
participants was excluded from further analysis. Besides meeting mathematical criteria,
the objects and comparison groups provided by the open-ended responses were required
to be theoretically plausible groups or objects that could create status identification. As
with the quantitative data, gender and age differences were also investigated in the
importance of selected groups and objects of comparison.
Selected Comparison Groups:
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Hypothesis: The proposed comparison groups will be statistically highly rated as tested
through one sample t-tests
Similar to study one, two comparison groups were not statistically significantly
greater than 2 (see Table 5). Members of the same religion and fictional characters had
means below 2 for all of the objects of comparison; general, financial, and interpersonal.
There was no statistically significant difference between males and females between
comparison group ratings (see Table 6). Age effects were found for the rating of one
comparison group, members of the same religion (see Table 8). Those over 49 gave a
statistically significantly higher rating for members of the same religion than those aged
18-24 and 25-34. The hypothesis was supported for all of the comparison groups except
for members of the same religion and fictional characters.
Selected Objects of Comparison:
Hypothesis: The proposed comparison objects will be statistically highly rated as tested
through one sample t-tests
One-sample t-tests comparing the ratings of the objects of comparison to the cutoff of
2 indicated that the means of all three objects (general, financial, and interpersonal) were
significantly greater than the cutoff. The effect sizes for general and interpersonal
comparisons were medium (above .30). The effect size for the financial object of
comparison was .22, making the cutoff qualify as a small effect.
Gender differences were examined by ANOVA. None of the objects of
comparison were statistically significantly different (see Table 6). Age similarly did not
show a statistically significant difference by object of comparison. The hypothesis was

161

supported in that all three predicted objects of comparison (general, financial, and
interpersonal) were statistically significantly highly rated.
Identification of Additional Comparison Groups:
Hypothesis: Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison groups.
These groups will be identified through two tests: the proposed group being reported in
2% of the total sample and the group must be theoretically likely to create both RD and
RG.
One hundred and fifty-four participants (97%) identified additional comparison
groups beyond those given in the questionnaire. Any response that was given by more
than two percent of the entire sample (n = 4) was a candidate for inclusion. Despite the
large portion of the sample that chose to provide additional comparison groups, after
coding the responses, only one additional group emerged, the general comparison group
(n = 13). Many other potential comparison groups were provided, however, there were
few repetitions in the responses (such as “Barry White, which was re-coded as “famous
people” and unrelated answers such as “the economy <is not good>”) or responses
reproducing an existing group (such as “friends”, which was listed by twenty
participants) or previous-self (n = 11). Several groups that were popular in Study one
were near but below the cutoff and were not eligible for consideration, such as the groups
“members of the same sex” (n = 3) and “famous/fictional characters” (n = 2). The
hypothesis was supported in that new groups were identified for consideration such as the
“general” comparison group.
Identification of Additional Objects of Comparison:

162

Hypothesis: Open-ended items will identify additional prominent comparison objects as
will be assessed through two tests: the proposed group being reported in 2% of the total
sample and the group must be theoretically likely to create both RD and RG.
One-hundred and forty-one participants (89%) identified additional objects of
comparison. Open-ended questioning was used to evaluate the identified objects (general,
financial, and interpersonal) and identify additional objects of comparison. Responses
were categorized by similarity and evaluated using the 2% frequency cutoff. For
example, the statements “wealth” and “possessions” were coded as “financial”. The
responses that were similar to those previously provided to the participants were also
recorded and all three were identified by more than 2% of the participants (general, n =
11; financial, n = 45; interpersonal, n = 10). However, two additional object of
comparison provided by the participants emerged as prominent, “health/looks” (n = 12),
and “knowledge” (n = 13). The hypothesis was supported in that several new comparison
objects were identified such as knowledge, health and looks.
Conclusion
Identification of prominent comparison groups and objects is the first step of the
two-step approach outlined above for the measurement of perceived deprivation. While
meaningful groups and objects were previously identified in study one, several problems
with the prior research were corrected: The instructions were revised to increase
acknowledgement of engaging in social comparison, the open-ended items were
presented before the close-ended items to reduce bias, and the sample was broadened to
more accurately reflect the U.S. population. The revised questionnaire was presented to
patrons of two DMVs in Southwestern United States, which increased the variance of
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the sample. Results were similar to those found in study one but with fewer new
comparison groups or objects provided by the participants.
The primary purpose of this study was to verify the findings of study one, with a
sample with greater age and ethnic distribution. Close-ended and open-ended
questioning was used to identify prominent comparison groups and objects. For
comparison groups, the prominent comparison groups provided by the researchers were
coworkers, family members, friends, previous-self, members of the same religion, and
famous people (changed from “fictional characters” in the previous iteration of the
PCGO). All of the provided comparison groups were supported as being prominent as
tested through one-sample t-tests, except for members of the same religion and fictional
characters. No gender differences were found in that both females and males agreed on
which groups were meaningful. Because of the expanded age range, analysis was
conducted to identify if the prominent comparison group ratings differed by age
category. An age effect was identified for members of the same religion. Specifically,
those over the age of forty-nine had statistically significantly greater means than those
that were younger (18-24 and 25-34 but not 35-49). This may have been a statistical
artifact caused by the somewhat small sample size of those over the age of forty-nine
(20). However, it is also reasonable to assume that such comparisons are more
meaningful to that group in the sample. As the overall mean did not meet the cutoff for
consideration, this comparison group did not appear to be prominent enough to include
in the measure.
In terms of additional comparison groups, only the “general other people”
comparison group again emerged as prominent from the open-ended items seeking
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additional groups. Unlike the previous study, however, no other groups emerged as
prominent. Assessment of the open-ended responses indicated that a possible reason for
this was that participants reported comparison groups that had already been selected by
the researchers.
All of the provided comparison objects were found to be statistically significant
(general, financial, and interpersonal). Like the identification of additional comparison
groups, fewer additional objects emerged in this study compared to study one.
Participants included “health” and “knowledge” as additional meaningful objects of
comparison. This is interesting because the “health” object is similar to the
“looks/appearances” object found with the predominately young sample in study one,
but the use of the word “health” suggests that with increased age comes the increased
emphasis on functioning of the body, not just appearances. Additionally, the
“knowledge” object is similar to the “accomplishments” group that emerged in study
one. Also, while in study one the “financial” object of comparison was not statistically
significant among males; the males in the expanded age pool did report financial
comparisons as being important.
While this study sought to overcome some of the weaknesses identified in study
one, there were some limitations. The self-report nature of this measurement approach
produces comparisons the participant thinks are important and are willing to disclose.
Participants may not be aware of social comparisons (Wood, 1996). However, the
purpose of this study was to identify if a self-report measure of social comparison can
predict health. As such, a self-report approach to the identification of prominent
comparisons is practical for the current test question.
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There were considerably fewer comparison groups and objects provided by this
sample than the sample of college students in study one. This may be indicative of test
fatigue or not understanding the question. Additionally, this may be influenced by
exposure to college courses that may have presented concepts such as social
comparison. All of the participants in study one had exposure to at least one psychology
course (by virtue of their participation for course credit). The present sample, however,
may not have had any exposure to higher education. The participants‟ education was not
assessed in the present study. This should be investigated in subsequent research
becauseas education may relate to one‟s ability to identify with abstract concepts such as
social comparison. Another reason for the reduction in participant-provided comparisons
may be the greater demographic variability in the current sample. By expanding the
population, the variability in comparisons may have been greater than the statistical
cutoffs. For example, while celebrities emerged as a prominent comparison group in
study one with college students, this group was not found to be prominent in the sample
of the general population patrons of the DMV. . Perhaps celebrities are an important
comparison group to young college students. As such, the final measure for study two
may be too broad to validly measure participants‟ prominent comparison groups and
may reduce the strength between prominent comparisons and health.
This research identified prevalent comparison groups and objects of comparison,
resulting in the identification of five comparison groups: friends, family members,
coworkers, previous self, and general, and four objects of comparison: general, financial,
interpersonal, and health. The present research established prominent comparison groups
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and objects useful for the development of a general scale to measure relative disparity
(RD) and relative gratification (RG).
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 4: MEASUREMENT OF RD/RG IN THE GENERAL POPULATION AND
THE ROLE OF SELF-REPORTED INEQUITY IN HEALTH PREDICTION
The purpose of this study was to develop a measure of RD and RG derived from the
prominent comparison groups and objects identified in the previous study. These
comparison groups were: general, friends, coworkers, family members, previous self; as
well as five objects of comparison: general, financial, interpersonal, health, and
knowledge. In study two, a relationship was found between perceived inequity and
health, but may have been minimized by the youthfulness of that sample.
The current RD/RG measure was based upon self-reported inequity of a specified
reference group in a specified condition (e.g. comparisons to coworkers on emotional
experiences). This was intended as a measure of magnitude. This alone may be
sufficient as a measure of RD/RG because though it is an objectively phrased item,
participants would likely not rate their comparison objectively(supported by the finding
in study two that the magnitude and intensity self-report measures were statistically near
identical). If participants believed they were doing worse than someone and were
distressed by the disparity, they may answer this item with a lower value than if another
participant felt the same disparity was not distressed about the situation. This item
measures perceived disparity similar to the local area index measures of RD and the
condition-based approach, but is rated by the participant instead of derived from data.
Hypotheses:
-

The magnitude ratings of perceived inequity will have sufficient
reliability as tested by Cronbach‟s alpha
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-

The site types will differ significantly by personal income but not
perceived inequity

-

The magnitude dimensions of perceived inequity will meet construct
validity as tested by correlation with related variables as well as
constructs that are expected to be unrelated. Specifically, perceived
inequity will be statistically significantly correlated to perceived
control, perceived stress, and self-reported status but not statistically
significantly correlated to income.

-

The magnitude dimension of inequity will not have statistically
significant sex or ethnicity differences as tested through analysis of
variance (ANOVA).

-

The magnitude dimension of inequity will have statistically significant
differences in age and education as tested through ANOVA.

-

The magnitude dimensions of both RD and RG will differently predict
self-reported health measures as tested through linear multiple
regression and contribute unique variance to the prediction of health in
addition to perceived stress and perceived control.
Method

Participants
Two-hundred and ninety nine patrons of two DMVs of a city in Southwestern
United States participated in the study. Incomplete surveys were addressed by case
deletion. Also, a “check” question was included to verify participation interest (the item
was “As a friendly check to make sure you‟re reading every question, please circle “2”
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for this question). Incomplete surveys and those participants not correctly answering the
check item were removed the sample, resulting in 267 participants (104 female). Ages
ranged from 18 to 77 (mean of 31 years). Prominent ethnic backgrounds included
White/Caucasian (40%), Hispanic/Latino (24%), Black/African American (20%),
Asian/Pacific Islander (11%), and Native American (2%). For analysis purposes, the
Native American group was collapsed into “Other” (5%).
Procedure
Participants were recruited from two Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada. The DMV was selected because the general population
of U.S. citizens visits the DMV; even those without a driver‟s license get state IDs at a
DMV. Additionally, patrons of the DMV often wait long periods of time in an indoor
environment, thereby facilitating test taking. These two specific DMVs were selected
because one DMV (known as the American Pacific DMV) is in a relatively affluent area
while the other (known as the Sahara DMV) is in a lower-income area of town.
Because this study also sought saliva samples from participants, only male
participants were asked to provide saliva samples for assessment of cortisol and sIgA due
to the biological variation in females previously described. Salivary collection was
performed only between the hours of 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. to control for the influence of
circadian rhythm. The only exclusionary criterion for participating in the survey portion
was a failure to speak and read in English. For males, exclusion for submitting a saliva
sample was acknowledgement of an autoimmune medical condition such as allergies,
autoimmune disease, endocrine metabolic disorders, or acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome.
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Participants were recruited at a booth set up at the entrance with a sign soliciting
for participation (the sign stated “Bored? Take a short study. Return it when you leave.
For UNLV. Free water”). To assist recruitment and address the self-recruitment
limitation identified in study one, a student also approached patrons to seek participation.
The student stated, “Hello, I‟m with UNLV conducting a research study. Please help us
out; take this study in with you and fill it out while you wait. Drop the survey off when
you leave.” If participants agreed, the student verified that they spoke English and
understood the questions. The response rate to this recruitment was 65%. Participants
received either bottled water or hot chocolate depending upon weather conditions.
Measures
Income. Absolute income is hypothesized to be distinctly different than RD.
Therefore, feelings of deprivation should not be highly related to income. Self-reported
personal income, household income, and education items were therefore measured
through participant reports of estimated yearly income before taxes.
Education. An item of self-reported education was included to address a
limitation identified in study three. Participants reported their education as one of the
following choices: Some high school, Completed high school/GED, Some college,
Completed college, Some graduate school, Completed graduate school, or I prefer not to
say.
Perceived Control. Perceived control was assessed through aggregated ratings of
agreement to nine questions (e.g. “At home, I feel I have control over what happens in
most situations” and “I often have the feeling that I am being treated unfairly” (Bobak et
al., 2000). Previous research has identified a Cronbach‟s alpha reliability score for this
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scale as 0.65 Scores along this measure mediate the affects of material deprivation,
suggesting the measure is a valid assessment of perceived control.
Social Participation/Status. There is no consistently used measure or format to
assess the construct of social participation. Marmot (2005) asserted that social
participation was related to the status syndrome. This conclusion was based upon studies
similar to those that are described above: exhaustive lists of organizations and abilities
in which participants rate their ability to have or engage in them. Each available measure
appears to have been tailored for the population of interest. None of the current
measures of social participation are appropriate for the current study. The purpose of the
current research is to test a measure of RD, and as such, an untested measure of social
participation would not be useful for construct validation. Given the unclear boundaries
and wide diversity that may occur in social participation, a generalizable and
psychometrically fit measure would need to be developed for the current population of
interest (U.S. adults). Developing and testing a new measure of social participation is
beyond the scope of the current research. Marmot (2005) considered social participation
the process by which status affects health (along with perceived control), though from a
research perspective social participation was not necessary for the identification of
status.
Due to the conceptual and measurement issues outlined above, social participation
was measured through a self-reported status rating. Previous research has identified a
discrepancy between one‟s reported status and actual standing (Runciman, 1966). A
single question was included that measures status, following the structure provided by
Thompson and Hickey (2005) of five class systems (lower class, working class, lower
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middle class, upper middle class, and upper class). This class structure was selected
among others (Gilber, 2002, Beeghley, 2004) because of the clear boundaries between
classes (e.g. upper middle class is argued to be household income between $100,000 and
500,000). Participants were asked: “What class do you consider yourself? (please circle
the appropriate number). A scale was provided of five categories (Lower, Working,
Lower middle, Upper middle, and Upper). Each ranking had four ponts, allowing for a
response range of “1” (corresponding to the lowest ranking of Lower class) to “20”
(corresponding to the highest ranking of Upper class).
Perceived Stress. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) (Cohen, Kamarck, &
Mermelstein, 1983) was used to measure perceived stress. This 14-item inventory
measures the frequency of feelings of anxiety regarding potentially stressful events over
the last month. Responses range from zero (never) to four (very much so). The PSS was
designed around three factors of the stress experience: unpredictable, uncontrollable, and
overloading. These factors have been found to be central to the stress experience
(Cohen, 1978; Lazarus, 1977). The scale is evenly divided in positively and negatively
worded items and designed for samples with at least a junior high school education
(Cohen et al., 1983). The original study of the PSS found no sex or age differences, and
was adequately reliable- both in alpha (coefficient alpha ranged from .84 to .86) and
test-retest (.85 at the two day mark and .55 for the six-week mark). Validation of the
PSS identified relationships of the scale with measures of life events, social anxiety,
depression, and health measures.
Biological Parameters. Cortisol and sIgA were collected through voluntary saliva
donation. Saliva samples were collected and assayed with Salivary Cortisol Enzyme
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Immunoassay Kit 1-3002 and Secretory IgA Enzyme Immunoassay Kit 1-1602, both
from Salimetrics, LLC. Collection and handling procedures will be consistent with the
recommendations of Shirtcliff, Granger, Schwartz, & Curran (2000) and Salimetrics.
Only males were recruited for participation in the saliva donation for two reasons. The
exclusion of females from salivary donation was because of hormonal variations that
may confound with a stress-immune relationship and the nature of the study design. A
relationship between the current measure of RD/RG and endocrine or immune activity
has not previously been established. Sex differences may exist in regard to HPA activity
(Kirschbaum et al., 1999), and an effect found may not be outside the range of health
functioning (Glaser et al., 1999). Furthermore, this study utilized a between-subjects
design without any within-subjects component. The majority of endocrine and immune
research regarding stress establishes a within subject baseline, exposes participants to a
stressor or control, and collects biological samples before and after the hypothesized
stressor at varying time intervals (Coste, Strauch, Letrait, & Bertagna, 1994). The
naturalistic setting of the present research does not facilitate within-subject testing. Any
effect that exists may be moderated by sex and/or barely detected. Because of the
influence of the menstrual cycle on the cortisol response to stress, and the previous
research findings of greater cortisol response in men, the health measures of cortisol and
sIgA were only attained from male participants.
Self-reported health. Single item self-report measures of health have consistently
been found to predict disease and mortality (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). Self-reported
health functions as a better predictor of survival than variables such as medical records
or self-reports of medical conditions. The authors noted that the wording of the self-
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rated health question differed across studies, with some asking respondents to compare
their health to others their age while others asked an overall general rating. All showed
high predictability of health, suggesting the concept of self-rated health status is robust
to semantic differences in wording. In the current study the participants were asked: “On
a scale of one to ten please rate your overall health” with answers ranging from 1 (Very
poor health) to 10 (Excellent health). Additionally, they were asked “On a scale of one
to ten please rate your overall health compared to others the same age” with answers
ranging from 1 (Very poor health) to 10 (Excellent health).
Health Behaviors. Items assessing health behaviors were included to assess the
frequency that participants smoke, drink, exercise, and wear a seatbelt.
RD/RG. The magnitude version of the Perceived Inequity measure format
designed in study three was used to measure RD and RG. However, the items were
revised to represent the prominent comparison groups/objects identified in study two. The
five comparison groups were friends, family members, coworkers, previous self, and
general; the four objects of comparison: general, financial, interpersonal, and health.
The intensity dimension of the scale was not included to reduce survey length, as
seventy items may be too long and monotonous to adequately measure the consequence
of social comparison (and then asking participants to complete the PSS, perceived
control, and demographic items). The magnitude items were selected over intensity
because the intensity items were tethered to the magnitude; the intensity items were
“How do you feel about this?” after each magnitude item.
The RD/RG measure developed in study 2 was designed to measure participants‟
perception of their comparisons. Items were created to assess participants‟ perception in
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reference to the selected comparison groups along a given object of comparison. This
was intended to be a measure of the magnitude of the comparisons.
The format of the questions was “How do you view yourself compared to _____
on _____?” The range of answers was on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (doing worse)
and 3 (doing better). Sum scores can be created for RD by rescoring all positive
responses to zero and for RG by rescoring all negative responses to zero. A sum score,
representing the overall consequence of comparison can be derived from a total sum
score.
Results
Analyses
In the descriptive analyses, the measure and the test locations were evaluated. The
reliability of the perceived inequity measure was tested through Cronbach‟s alpha. The
test sites, the two DMVS, were contrasted by differences in age, income, and perceived
inequity.
In the construct validity analyses, the perceived inequity measure was tested
through correlation analysis with the measures of perceived control, perceived stress, and
income. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used to determine whether perceived
inequity scores differed by sex, ethnicity, and age. RD and RG were derived from
inequity scores and the influence of age and education to the prediction of RD and RG
were evaluated using linear regression.
After the reliability and validity of the measure were tested, the predictive
analyses were evaluated. The ability of RD/RG to predict health was tested as well as the
constructs‟ relationship to related phenomenon. Linear regression was used to test the
176

ability of the RD/RG measure to predict health outcomes such as the self-rated health
items, BMI, and immune measures in concert with other constructs that may predict
health such as perceived control and perceived stress.
Descriptive Analyses
The Consequence of Social Comparison inequity index item scores ranged from “-3”
(indicating the maximum perceived sense of deprivation compared to others) to “3”
(indicating the maximum perceived sense of gratification compared to others). The mean
for the perceived inequity index was 30.99 (SD = 23.00). Relative deprivation and
gratification scores were derived through a similar procedure described in study 2. The
RD mean was -4.70 (SD = 8.11) and the RG mean was 35.85 (SD = 17.80). Mean and
variance scores for all scales and mathematically derived subscales are included in Table
9.
Hypothesis: The magnitude ratings of perceived inequity will have sufficient reliability as
tested by Cronbach’s alpha; the site types will differ significantly by personal income but
not perceived inequity.
Cronbach‟s alpha for the perceived inequity was α = .94. The average age of the
American Pacific DMV was 27 (SD = 11.24) and the Sahara DMV was 34 (SD = 13).
The personal incomes of the average American Pacific DMV participant was statistically
significantly greater than Sahara, F (1, 233) = 5.79, p = .02, η2 = .02. Inequity scores,
however, were not statistically significantly different by site (F (1, 265) = 1.4, p = .24.
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimensions of inequity will not have statistically significant
ethnicity differences as tested through analysis of variance (ANOVA)
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Scores of inequity were not statistically significantly different by ethnicity, F (4,
262) = 1.30, p = .26. Similarly, the inequity scores were not statistically significantly
different by ethnicity when transformed to represent RD (F (4, 262) = 2.05, p = .11) and
RG (F (4, 262) = 1.17, p = .32).
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimension of inequity will not have statistically significant
sex differences as tested through analysis of variance (ANOVA)
The mean inequity for females was 33.50 (SD = 23.60) and for males it was 29.60
(SD = 22.50). Scores of inequity were not statistically significantly different by sex, (F(1,
265) = 1.85, p = .18), Transformed inequity scores produced RD mean score for females
of -4.58 (SD = 8.72) and of males a mean of -4.78 (SD = 7.71).
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimension of inequity will have statistically significant
differences in age as tested through ANOVA.
Age was categorized into “18 – 24” (n = 113), “25 – 34” (n = 61), “35 – 49” (n =
67), “50 – 64” (n = 22), “65 and over” (n = 4). Due to the low sample size of the final
group, the last two groups were collapsed into “50 and over”. ANOVA did not identify a
statistically significant difference by age for inequity scores (F(3, 263) = .74, p = .53) nor
for the derived measures of RD (F(3, 263) = .20, p = .90) or RG (F(3, 263) = .47, p =
.70). Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimension of inequity will have statistically significant
differences in education as tested through ANOVA.
The self-reported education distribution was “some high school” (n = 15),
“Completed high school/GED” (n = 45), “Some college” (n = 148), “Completed college”
(n = 32), “Some graduate school” (n = 8), “Completed Masters degree” (n = 8),
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“Completed Doctorate degree (n = 4). For ANOVA these groups were recoded into three
education categories: “Some/completed high school” (n = 60), “Some/completed college”
(n = 180), and “Some/completed graduate school” (n = 20). The ANOVA test revealed
no statistically significant difference in education between inequity scores (F(2, 257) =
.08, p = .92). Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.
Construct Validity
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimensions of perceived inequity will be significantly
correlated with related variables but will not be significantly correlated with income.
Correlation analyses were performed to identify the relationship between the inequity
index and measures predicted to be associated as well as those predicted to not correlate
with the inequity measure (see Table 10). The inequity index did not correlate statistically
significantly with PSS scores (r = -.12, p = .05) or perceived control (r = -.03, p = .67).
The inequity index was statistically significantly correlated to personal income (r = .24, p
< .01) and was correlated statistically significantly with self-reported class (r = .30, p <
.01).
Health Prediction
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimensions of both RD and RG will be significantly
correlated with health, as will the alternate hypothesized constructs argued to predict
health (perceived control, perceived stress, status, and income).
Five indicators of health were measured: BMI, self-reported health, self-reported
health respective to participant age, salivary cortisol, and salivary immunoglobulin A
(sIgA). BMI correlated statistically significantly with both self-reported general health (r
= .36, p < .01) and self-reported general health to others of the same age (r = .30, p <
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.01). The self-reported general health question was also statistically significantly
correlated to self-reported general health to others of the same age (r = .76, p < .01).
CORT and sIgA were not statistically significantly correlated to one another (r =
-.07, p = .60). CORT was not correlated statistically significantly to collection time (r = .06, p = .62) or length of time to collect sample (r = -.10, p = .42). Similarly, sIgA was
not significantly correlated to collection time (r = -.06, p = .86) or time to collect sample
(r = .09, p = .46). Samples of sIgA were correlated to age (r =- .23, p = .05) but was not
statistically significantly correlated to any of the hypothesized constructs. As such, the
CORT and sIgA are not included in subsequent analysis.
RD was not significantly correlated to BMI (r = -.08, p = .18). RD was
significantly correlated to self-reported general health (r = .36, p < .01) and self-reported
general health to others of the same age (r = .30, p < .01). Similarly, RG was not
significantly correlated to BMI (r = -.01, p = 82). RG was significantly correlated to selfreported general health (r = .40, p < .01) and self-reported general health to others of the
same age (r = .36, p < .01).
Table 11 includes the correlations of RD, RG, perceived stress, perceived control,
status, and income to the health measures of BMI and the two self-rated health items.
Income was not significantly correlated to any of the health measures. Similarly, neither
PSS nor perceived control scores were correlated significantly to BMI or either selfreported health questions.
Sex differences were obtained in the correlation of self-reported class and health
predictors. With males, self-reported class was not significantly correlated to any of the
health predictors (see Table 11). For females, however, self-reported class was
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significantly correlated to BMI (r = .26, p < .01), self-reported health rating (r = .22, p =
.02), and self-reported health with others of the same age (r = .23, p = .02). Therefore,
this hypothesis was partially supported in the general health ratings were correlated to
inequity measures.
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimensions of both RD and RG will both significantly predict
self-reported health measures as tested through linear multiple regression and contribute
unique variance to the prediction of health in addition to perceived stress and perceived
control.
All status indicators were included in a regression model prediction of health. RD,
RG, status, income, PSS, class, and perceived control scores were included as
independent variables for the prediction of the general health question using standard
linear regression (see Table 12). Only RD and RG were identified as statistically
significant predictors. The model was then re-run with only RD and RG as predictors (R2
= .19; RD B = .04, SE = .01, t = 3.36, p < .01; RG B = .03, SE = .01, t = 4.53, p < .01).
The health prediction estimation model was performed again using RD and RG as
predictors but splitting the sample by sex. The model was significantly predicted by RD
but not RG for females (R2 = .15; RD B = .01, SE = .02, t = .53, p = .60; RG B = .03, SE
= .01, t = 3.26, p < .01) and both RD and RG for males (R2 = .26; RD B = .07, SE = .02, t
= 4.10, p < .01; RG B = .02, SE = .01, t = 3.43, p < .01). Therefore, this hypothesis was
supported.
Hypothesis: The magnitude dimensions of both RD and RG will significantly predict risk
behavior.
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RD and RG were significantly correlated to measures of risk behavior assessing
participants‟ ratings of exercise (see Table 13). RD and RG were not significantly
correlated to alcohol consumption or cigarette use. Regression analysis was performed
separating the sample by sex. For the prediction of exercise rates in females, RD was not
a significant predictor while RG was a significant predictor (R2 = .10; RD B = .003, SE
= .01, t = .23, p = .83; RG B = .02, SE = .01, t = 2.68, p < .01) while for males the inverse
was found; RD was a statistically significant predictor but RG was not (R2 = .05; RD B =
.03, SE = .01, t = 2.65, p < .01; RG B = -.001, SE = .005, t = -.20, p = .84).
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to employ the method of measuring RD and RG
identified in study one and two but with a larger and more diverse sample. Additionally,
other constructs that have been argued to also measure the relationship between inequity
and health were administered to identify which measure best predicts health. To achieve
greater age diversity, both studies three and four recruited participants from DMVs in
Southwestern United States. The first study in this experiment identified the comparison
groups and object that were prominent with the new population. These comparison
groups were: friends, family members, coworkers, previous self, and general; the four
objects of comparison were general, financial, interpersonal, and health. A measure of
RD/RG was designed to measure the perceived inequity of these comparisons, the same
method used in study one. Participants also completed scales measuring the constructs of
perceived control, perceived stress, status (as a measure of social participation), and selfreported income.
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Perceived inequity scores (as well as the RD/RG derivations) did not differ
significantly by ethnicity, sex, age, or education level. Age and education were both
hypothesized to be significantly different by inequity. The failure to obtain support for
this hypothesis suggests that perceived inequity as measured through prominent
comparison groups/objects may be durable to variations in such demographics. This may
be because the measure allows the participant to identify who specifically is making up
each group. For example, a person with an advanced degree may feel the same when
comparing themselves to their friends as someone who did not complete high school
because they both feel they are doing worse than their friends. Both people are likely
considering different people in the comparison but the effect could be the same.
The perceived inequity measure was compared to other constructs identified as
important in the relationship between inequity and health. Perceived stress and perceived
control were not significantly correlated to the inequity measure while self reported class
and income were significantly correlated. In the transformation of RD and RG, RD was
significantly correlated to perceived stress, while RG was not. This supports the notion
that RD and RG are separate constructs and holds with theory that RD may be stressing
(Wilkinson, 2005). Additionally, the correlation with RD/RG and self-reported class and
income demonstrate that a link between perceived inequity and income does exist in an
absolute sense as well.
The relationship between the selected inequity constructs and health were
explored. Health is a challenging construct to measure (Maier & Watkins, 1998; Jones &
Bright, 2001; Wilkinson, 2005). As such, three approaches to measuring health were
considered: immune measures, self-ratings, and BMI. Two immune measures were
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collected through salivary collection: cortisol and sIgA, two biological products related to
both stress and health (Pawlow & Jones, 2005). Salivary collection only occurred in
males and between the hours of 11am and 3pm to control for influences of circadian
rhythm. The immune measures were not found to relate to any of the measured constructs
or demographics (with the exception of age for cortisol). Most immune studies are
performed within-subjects; participants have their immunity tested before and after an
experimental condition (Jones & Bright, 2001). There is likely far too much individual
variation in such immune measures to find a correlation between immune-measures and
the selected social constructs. As such, while ambitious the measures of cortisol and
salivary immunoglobulin A were poor measures of health for the current study.
There were, however, several significant correlations between the self-reported
health items and the constructs predicted to relate to health. Self-reported health has
consistently predicts mortality (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). Two items were used, selfreported health and self-reported health compared to others of the same age. Overall,
these correlations were stronger for the “overall” health assessment than the “same age”
rating. This may be due to the same age item being too narrow in scope. RD, RG, and
self-rated class were all significantly correlated to self-reported health. Perceived control
and perceived stress, however, were not correlated significantly to the self reported health
measures, suggesting the links between stress and control to health, while meaningful and
potentially significant, are not as linearly correlated as the effect of perceived inequity.
Put differently, perceived inequity appears to be a better predictor of health than income,
stress, and control.
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BMI was not found to be significantly related to any of the inequity indexes. Sex
differences were also identified with these correlations. Class was a statistically
significant predictor of health in females for both self-rated health items and BMI (the
only significant correlation found). As self-rated class increased, BMI decreased.
This effect of self-rated class in females is interesting. One explanation is that class is
very meaningful to the health and happiness of females. Another explanation is that the
worse a female‟s health is, the lower their perceived status. Again, the item was self-rated
status, a measure of social participation (the ability to do the things one wants and feels
they should be able to do). A more accurate measure of true class, income, was not
correlated to any of the health measures. As such, there is a relationship between females‟
sense of status and health at suggests it relates to inequity.
Our measures of inequity, RD and RG, support this conclusion by demonstrating
a strong relationship with the health indices. RG was strongly predictive of health
assessments in both men and women. However, RD was more predictive of men‟s selfreported health than women‟s health. The increased strength of the relationship of RD
and health for men than women is noteworthy. Perhaps males are more impacted by
doing worse than their comparison groups. The identification of sex differences in the
strength of the relationship between perceived inequity and health has not been
previously documented and would need to be a consideration for future studies exploring
this link.
To test the strength of the social constructs to predict health among one another,
multiple regression was used to determine which predictors were useful after accounting
for the effects of other predictors. RD and RG consistently emerged as superior predictors
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of health. They were the only two predictors to account for a significant proportion of the
variance of the general health question.
As with the previous study, sex differences were identified. RG did not
significantly predict health in females. This may be due to social facilitation. This
explanation is unlikely as the construct was RG, one‟s sense of gratifications. Perhaps
females felt they would be “showing off” to flaunt their believed successes over others.
Another possibility is that there is a distinct sex difference in the relationship of perceived
inequity and health.
The ability of RD and RG to predict health behaviors was also tested. Health
behaviors are often considered in the relationship between perceived inequity (believed to
be stressing) and health (Bobak et al., 2000; Marmot, 2005; Wilkinson, 2005). Smoking
and alcohol consumption rates were not significantly related nor predicted by RD or RG.
A possible explanation for this lack of effect is that these are two items people may not
feel comfortable disclosing or are not aware of how much they do smoke cigarettes and
consume alcohol. Exercise rates, however, were significantly predicted by RD and RG.
Again, sex differences emerged. Only RD was predictive of exercise rates in males while
RG was only predictive of exercise rates in females.
There were several limitations to this study. The measurement model required
testing the population at one point in time, determining prominent comparison groups and
objects, and then retesting the sample with those prominent groups considered. The
population may have fundamentally changed between testing sessions, reducing the
reliability of the measure. Additionally, as the test is self-report in nature, social
facilitation is a concern. Participants may not be aware of their comparisons or are not

186

willing to discuss them. This is a well discussed concern in social comparison research
(Wood, 1996). The relationship between this measurement approach and social
facilitation should be explored. Additionally, alternatives to such a direct model of
measurement should also be explored now that this approach has been supported as a
usable method.
This study established that the “global RD/RG” approach to measuring perceived
inequity is a reasonably reliable and valid measure. The measures reliability over time
was alpha level = .94. The internal consistency was high and indicated that the inter-item
correlation was very strong. The scale was consistently measuring the same construct
with each item. . The measure manifested strong construct validity. It was strongly
correlated to class. Additionally, this model can be employed for measuring inequity
related health disparities as determined by the strong correlation to health measures as
well as the superior variance accounted for by RD and RG over other social inequity
measures such as perceived stress, perceived control, perceived status, and personal
income. Additionally, sex differences were obtained in the relationship between
perceived inequity and health, a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Further research
should identify alternative methods of measuring global RD and RG to identify if the
self-report method is causing the sex differences or if these are real differences in how
females and males are affected by inequity. A “global” measure of RD and RG derived
from prominent comparisons predicts health and is a critical step towards understanding
the role of perceived inequity in health disparities.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research was to test the feasibility of a comparison-based selfreport measure of RD and RG, identify the ability of such a measure to predict health,
and to test this predictability against alternative constructs that have been argued to
predict health. To accomplish these goals, a measure of RD and RG based on prominent
social comparisons was developed. Measures of health were identified and the ability of
the new measure to predict health was identified. Then this measurement approach was
tested with a more demographically diverse sample along with other measures of
constructs that have been argued by other researchers to predict health.
Health and inequity seem to be linked, and this goes beyond objective conditions.
In our study, income and self-reported health had virtually no relationship. Income
appears to be related to health but once basic needs are met this relationship diminishes
(Wilkinson, 2005). Marmot contended that the perceived control and social participation
were the cause of status-linked health disparities. Stress may also be the agent that affects
health through influencing the body‟s immune response (Maier & Watkins, 1998).
Research has identified a effect relationship between inequality and health but not
how it occurs. This effect would require a psychological process by which seemingly
arbitrary possession disparities result in concrete health disparities. The psychological
processes of relative deprivation (RD) and gratification (RG) may be such processes‟. RD
is the sense that one is feeling deprived, regardless of objective conditions. The converse
is RG, in which one feels better about their condition. Both processes may be created
through social comparisons with others. RD may create stress that over time can lower a
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person‟s baseline immunity while RG increases one‟s ability to cope with stress (thereby
acting as a buffer to the health effects of stress). RD and RG-distress and gratification
(respectively) derived from inequity- belong among these constructs as essential to
understanding the relationship between inequity and health.
Previous measures of RD and RG were not suitable for the current study. Multiple
measures of RD have emerged due to the various definitions of the construct. Stoufer et
al. (1949) vaguely described RD, leaving subsequent researchers to develop their own
definitions and subsequent measures. Runciman‟s (1966) definition of RD was based
from the following logic: “If relative deprivation is to be precisely described, all
inequalities which give rise to feelings of relative deprivation must be treated as
inequalities between and only between the membership reference group and comparative
reference group” (p. 14). Gurr (1970), conversely, chose objective measures of RD. RD
was derived from expectations, Gurr argued, and these expectations could be measured
through “status quo” indexes such as income. Objective-based approaches to measuring
RD, however, have been discounted. Merton and Kitt (1950) described RD as a
conclusion derived from comparisons to referents, and one has no guarantee that
objective conditions are indeed creating RD. Research has gravitated towards supporting
a reference-based approach of measuring RD and the inverse, RG (Guimond & Dambrun,
2002; Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, and Mèot, 2006).
A similar comparison-based approach was selected for the current research
design, though none of the existing measures of RD were appropriate as all were
designed for specific test questions and narrow situations. No “general” RD/RG measure
was identified. As such, a measure of RD/RG was designed. In the planning stages of
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developing the measure, the role of social comparison was explored. The construct of
one‟s comparisons to others had been argued as necessary to RD by most of the RD
researchers (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966; Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan, 1977). The
comparison groups and objects people employ- those likely to elicit feelings such as RD
and RG- are unique for each person (Wood, 1996).
A social comparison approach to measuring status assumes that the health effects
of status are derived from perception of status instead of or beyond the absolute effects of
status. However, there are two benefits to measuring social position with such a
“perceptive” approach. The first is the flexibility of such a measure across diverse
groups. In the Whitehall studies of British civil servants, social position was easily
measured through civil service rankings (Marmot, 2003). Pay grade was a near mirror
image of status. However, in groups with a variety of professions and interests, the
estimation of social position becomes more difficult. In this regard, perceptive measures
may be more precise than researcher derived calculations. Given the possible influence of
social comparison on health, a clear understanding of the relationship between these two
constructs is beneficial for understanding health disparities. Identifying prominent
comparisons is an appropriate starting point as the effects of social comparisons are likely
derived from the comparisons the individual finds most meaningful.
An overall scale of RD/RG, a so-called “global” measure that was based on social
comparisons, would therefore require being able to identify prominent comparison
groups and objects of comparison for each person. Rather, we took the approach of
identifying the prominent comparison groups and objects within a population, andthen
developing an inequity measure around those groups and objects. The goal of such an
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approach was to not fully measure RD and RG within each person but measure an overall
sense of RD/RG.
Runciman (1966) contended that RD was made up on “magnitude” and
“intensity”. Magnitude was the extent of the disparity while intensity was the degree of
distress caused. These dimensions were included in our measure. Participants rated how
they were doing compared to a selected comparison group by a given object. This was to
measure the “magnitude” component of RD/RG. Such a method creates the possibility
that a participant does not compare themselves to any of the groups or objects selected by
the population. As such, a follow up item was included in which participants rated the
degree to which such a comparison impacted them. This follow up item was designed to
measure the “intensity” component of RD/RG.
The RD/RG measure was derived through two stages. First, the population of
interest was surveyed for prominent comparison groups and objects. A self-rating
approach was employed by which participants rated the degree to which they care about
comparisons towards groups and objects deemed by previous research to be prominent.
Additionally, participants were encouraged to volunteer groups and objects they use for
comparison to identify additional comparisons. Second, the RD/RG measure was created
in which items were created to measure the perceived inequity perceived compared to
each group by each object. Participants rated each such comparison from “-3” to “3”.
Negative scores denoted RD while positive scores were interpreted as RG.
This method of measuring RD and RG was first tested with college students from a
southwestern university in the United States. Prominent comparison groups were friends,
family members, coworkers, previous self, celebrities/athletes, members of the same
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gender, and general. The five prominent objects of comparison were general, financial,
interpersonal, achievements, and appearance.
These groups were used for the creation of a perceived inequity measure.
Additionally, a measure of belief in a just world (BJW) and self-reported income was
used for the construct validation of the scale. Perceived inequity was hypothesized to
correlate to BJW and not to income, and that hypothesis was supported in the study. The
RD and RG derivations correlated to measures of health. However, this study suffered
from the limited age variation in the sample. Also, the measures of health were
encouraging but limited. Therefore, we sought to duplicate the study with a sample
containing a greater age range and using more sophisticated health measures.
Our method of measuring RD and RG was applied to a more diverse population
through sampling at DMVs in a southwest city in the United States. As the population of
study had changed, the prominent comparison groups and objects identified in study one
using college students, were generally replicated with a the more representative general
population. However, several differences emerged. may not be accurate. As such, the
assessment of prominent comparison groups and objects was repeated. With this study
the prominent comparison groups that emerged were friends, family members,
coworkers, previous self, and general. The four prominent objects of comparison that
emerged were general, financial, interpersonal, and health. Unlike the previous sample,
members of the same gender and celebrities/athletes did not emerge as prominent groups.
As for objects, appearances did not emerge as prominent but a related object, health, did.
This illustrates the importance of the prominent group/object assessment of the RD/RG
measurement as well as emphasizing a link between health and social comparison as
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many people in the sample are consciously aware and admit to making comparisons to
others regarding their health. The approach identified here was valid but laborious- each
measure of RD/RG would require two studies- one to identify prominent comparison
groups and objects and another to test the perceived inequity. However, between both
experiments several groups and objects were present in both; comparisons such as those
to friends, coworkers and family and along such dimensions as money, interpersonal, and
an overall sense of doing well to others. These groups and objects could suffice as a
global measure of RD/RG. Further research is needed to evaluate this possibility.
A scale to measure perceived inequity was derived from the above comparison groups
and objects. Having previously established a relationship of our perceived inequity
measure to health with a less demographically diverse sample, we sought to not only
identify if this relationship held with the new sample, but also to test the strength of this
relationship compared to other constructs that had been hypothesized to predict health.
Income, perceived stress, perceived control, and social participation were measured.
Income was measured through self-reported income. Perceived stress was measured
(Cohen, Karmarck, & Memelstein, 1983) along with perceived control (Bobak, Pikhart,
Rose, Hertzman, & Marmot, 2000). Social participation, the act of doing and affording
the things one thinks they ought to be able to, does not have a pre-established scale but is
similar to one‟s perceived status (Marmot, 2005). The self-reported perceived inequity
scale and the RD/RG derivations differently correlated to the related measures. RD was
strongly associated with stress scores. RD may be stressing but RG does not seem
therapeutic as there was no strong relationship between RG and PSS scores. Income was
strongly related to RD and very strongly related to RG, but there is potential for overlap
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in variance as income was an object of comparison in the scale. However, income is tied
to one‟s sense of inequity. Status, the measure of social participation, was strongly related
to RD and RG.
The strong relationships identified between these constructs suggest they are
important towards understanding health inequities. Measuring health, however, is
difficult because there is no one universal measure of health (Jones & Bright, 2001). A
strong predictor of mortality and health problems is self-reported health (Idler, &
Benyamini, 1997). This item was included along with self-reported health compared to
others the same age. Additionally, efforts were made to measure health through objective
indicators. BMI was calculated for each participant from reported height and weight and
salivary cortisol and immunoglobulin A (sIgA) were measured. While the BMI and
neuro-endocrine measures were not tied to any of the social constructs, the strongest of
the health measures to the inequity constructs was self-reported health. Using regression
analyses to evaluate the ability of each of the proposed inequity measures to predict
health, RD and RG emerged as stronger predictors of health than income, perceived
stress, perceived control, and social participation.
The underlying mechanisms that support the relationship between inequity and health
are profoundly influential but not understood. The current research was an effort to
identify if RD and RG can predict health and how well this measure predicts health when
considered among other constructs that are also theorized to be tied to health inequities.
Our measures of RD and RG were derived from the targeted study of the prominent
comparison groups and objects. The measure was an attempt to directly measure
individual‟s perceived inequity rather than inferring perceived inequity as is measured
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with constructs such as perceived stress and social participation. The strength of such an
approach is the measurement of the perception of inequity. This was accomplished
through evaluating social-comparison derived inequities and considering such
conclusions the equivalent of RD and RG. Moving forward, the durability of this
relationship should be tested. If these effects could be diminished through education
about such an effect, then perception could also be the means to reduce health inequities.
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APPENDIX 1
IRB APPROVALS
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Table 1
Descriptives and t-test values for groups and objects of comparison against a score of
“2” (value equivalent of “I care a little about this group”)
Comparison
Groups

Mean Std deviation

t

Cohen’s d

Coworkers

2.70

1.15

8.64**

0.61

Friends

3.43

1.10

18.38**

1.30

Family members

3.25

1.18

15.05**

1.06

Previous self

3.45

1.20

17.12**

1.21

Members of same religion

1.32

1.40

-6.89**

-0.49

Fictional characters

1.55

1.29

-4.91**

-0.35

2.79

.83

13.88**

0.95

Financial

2.22

1.01

3.11**

0.22

Interpersonal

2.79

.85

13.11**

0.93

Objects General

** p < .01
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Table 2
ANOVA values for groups and objects of comparison by gender
Sum of
Comparison

Mean
df

Squares
Groups

Coworkers

Between

F
Square

2.18

1

2.18

260.62

199

1.31

262.80

200

.24

1

.02

243.23

199

1.22

243.25

200

.05

1

.05

275.17

199

1.39

275.22

200

<.001

1

1.66

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
Friends

Between

.02

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
Family

Between

.04

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
Previous Self Between

198

<. 001

< .001

Groups
Within

289.56

199

1.45

289.56

200

9.21

1

9.21

378.40

199

1.92

Total

387.62

200

Fictional

Between

10.83

1

10.83

character

Groups
323.09

199

1.62

333.92

200

.13

1

145.69
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145.81
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`1.70

1

Groups
Total
Same

Between

Religion

Groups
Within

4.80*

Groups

Within
Groups
Total
Objects

General

Between

.18

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
Financial

Between

199

1.69

6.68*

Groups
Within

199.69

198

201.40

199

2.99

1

143.17

199

146.17

200

Groups
Total
Interpersonal

Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Total

* p < .05, ** p < .01

200

4.16*

Table 3
Means and descriptives for Consequences of Social Comparison scale and subscales,
HSCL-30, BJW, self-reported health, and income
Scale

n

Mean

Consequences of Social 238 71.90

Std. Dev
59.76

Comparison
Magnitude

244 33.98

30.26

RD Magnitude

246 -10.52

10.52

RG Magnitude

246 44.42

22.32

238 37.24

32.85

RD Intensity

238 -9.40

11.09

RG Intensity

238 46.58

25.77

HSCL-30

246 4.88

4.07

BJW

246 29.86

5.51

Self-reported health

244 7.92

1.36

Income

213 19976.82 21207.53

Intensity

HSCL-30: Hopkins Symptomology Checklist 30 Questions
BJW: Belief in a Just World
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Table 4
Correlations of Perceived Inequity and Validity Indices
BJW

Income Self-reported HSCL-30
health

Consequence of Comparison .35**

.13

.42**

-.38**

Magnitude

.36**

.13

.41**

-.35**

RD

.32**

.07

.30**

-.40**

RG

.34**

.14*

.41**

-.29**

Intensity

.32**

.12

.40**

-.37**

RD

.27**

.07

.24**

-.42**

RG

.29**

.12

.41**

-.29**

* P < .05, ** P < .01
HSCL-30: Hopkins Symptomology Checklist 30 Questions
BJW: Belief in a Just World
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Table 5
Descriptives and t-test values for groups and objects of comparison
Comparison
Groups

Mean Std deviation

t

Cohen‟s d

Coworkers

2.36

1.48

3.08**

0.24

Friends

3.03

1.48

8.81**

0.70

Family members

3.18

1.50

9.89**

0.79

Previous self

3.51

1.48

12.96**

1.02

Members of same religion

1.67

1.67

-2.50*

-0.20

Fictional characters

.90

1.29

-10.77**

-0.85

2.53

1.02

6.62**

.52

Financial

2.27

1.21

2.84**

.22

Interpersonal

2.51

1.14

5.76**

.45

Objects General

*p < .05, **p < .01

203

Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Comparison Groups by Gender
Comparison

Sum of Squares

df

Mean

F

Square
Groups

Coworkers

Between

4.70

1

4.70

340.63

157

2.17

Total

345.33

158

Between

4.31

1

4.21

339.74

157

2.16

Total

343.95

158

Between

.86

1

.86

355.76

157

2.26

Total

356.62

158

Between

1.70

1

2.17

Groups
Within
Groups

Friends

1.95

Groups
Within
Groups

Family

.38

Groups
Within
Groups

Previous Self
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1.70

.78

Groups
Within

343.12

157

2.19

Total

344.81

158

Same

Between

5.64

1

5.64

Religion

Groups
434.03

157

2.77

Total

439.67

158

Famous

Between

7.86

1

7.86

People

Groups
254.31

157

1.62

Total

262.17

158

Between

3.37

1

3.37

159.95

157

1.02

Total

163.32

158

Between

3.66

1

Groups

Within

2.04

Groups

Within

4.85**

Groups

Objects

General

3.31

Groups
Within
Groups

Financial

205

3.66

2.51

Groups
Within

229.19

157

1.46

Total

232.85

158

Between

.58

1

.58

205.02

157

1.31

205.60

158

Groups

Interpersonal

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
** p < .01

206

.45

Table 7
Analysis of Variance of Comparison Groups by Age
Comparison

Sum of Squares

df

Mean

F

Square
Groups

Coworkers

Between

5.71

3

1.90

339.62

155

2.19

Total

345.33

158

Between

4.00

3

1.34

339.95

155

2.19

Total

343.95

158

Between

3.31

3

1.10

353.31

155

2.28

Total

356.62

158

Between

6.54

3

.87

Groups
Within
Groups

Friends

.61

Groups
Within
Groups

Family

.69

Groups
Within
Groups

Previous Self
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2.18

1.00

Groups
Within

338.27

155

2.18

Total

344.81

158

Same

Between

33.13

3

11.04

Religion

Groups
406.53

155

2.62

Total

439.67

158

Famous

Between

6.86

3

2.29

People

Groups
255.30

155

1.65

Total

262.17

158

Between

2.57

3

.86

160.76

155

1.04

Total

163.32

158

Between

4.39

3

Groups

Within

4.21**

Groups

Within

1.39

Groups

Objects

General

.83

Groups
Within
Groups

Financial
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1.46

.99

Groups
Within

228.46

155

1.47

Total

232.85

158

Between

4.28

3

1.43

201.32

155

1.30

205.60

158

Groups

Interpersonal

Groups
Within
Groups
Total
** p < .01

209

1.10

Table 8
Differences by Age Group on Rating of “Members of the Same Religion”
Group

n

M

SD

18-24

25-34

35-49

Over 49

rating by
age group
18-24

43

1.30

1.50

NS

NS

NS

*

25-34

45

1.44

1.50

NS

NS

NS

*

35-49

51

1.74

1.80

NS

NS

NS

NS

Over 49

20

2.78

1.73

*

*

NS

NS

Note: NS = nonsignificant differences between pairs of means, while an asterisk (*) =
significance using Tukey HSD with alpha of .05.

210

Table 9
Means and descriptives for Consequences of Social Comparison scale and subscales,
PSS, Perceived control, and income
Scale

n

Mean

Consequences of Social 266 31.12

Std. Dev
23.00

Comparison
RD

266 -4.70

8.11

RG

266 35.84

17.80

PSS

266 19.84

7.44

Perceived control

266 39.86

6.60

Income

234 34267.77 32949.97
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Table 10
Correlations of Perceived Inequity and Validity Indices
PSS
Consequence of

Perceived control Income

Class

-.12

-.03

.24**

.30**

RD

-.18**

-.06

.17*

.31**

RG

-.08

-.005

.24**

.25**

Comparison

* P < .05, ** P < .01
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Table 11
Correlations of Perceived Inequity and Validity Indices Split by Sex
BMI
Income

General Health General Health of Same Age

.08

.03

.05

Females

.03

.09

.17

Males

.07

-.01

-.01

-.04

-.10

-.12

Females

-.14

-.11

-.09

Males

.09

-.07

-.09

Perceived

-.04

-.02

-.08

Females

-.15

-.06

-.16

Males

-.009

-.008

-.06

-.06

.14*

.07

-.26**

.22*

.23*

.06

.09

-.03

-.08

.36**

.30**

Females

-.13

.24*

.22*

Males

-.05

.46**

.37**

-.01

.40**

.36**

Females

-.03

.38**

.41**

Males

.03

.43**

.35**

PSS

control

Class
Females
Males
RD

RG

* P < .05, ** P < .01
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Table 12
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for General Health (n = 224)
β

Variable

B

SE(B)

t

Income

.00

.00

-.11 -1.76

.08

Class

.02

.03

.03

.62

PSS

-.02

.02

-.08 -1.31

.10

PC

-.01

.02

-.02

-.31

.75

RD

.05

.01

.23

3.26

< .01

RG

.03

.01

.32

4.55

< .01

.50

Sig. (p)

R2 = .24.
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Table 13
Summary of Correlations of RD and RG to Risk Behaviors (n = 266)
Variable

RD

RG

Drinking alcohol

-.05

-.08

Rate of exercise

.20** .16**

Cigarette smoking

-.07

-.08

Not wearing seatbelt

-.06

-.12

* P < .05, ** P < .01
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